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ABSTRACT
For over 40 years Europe and the rest of the world were divided into 
spheres of influence by two military superpowers. Bi-polarity and nuclear 
deterrence formed the basis of the international security system. They also 
gave rise to an arms race which resulted in the destabilization of the 
economies of both the Soviet Union and the United States. It gradually 
became apparent that 'war' was no longer a cost effective tool of policy, that 
international relations had to be conducted in a different manner.
As part of this latter process Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1991, proposed an 
alternative system, one which would be based on a reduction of military 
strength, the abandonment of ideological confrontation and an increase in 
the level of cooperation between states. This thesis examines the steps 
taken by the Soviet Union and its successor, Russia, to implement this 
alternative regime. Of particular interest to this study are their 
consequential attempts to reduce their armed forces and convert defence 
production.
The groundwork is laid for this examination with a discussion in 
Chapter One on the nature of security. It is generally acknowledged that a 
state's security is defined in terms of political and economic stability as well 
as by the ability to physically defend itself. During the Cold War, however, 
excessive emphasis was placed upon physical security through military 
rather than economic means. The writings on security of Carl von 
Clausewitz and Niccolo Machiavelli are examined for their relevance to 
the security policies form ulated during the governments of Vladimir 
Lenin and Mikhail Gorbachev. Lenin and his successors were influenced 
by Clausewitz, viewing war as an important instrument of state policy. 
Gorbachev rejected this approach on the basis that it had become too costly, 
in hum an and economic terms, to be used in the modern day. He strongly 
urged that peace be used in its place.
The central argument is that war and peace are more than just tools 
of policy, they also have the power to form the foundation of the state. 
The way in which a state perceives the purpose of war will in turn affect 
the way in which it pursues peace and disarmament. Although Gorbachev 
recognized the cost of the war system and supported the transition to 
peaceful means of cooperation, he failed to understand the depth to which 
society was affected by the preparation for war. In Chapter Two, the 
literature on the role of m ilitary-industrial complexes in society is 
reviewed as is that literature which analyses the best possible way to 
transform or convert the defence sector. As a result of this survey an ideal 
conversion programme is proposed.
Chapter Three details the rapid pace of disarmament by reviewing 
the INF, CFE, START I & II Treaties and unilateral actions. This is not 
meant to be a detailed account of the disarmament process but an outline
iv
of the resulting changes inflicted upon the Soviet armed forces, i.e. 
unem ploym ent and pension payments and the costs of destroying 
weapons and restructuring the armed forces. This examiniation continues 
in Chapters 5 and 6 with a discussion of the theoretical and practical aspects 
of the Soviet and Russian conversion programmes.
Based on these studies the conclusion is reached that the expected 
peace dividend need not be illusory and that peace can be used as both a 
tool of policy and the foundation of the state. However, it can only happen 
if, among other things, disarmament and conversion are properly 
prepared and managed. Returning troops can be absorbed into the 
employment and housing markets and defence manufacturing can be 
transformed to meet civilian needs. But when these plans are not made 
and executed, a society becomes disillusioned with the peace dividend.
V
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to take this opportunity to thank certain 
individuals for their support. Professor Stephen White 
and Mrs. Tanya Frisby deserve special mention. Their 
willingness to offer both encouragement and constructive 
criticism were of immeasurable value. The same could be 
said of Professor William Wallace who not only assisted 
me in my research but offered me the opportunity, on 
several occasions, to make my ideas known to academics 
and m ilitary personnel alike. The exchange of ideas 
helped to further my research. I would also like to extend 
my thanks to Dr. Evelin Rubinskaia of the Rostov 
Institute of National Economy. She had the rare ability to 
open seemingly closed doors. Finally, I would like to 
thank my husband and my family for their love and 
support. Thank you all.
VI
PREFACE
The fraying of the "iron curtain" in the late 1980s appeared to herald a new 
age in international security. The shift from communism to liberal democratic 
forms of government and the conclusion of various disarmament treaties by 
members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact was welcomed by politicians and 
citizens alike. Although the basic definition of state security did not change, the 
em phasis on certain factors clearly did. It was hoped that ideological
confrontation and m ilitary competition would no longer be the prim ary 
determinants of a state's security and position within the international arena.
•;ïThey would be replaced by economic and political health and stability. Although
',ÿthese two aspects had always been part of the security equation their value had
been diminished to a certain extent during the cold war. With the end of that 
confrontation it was believed that that equation could finally be re-evaluated.
In performing that exercise, however, governments would have to assess 
the effect of the cold war on their societies. The much trum peted positive
z;outcome was, of course, the peace dividend. The term implies a financial gain, 
yet the size of the windfall is reliant upon the basic structure and flexibility of any 
given state's economic system. During the 1960s and 1970s both Soviet and 
western analysts presumed that the benefits of disarmament could be achieved 
fairly easily, without any major structural adjustments to the economy. It has q 
become increasingly apparent, however, that some form of structural adjustment 
must be made. Furthermore, in order to enjoy the benefits of the dividend more 
money m ust be paid into the defence sector in order to facilitate the 
decommissioning and conversion of certain weapons systems and resultant 
technology and the transfer and retraining of m ilitary and defence sector 
personnel. The fact that additional money is required before the benefits of a
Vll "ïi
peace dividend are enjoyed by society is one generally overlooked by politicians 
in their statements on the subject and in their initial budget allocations.
As a result, the sector which is relied upon so heavily during periods of 
conflict is given short shrift once the danger has passed. Thus the military- 
industrial complex, in its broadest sense including personnel from the 
enterprises and the armed forces is forced to defend its position at home, 
attempting to protect wages and employment numbers. The complex appears 
obstructionist, preventing society as a whole from enjoying its much needed and 
desired peace dividend. Yet it is important to remember that members of the 
complex are also members of society. If the transition from a war economy to a 
peace economy is not m anaged successfully the repercussions will be felt 
throughout society and the peace dividend in its political, economic and social 
forms will prove illusory.
This thesis is an examination of a security system in transition. Soviet 
security from 1917 until the late 1980s was defined primarily in terms of military 
force capability, and, to a lesser extent, by the economic well-being of the citizenry. 
Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU from 1985 to 1991, came to the 
conclusion that continued military development, to the exclusion of economic 
health and stability, was no longer a viable policy option. Thus he began to 
promote a programme of disarmament and conversion. A policy which was 
continued by Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia.
The thesis begins with an assessment of various definitions of security. 
The writings of Clausewitz, Machiavelli and Lenin come under particular 
scrutiny. The thesis then progresses to a review of the literature on conversion. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Jahn, Aspaturian and Doernberg argued that conversion
Vlll
could be accomplished w ithout any major structural change to the Soviet- 
economic system because a military-industrial complex did not exist within the 
Soviet Union. This assessment of the relationship of the defence complex with 
the command-administrative economic system was not sufficiently accurate. 
They claimed that there was no bureaucratic or military opposition which 
would prevent defence reform and conversion. This was clearly not the case. 
Subsequent writers, like Izyumov and Kireyev, recognised the existence of a 
Soviet military-industrial complex. Based on their more accurate descriptions of 
the state of the defence sector an hypothesis is put forward. In both the United 
States and the Soviet Union government was very m uch involved in the 
operations of the m ilitary-industrial complex. Indeed a form of state 
managerial capitalism existed in both systems. Since this had been the case it 
would prove impossible for the Soviet, and subsequently Russian, government 
to suddenly adopt a "hands-off" policy towards the defence enterprises as they 
proceeded to convert. For conversion to succeed a new industrial policy which 
incorporated an economic bill of rights would need to be drafted. This thesis 
argues that not only do the needs of the defence enterprises and their staffs need 
to be addressed but so too do the needs of military personnel. This is a departure 
from much of the literature on conversion, which is primarily concerned with 
the enterprises.
Conversion is, however, more than an economic issue, it can have both 
social and political repercussions. This conclusion is supported by the evidence 
provided in chapters three through six. The m anner in which m ilitary 
personnel have been retired, w ith insufficient pensions and in some cases 
without any remuneration at all, has led to social and political unease. Military 
personnel have established their own unions in order to lobby for better 
treatment, an act unheard of in most armed forces.(1) Others have turned to
IX
Xsupport one of the myriad nationalist political parties.(2) It is, perhaps, still too 
early to predict with any confidence what will be the long-term development 
path of the Russian political system, however, certain assumptions have been 
made about the rise of Vladimir Zhirinovsky of the Liberal Democratic Party and 
his support among the armed forces. There is concern in the West over the 
possible rise of fascism in Russia. If this was to occur then there would probably | |
be a return to an ideologically confrontational world arena and a corresponding 
arms race.
A lthough conversion has not proved as successful as originally 
anticipated it will continue to be a factor in Russian economic reform. The 
policies which are implemented in the next few years and the support given to 
enterprises by the government and foreign aid agencies will determine the 
future of conversion and the long-term stability of the sector and perhaps of the 
state.
Source material for this study has been varied. Most of the information has been 
gathered from Soviet periodicals and government legislation. It has been 
supplem ented by material gained through personal interviews, unpublished 
reports and news and documentary programmes. The titles for Russian sources 
have been transliterated in accordance with the "Soviet Studies" style. It should 
also be pointed out that notes are in an abbreviated form at the conclusion of 
each chapter. Full details of the texts are provided in the bibliography.
1. Interview with Valerian Nesterov, Head International Department, Russian 
Federation of Independent Trade Union of Servicemen Central Committee, 
November 5, 1994.
2. There are approximately 80 nationalist parties or organisations currently 
operating in Russia. They range from tsarist nationalist, soviet nationalist and 
military nationalist parties.
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CHAPTER ONE 
ON THE NATURE OF SECURITY: 
THE BALANCE BETWEEN MILITARY POWER 
A ND  POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
CAPABILITY
The implementation of a conversion programme by Mikhail Gorbachev 
and the Soviet government between 1988 and 1991 would prove to have far 
reaching consequences for every sector of society. The political and economic 
repercussions of that policy are still being felt today by the former Soviet 
republics. In order to understand why the transition from an "armed economy 
to a disarmed economy" has been so difficult for the Soviet Union and its 
successors it is first necessary to assess the way in which the state defined security 
and viewed the use of military power.
Generally, a state's security is defined in terms of political and economic 
stability as well as by the ability to physically defend itself. (1) These elements are 
intertw ined, making it impossible to consider any one of them in complete 
isolation. Ideally, each should receive equal consideration and the 
government's objective should be to achieve an optimum balance of priorities. 
Both during and after the Cold War it was argued that the United States and the 
Soviet Union failed to achieve this balance of priorities by placing excessive 
emphasis on physical security. Japan and Germany are viewed as the real 
winners, for they are the two nations which appear to have been the most 
successful in re-writing the equation for security. While a reasonable level of 
economic growth has always been necessary in order to underwrite military 
security, the development of the economy is no longer seen as simply a means to
sensitive to and influenced by these conditions.
1
■ÏIan end but rather an end in itself. This does not mean that the desire of the world's nation states to possess their own armed forces has declined. There is, 
rather, an increasing awareness that for a nation to be strong it must have more 
than a sizable armed force: it must also have a healthy and well-structured
economy and a stable political system. As the two principal protagonists in the
:Cold War, the United States and the former Soviet Union (FSU) are most
The Cold War can be viewed in two ways: either as an actual confrontation 
between two ideologically and militarily opposed powers or as a system for 
international relations.(2) For the purposes of this discussion the former 
definition is of primary importance. Although the United States and the Soviet 
Union did not engage in open warfare, the level of preparedness necessary to 
"keep the peace" by means of nuclear and conventional deterrents arguably took 
a heavy toll on the financial, technological and ideological cultures of both 
nations. Both the US and FSU must go through a transition period similar to 
that experienced by Germany and Japan after World War II. Ideally, priorities 
should be reassessed. This thesis will attempt to analyse the effect that the Soviet 
Union's pursuit of physical security had on its political and economic stability. 
The question that will be asked in this thesis is how a shift in emphasis from 
military power to political and economic development can best be managed in 
order to guarantee the continued stability and security of the state. The search 
for an answer begins in this chapter with an examination of the various 
definitions of security.
TWO VIEWS OF MILITARY POWER
John Garnett in his contribution to Contemporary Strategy: Theories and 
Concepts (1987) has outlined the various roles of military power. He defines
military power as a "legally sanctioned instrument of violence that governments
the complex relationship between the use of military power and the status of the 
state provides a model to which the Soviet Union can be seen to be related.
W ithin the physical battle, however, lies a contest of emotions, a clash of
use in their relations w ith each other, and, when necessary, in an internal 
security role".(3) Military power has four distinct uses: as a method of pursuing 
foreign policy objectives, as a symbol of national prestige, as an instrument of 
national unity and as a means for ensuring security.(4) Garnett is primarily 
concerned with the foreign policy role of military power, but a thorough 
understanding of Soviet military policy requires analyses of all four uses. Of 
particular value in such analyses are the writings on war or military power of
Carl von Clausewitz and Niccolo Machiavelli. Their detailed examinations of ?
.
W riting in 1832, Carl von Clausewitz did not speak in terms of military
spower but rather in terms of war, and he was primarily concerned with how war 
could be used to achieve foreign policy objectives. For Clausewitz war was 
simply the physical confrontation of two opponents. The ultimate goal of this 
meeting was to "compel [the ] enemy to do [one's] will".(5)
wills. Clausewitz believed that "the advance of civilisation had done nothing 
practical to alter or deflect the impulse to destroy the enemy, which is central to 
the very idea of war."(6) The word "impulse" is in itself indicative of an 
emotional response, a whim, or desire. Calculated political moves more often 
than not cause countries to enter into war, but emotions inspire men to battle. 
"Hostile feelings and hostile intentions" motivate m en to fight.(7) One 
country's "hostile intentions" will invariably provoke a hostile response from its 
opponent. Force will be met by counter-force, which in turn will generate a 
reciprocal action, and thus the severity of the response will continue to escalate.
This emotional spiral can be halted when one side is able to disarm its 
enemy. Clausewitz said that war was the method by which a state compelled an 
enem y to do its will. Consequently, the enemy m ust be m ade literally 
defenceless or at least be put in a position that made this danger probable in order 
to overcome his will. Once the adversary had been overcome then the terms of 
peace could be dictated.(8) Naturally enough, peace treaties are negotiated from 
positions of strength. This fact means that peace treaties are generally perceived 
by the defeated nation to be inherently unfair. For example the Peace of 
Versailles, which concluded World War I, was perceived and portrayed by Hitler 
and his supporters as unfair to the German nation. The Germans felt that they i 
had been branded as solely responsible for the events of the first World War, and 
that the redistribution of their lands and colonies and the demands for war 
reparations were excessive.(9) Hitler's initial policy was to right these perceived 
wrongs.
The First World War and its resulting treaties provided the basis for the 
foreign policy of the European nations as well as setting the stage for the internal 
politics of Germany. A hundred years earlier Clausewitz had addressed this type
Iof situation. He concluded that war, although an instrument of policy, could, in 
and of itself, create new political situations. War, he argued, was always derived 
from some political situation, "and the occasion is always due to some political 
object. War, therefore, is an act of policy."(10) In the opinion of Clausewitz, 
when all other political methods fail, countries resort to war. This deadliest of 
"tools" was nothing more than a political instrument. While policy permeated 
all military operations it could also be argued that the possibility of military 
operations permeated all policy. Many nations maintain a constant state of 
readiness for war. Clausewitz denied that one would want to "consider the
.
whole business of maintenance and administration as part of the actual conduct 
of war. "(11) By defining war in such a narrow context, by claiming that it was 
"nothing but a duel on a large scale", and that "countless duels go up to make a 
war", Clausewitz had no choice but to exclude the business of maintenance and 
administration. As a result of technological advancements in warfare the 
business of maintenance and administration became a primary concern. In order 
to deter aggression a state must appear constantly ready to fight.
Garnett's definition, as quoted above, of war as an instrument of policy has 
strong echoes of Clausewitz's theory. Of particular significance for Soviet 
defence policy, however, were two of Clausewitz's other concepts, also outlined 
above. These are (1) that war is an act of force to compel the enemy to do our 
will; and, (2) that war is caused by political situations and objectives. Lenin 
modified these principles to fit the prevailing circumstances but the core ideas 
remained, as will be discussed later.
Turning our attention to Machiavelli, his sixteenth century view gave 
war, or military power, a greater political content than the definition put forward 
by Clausewitz. Machiavelli saw war not simply as a battle but as a basis of the 
state. "The main foundations of every state...are good laws and good arms."(12) 
It was his contention that if a state did not have the means to protect its civic 
institutions that state would soon collapse. So important was it to protect the 
institutions of government that he advised that a study of warfare should be 
"pursued as an exercise in peacetime and as a necessity and for glory in 
wartime."(13) The theories of Clausewitz and Machiavelli are at odds over the 
maintenance and administration of the armed forces. While Clausewitz did not 
hold these tasks to be unim portant, he did not feel that there was sufficient 
justification for their inclusion within the narrow context of his definition. For
Machiavelli these issues were inherent in his statement concerning the study of 
war. If a commander did not understand the basic principles of administering 
and leading his forces during peacetime he would never be prepared for actual 
combat. Machiavelli supported force reductions so long as the basic framework 
of the armed forces was maintained.
It was Machiavelli's contention that the level of military preparedness was 
derived in part from a state's need for respect. If a state did not have the respect 
of its neighbours, if it appeared weak, then it would invite aggression. The very 
theory of deterrence is based upon this precept. The object is to amass such 
firepower that an opponent would never think to engage in battle. The policies 
of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War perfectly 
illustrated Machiavelli's argument. The US and the former USSR, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Warsaw Pact (WTO) tried to formulate 
their doctrines and strategies on the basis of parity, matching each other’s 
weapons systems point for point. The overriding fear was that one state might 
fall behind the other in the arms race. "If you are unarmed you are bound to 
meet misfortune for people will despise you."(14)
Machiavelli believed that the task of maintaining a certain level of respect, 
of m aintaining the strength of the military, fell to the ruler of the state, for 
inevitably it was, and is, his power too which hangs in the balance. He 
counselled his prince that the skills of organisation and discipline in war were 
param ount. Citing various historical figures, he claimed that the best- 
remembered leaders were those who excelled at war. The most successful states 
were those in which the leadership alternately had fallen to w arriors and 
lawmakers. Again, an example from the recent past emphasises these two 
points. During Gorbachev's tenure in office his predecessors were vilified for
make war their profession. "From not desiring peace come the treacherous 
deeds that m ilitary leaders commit against their employers to keep a war 
going."(15) It is thus a fine line upon which a ruler is forced to walk. He must be
I
I
not having been good "lawmakers". The military had been maintained at a 
high level, but civic institutions had been neglected, and the state had fallen into 
disarray. The most notable victim was the economy. The civilian sector of the 
economy had been geared to the support of the military and eventually the strain 
became too much. Gorbachev, during his six years in power, tried to be a good 
lawmaker and a good statesman by placing more emphasis on the economy and 
the domestic political system than on the military. Although it was necessary to 
shift the emphasis of Soviet policy from foreign confrontation to domestic 
reconstruction, Gorbachev erred by restricting the military's role in society too 
rapidly. Their attitude towards reform was initially supportive, but as the 
governm ent lost control of the pace and scope of perestroika (the reform 
programme) the military hierarchy started to voice its opposition. The view 
behind this opposition was that the political leadership had to be prepared for the 
possibility of renewed conflict with the West and that it was not taking adequate 
precautions for such an eventuality. Gorbachev was torn between two factions.
On the one hand he was confronted by the conservatives who wanted to ensure 
the defence of the nation. On the other hand he was faced by the reformers who 
believed that in order to defend the state you had to have a state w orth 
defending. While Gorbachev should receive credit for beginning the difficult
■■process of reform, he is more often criticised for being neither a good warrior nor 
a good lawmaker.
I
It is a difficult task for any leader, in any age, to balance the needs of the 
military against the needs of the populace as a whole. Bearing this in mind 
Machiavelli warned that princes and republics should guard against men who
I
;
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IN PURSUIT OF SECURITY
able to maintain a certain level of military preparedness to ward off the hostile 
advances of his neighbours, yet, at the same time, he m ust keep the growth of 
the military in check so that his state may not be seen as overly aggressive. Both 
the commander and the troops he leads must know when, and be willing, to 
return home to their more peaceful professions. Only when this is mastered will 
a ruler earn obedience at home and respect abroad.
■il
The main points of Machiavelli's theory which are relevant to the 
discussion that will follow are (1) that good arms and good laws are the 
foundation of every state; (2) the power of the ruler rests upon the power of his
military; and (3) war is a policy maker. Until the late 1980s Soviet strategists, as i
had Clausewitz and Garnett, placed an emphasis on m ilitary pow er as a 
guarantor of national security. Machiavelli also understood the significance of f
military power but he believed that political and economic stability were of the 
utmost importance. While the power of the ruler might rest upon the military, 
the power of the state rested upon good arms and good laws in equal measure. 
Both the Clausewitzean and Machiavellian approaches to security will be used to 
analyse the views of the leadership of the former Soviet Union towards security 
and military power.
Soviet military doctrine has generally been viewed in two ways. Either it 
is seen as having been overly aggressive and expansionistic (the Western view) 
or having been merely sufficient for the protection of the homeland (the Soviet t
view). We should not take at face value the Western assertion that Lenin's 
writings are definitive proof of Soviet expansionistic polices; the roots of Soviet 
military doctrine run much deeper.
Lenin was greatly influenced by Clausewitz. Indeed he incorporated many •S
of the German's ideas into his theory of war. Lenin argued that wars were Iinseparable from the political system s w hich 
engender them. The policy which a given state, a 
given class within that state, pursued for a long time 
before the war is inevitably continued by that same 
class during the war, the form of action alone being 
changed.(16)
For Lenin, war was the result of capitalism and class divisions. Writing in 1917, 
he argued that the peasant must understand that war is waged by governments, 
that the war and the peasants who fight it are tools of the government.(17) In the 
case of the socialist state, wars would continue to be fought so long as aggressive, M
imperialist powers remained in existence. Furthermore, wars would not be |
abolished as tools of policy until such time as classes were abolished and 
socialism had been created throughout the world.(18) Until that time those wars 
fought by socialist states would be of a defensive nature, in the sense that the <:|
socialist state would a) be protecting its own rights and existence, or b) assisting 
an oppressed people to overthrow the "slave holding and predatory 'Great 
Powers'."(19)
'Z:
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The arguments of those who supported the theory of an aggressive Soviet 
military doctrine can be summarised as follows. The continued existence of |  
capitalist states was a direct threat to the political stability and thus the security of 
the Soviet Union.(20) The Soviet Union would therefore take two steps. First, it 
would create a geographical buffer zone in order to insulate itself from the West. æ
Secondly, it would continue to work for the defeat of the capitalist states, viewing
them as direct military threats and as bases for anti-communist subversion and 
sabotage.(21) Methods to this end would be both direct military confrontation 
and the destabilisation of capitalist political structures through support of the
I
class struggle.(22)
Robert Bathurst in his essay, "The Two Languages of War", looked again at 
the issue of war as a tool of policy and concluded that the Soviet policy was to 
overthrow capitalism.(23) He suggested that the Soviet language of war was 
different to that used by Americans. It did not start with a breach of legality, or 
end with a military defeat. It had and always would begin with an exacerbation 
of class warfare, and would end with nothing less than the transformation of 
society.(24) For such a grand battle an immense army would be necessary. Thus 
the size of the armed forces, approximately five million men in 1985, is 
explained.
Or is it? An alternative view looks beyond the Soviet period to the more 
distant past. David Jones has argued that Soviet military doctrine shared many 
similar attributes with Imperial Russian policy. In an article written in 1983 he 
outlined the points of comparison. The decision-making structure w ith its 
Defence Council, General Staff, Military-Industrial Commission, and wartime 
General Headquarters all resembled the structures created by Nicholas 11.(25) The 
Imperial Army's role as a "national university" had also been continued by its 
Soviet counterpart. The overall internal function of the armed forces remained 
the same. Both armies served to "buttress the state's domestic peace, unify a 
multinational empire by acting as a means of advancement and education,...and 
served politically as an instrument loyal to the regime in power."(26)
If these legacies are to be remembered so too must the legacy of successive 
invasions throughout the ages. The Mongol hordes, the Poles, the Swedes, the 
French, the Germans, the British and the Americans all left their mark on the 
R ussian  n a tio n a l psyche. W hat m ight have  been  seen as an
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expansionistic/im perialistic policy, Jones argued, was nothing more than an 
attempt to protect the borders of Russia. Because the state had no natural barriers :||
the creation and maintenance of a strong armed force had to be a priority.(27)
Jones did not suggest that Marxist-Leninist theory should be discounted 
when considering Soviet defence policy, he simply argued that it should also be
%viewed in light of Russian history. Major R. Hall would concur. He has
described the military doctrine of the Soviet Union as a philosophy of war.(28)
This doctrine applied as much to the war itself as to the entire state's preparation 
for that war. Thus the political, economic, social and military factors were all of 
equal significance.(29) This approach is reminiscent of the one sanctioned by 
Machiavelli. To judge Soviet military doctrine solely on the basis of political 
ideology is to make a gross error. If it is to be understood each component must 
be examined. The overall policy m ust be viewed as the Soviets saw it if
- :J';themselves. Only when this approach is taken does the overall defence burden | |  
and the Soviet people's willingness to bear it become understandable.
GORBACHEV’S INHERITANCE
IAs a result of history and ideological confrontation it was necessary for the ;V;
Soviet Union to create a large and powerful armed force. This they did, but at a 
cost. When Gorbachev came to power in March 1985 he inherited an armed 
force of some five million men. The military had been restructured under 
Khrushchev so that they m ight better incorporate advances in technology, 
nuclear weapons above all. During the 1950s the size of the army had been g  
reduced, but when Brezhnev came to power that trend was reversed. He 
oversaw an expansion in the fighting forces and the defence sector as a whole.
The use of nuclear weapons, the number of men under arms, and the defence
ï|
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budget would all become targets of Gorbachev's reform policies.
Stalin had been responsible for promoting the development of nuclear 
weapons, but it was Khrushchev who orchestrated their incorporation into the 
military structure. In a speech before the Supreme Soviet in January 1960 he 
declared the primary importance of nuclear weapons and missiles. He argued 
that certain sectors of the armed forces were becoming obsolete and that there 
should be an increased reliance on nuclear weapons, the weapons of the 
future.(30) He emphasised that nuclear firepower would make up for any 
reductions in manpower.(31) In 1955 the armed forces stood at 5,700,000, by 1960
they had been reduced to 3,700,000.(32) There was a subsequent cut of over a 
million which left the military with 2,600,000 men in 1965. The armed forces 
were wary of this policy because they felt that a degree of inflexibility was being 
forced upon them. (33) The issue would not be resolved until Brezhnev came to 
power.
Initially the Soviet government believed that a nuclear war could be won. 
As time progressed and the reliance upon these weapons increased attempts 
were made to reconcile the use of the means of mass destruction w ith the 
concept of war as a tool of policy. During Khrushchev's last years in office a 
debate raged in the policy-making circles over whether war could continue in its 
function as a tool of policy. One group believed that regardless of the advances in 
weapons technology and the destructive capability of nuclear weapons, war could 
still be used in this m anner.(34) The second faction held the belief that the 
concept of war as an implement of policy was "beyond question", but that the 
validity of the thesis need no longer be tested nor should it be tested due to the 
newly destructive nature of war.(35) The third bloc argued that war was no 
longer a feasible tool.(36) Nuclear weapons made war unwinnable. While some
:3
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■policy makers debated which element should be most prominent for a victory in 
war — politics, the military, ideology, economics or social factors — this third 
faction contended that for any of these factors to survive within the framework 
of society, let alone win a war, nuclear weapons m ust be abandoned as an 
implement of state policy.(37) As a natural outgrowth of this belief the Leninist 
theory of war was discarded by this third party, of which Khrushchev claimed to 
be a member.
This debate was not resolved, nor were nuclear weapons abandoned. The 
majority of articles published during the 1960s and 1970s, indeed claimed that 
nuclear war was "winnable". A growing minority began to argue, however, that 
victory in nuclear war could not be guaranteed, and indeed that to fight such a 
war would be suicidal.(38) These statements can be seen to represent the political 
aspect of Soviet military doctrine. They were in line with the general image 
which the Soviet government tried to present of a peace-loving nation operating 
only from purely defensive motives.(39) Again it would be a mistake to judge 
the doctrine by these political statements alone. The technical aspect should also 
be examined.
I
During his period in office Brezhnev reversed his predecessor's policy 
towards conventional forces. They benefited from an increase in size and the 
development of new technology. The development of the armed forces could be 
viewed, and often was, as demonstrating the expansionistic nature of Soviet 
military policy. Alternatively, it could be viewed as a defensive measure. The 
promotion of ground forces meant that the next war did not necessarily have to 
be a nuclear one. It was hoped that any conflict between East and West could be 
resolved through the use of conventional forces, relegating nuclear weapons for 
use as a last resort. This was a more flexible policy than the one put forward by
13
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Khrushchev, who intended to rely heavily on nuclear weapons for the defence of 
the USSR. It also allowed the Soviet Union to defend itself against threats posed 
by nations outside of NATO, most notably China.
From 1960 onwards there was only one incident, the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979, which could lend credence to the theory of Soviet territorial 
expansionism. Generally, military power was used to support Soviet diplomatic 
positions.(40) Military advisors and material were used to underline 
relationships between the Soviet Union and other states. Alternatively, the 
armed forces were used to maintain Moscow's influence in Eastern Europe.(41) 
The United States was equally guilty of applying military power to serve its 
foreign and diplomatic policies. In terms of nuclear and naval forces Soviet 
policy must be viewed vis-à-vis that of America. The Cuban Missile Crisis and 
the threat of American naval superiority had their effects on Soviet technical 
policy. The Soviet desire to achieve parity with the US appeared as a threat to 
America's own security, thus they in turn increased the num ber of nuclear 
weapons held. Parity could only be achieved at ever increasing levels, which 
meant that parity no longer necessarily provided security.
The above discussion has been concerned primarily with the political and 
military aspects of Soviet doctrine. However, economic and social factors are of 
particular relevance for the reforms which Gorbachev would initiate. In order to 
compete in the arms race the Soviet government needed to make increasing 
demands on the economy. Its ability to quantify that demand was not easy. This 
was for a number of reasons. First, in order to ensure security a high level of 
secrecy surrounded defence estimates. Until 1989 defence spending was listed as 
a lump sum. This amount was relatively static as can be seen in table 1.1.
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Table 1.1
(Reported expenditure in billions of roubles)(42)
1985 1986 1987 1988
National Economy 222.4 247.4 241.0 278.9
Social/Cultural 124.0 140.6 153.5 163.5
Defence 19.06 20.2 20.2 20.2
A dm inistration 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
The figure appeared highly unrealistic, especially when 
amount spent on defence in the United States (table 1.2).
comparée
Table 1.2
(Expenditure in billions of US dollars)(43)
1985 1986 1987 1988
Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) 4200 4300 4500 4600
Total Defence 
Outlay 252.7 273.4 282.0 290.4
In May 1989 Gorbachev admitted that defence expenditure had been 
"hidden" in order to prevent enemies of the Soviet Union gaining an accurate 
picture of the Red Army's strengths and weaknesses.(44) He cited a figure of 77.3 
billion roubles for the 1989 defence budget.(45) To analysts in the West and the 
Soviet Union this figure still appeared too low. It m ust be remembered, 
however, that costs were not calculated in the same manner in the USSR as in 
the US. Attempts were made by the United States' Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) to assess Soviet costs. Estimates were derived by comparing the dollar
15
value of US and Soviet expenditures. There were obvious limitations to this 
approach. First, estimates failed to take into account the relatively higher quality 
of American personnel and equipment. Second, a comparison of figures could 
not be accurate because the rouble was not convertible. In addition, the CIA 
would have had to estimate the cost of hundreds if not thousands of items used 
by the military to determine the level of overall expenditure. This would have 
been a difficult task to complete due to the lack of open sources and the Agency's 
reliance on spy satellites. Inadequate information on the various specifications 
of the items would have limited their ability to estimate the cost. Finally, 
different values were placed on different aspects of defence. For instance, 
military hardw are was much more expensive than manpower in the Soviet 
Union, while in the United States the reverse was true.(46) By employing these 
methods there was a tendency to overvalue Soviet expenditure.
Following Gorbachev's announcement in 1989 Nikolai Ryzhkov, the then 
Premier, provided an outline of Soviet defence spending.(47) The main 
categories were listed as, (1) the purchase of arms and military equipment; (2) 
scientific research and design; (3) maintenance of army and navy; (4) overall 
military development; and, (5) payment of pensions. While the categories bore a 
closer resemblance to those employed by the US Department of Defense (DoD) 
there still appeared to be notable omissions. For instance, was expenditure on 
military space technology contained within the defence budget or was it listed as 
an item in the budget of a civilian minister in order to ensure state security? 
Furthermore, were the military police, civil defence measures and military aid 
incorporated in the defence budget or elsewhere in the state's accounts? 
Omissions like these led analysts to believe that the truth was being withheld. 
W ithout a recognisably accurate figure determining the overall defence burden 
would continue to be difficult.
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with the general trend in Russian and Soviet defence expenditure. David Jones's 
essay on the defence burden through the ages (1987) traces fluctuations in defence 
spending from 1680 to the 1980s. Between 1680 and 1874 the percentage of total 
state spending on defence had fluctuated from a high of 76.82% in 1701 to a low 
of 34.3% in 1781.(54) A similar calculation was made for the period from 1804- 
1914. Figures, based on quinquennial averages, ranged from 61.2 percent to 22.4 
percent.(55) Jones believed that these levels of expenditure were reasonable 
considering the expansion of the empire being undertaken at that time and the 
scope of the army's policing duties.(56) The circumstances surrounding Soviet
17
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The term  "defence burden" symbolises m ilitary expenditure as a
percentage of the national product.(48) Despite the lim itations of the CIA 
approach, its estimates were still the most widely accepted.(49) According to the 
Agency's statistics the Soviet defence burden increased from 12-14 percent in the 
early 1970s to 15-17 percent in the early 1980s,(50) Soviet GNF increased from 
R383.3 billion in 1970 to R720 billion in 1982. During that period it is believed 
that total Soviet military expenditures increased from R45-54 billion to R108-122 
billion.(51) Official Soviet statistics only started presenting GNP figures from 
1987 onwards so it is difficult to make comparisons. According to official data 
for 1989 the defence burden was 8-9 percent. While the CIA has stated that 
growth in military resource allocation did slow from 1976 onwards (52), official 
Soviet statistics seem to bear little relationship to the actual state of affairs, 
especially if the Soviet military had achieved parity with the United States. In 
order to compensate for omissions in the defence budget and for fluctuations in 
Soviet GNP the defence burden has been calculated by Western analysts as being 
between 22 and 30 percent.(53)
.■While this may appear to be yet another overestimate the sum is in line
defence expenditure were not much different. While the Soviet "empire" did 
not expand between 1955 and 1985, the cost of policing it did increase. During the 
imperial era the majority of defence expenditure went to supporting the troops. 
In the twentieth century funds for materiel have surpassed those for personnel. 
For example, in 1798 approximately 71 percent of the budget was spent on the 
maintenance of the army and cavalry and only 28 percent on weapons and other 
equipm ent.(57) In 1990 those percentages were reversed with roughly 67.5 
percent of the proposed budget being targeted for procurement and R&D and 
only 30.6 percent for the maintenance of the army and navy.(58)
Although a defence burden between 22-30 percent might have been at the 
low end of the historical scale, it was increasingly apparent that such a level 
could not be sustained. In 1985, for these and other reasons, the Soviet Union 
found itself in a "pre-crisis" situation.(59) In an attempt to achieve parity with 
the United States the highest quality resources and the best trained personnel 
had been allocated to the defence sector. Because the civilian sector of the 
econom y was denied the same quality of resources and personnel a 
technological gap had developed between the Soviet Union and the rest of the 
developed world. The economy was stagnant. If Gorbachev was going to reduce 
this gap he needed to be able to reallocate resources. To do that he needed to 
redefine security and redraft Soviet foreign and military policy.
NEW THINKING AND REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY
Gorbachev's views on the use of military power and the nature of security 
were different from those postulated by Lenin. Gorbachev, apparently influenced 
by the debate which had occurred during the Khrushchev era, rejected the idea 
that war, particularly nuclear war, could be used as a tool of policy. While he
18
Continuous expansion within the Soviet military sector was advocated in the 
belief that it would enhance security. At the same time diplomatic negotiations.
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rejected those elements of Lenin's theory which reflected the earlier theories of 
Clausewitz he maintained those aspects which dealt with peace as a tool of policy. i
In addition to identifying the instigators of war and encouraging socialists 
to defend themselves against a confrontation with the capitalists/im perialists, 
Lenin urged his fellow Party members to be aware of the surrounding
;conditions. It was not enough simply to use war as a tool of policy, one had to A
assess constantly the effects of its implementation. In his "Afterword to the 
Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and 
Annexationist Peace" (1918), Lenin criticised the majority of Party functionaries 
for not "{grasping} the new socioeconomic and political situation", and for not 
taking into consideration "the change in the conditions that demand a speedy 
and abrupt change in tactics...."(60) He commented further that Marxism 
demanded the consideration of objective conditions and their changes, "that the 
question m ust be presented concretely as applicable to those conditions...."(61)
Thus Lenin believed that war was a tool of policy only if the material interests S
Icwere there to support it. |
ÿ'iiGorbachev took these earlier criticisms of the Party to heart, for they 
remained applicable to the Party of which he was then in charge. Even a cursory 
glance at the limited statistics available demonstrated that competition in an
arms race w ith the West was proving a hindrance to economic growth. 
Gorbachev's subsequent policies manifested his belief that it was necessary to 
alter the way in which security was achieved.
During the Brezhnev regime a "dual-track policy" had been pursued.
■::Ç
particularly arms control negotiations, were used as a means to govern the 
competition with the West. To secure its position as a superpower the Soviet 
Union was determined to expand its influence within the Third World. The 
government was willing to accept Western economic inputs so long as it did not 
have to accept the West's political and cultural influences.(62)
Gorbachev implied that the primary aspect of this policy, the expansion of 
the military, had achieved the opposite effect from the one desired. The ever 
increasing arsenals of the combatants did not instil a sense of security but a sense 
of fear and a desire to improve weapons technology so that security could be 
achieved. The policy of "new thinking", proposed in 1986, and the doctrine of 
"reasonable sufficiency" (1987), attempted to replace the dual-track policy. At the 
27th Party Congress in 1986 Gorbachev declared that it had become impossible to 
believe in the survivability of nuclear war or even that a conventional war could 
be won. Increases in the destructive capability of both types of weapon ensured 
m utual destruction and eliminated the ability of war to achieve either political 
or military objectives.(63) Thus, in this new age, security could be maintained 
only through political means.
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Gorbachev's "new thinking" advocated the replacem ent of "gunboat 
diplomacy" with political dialogue, stressing co-operation and interdependence. 
Outlined at the 27th Party Congress in 1986, the concept consisted of five points:
1) a recognition of the existence of global problems 
that can "be resolved only by co-operation on a world­
wide scale";
2) a new emphasis on the interdependence of states;
3) the e labo ra tion  of a set of "princip led  
considerations" that are derived from an examination 
of the present world situation;
4) a recognition, that, if the nuclear arms race 
continues, even parity will cease to be a factor for 
military restraint; and,
5) a harsh condemnation of the rigidity of previous
Soviet foreign policy.(64)
Points one and two can be viewed together. Those problems "that can only be 
resolved by co-operation on a world-wide scale" were enum erated as issues 
concerning ecology and economic development and the achievement of a lasting 
and just peace.(65) There can be only joint solutions to these problems, and all 
nations must realise that they can no longer take an isolationist stand. A nuclear 
accident in Chernobyl affects farming in Scotland, just as industrial emissions in 
the United States have repercussions for the forests and fisheries of Canada.
A ttem pts at making industry ecologically sound rely on advanced 
technology and the willingness of nations to share their knowledge. This 
exchange of information is reliant on trust and a sense of friendship as well as a 
system of communications. Just as the industrial revolution had its effects on 
the global economy so too does the rapid advancem ent in inform ation 
technology, perhaps the single leading com ponent in m aking this an 
"interconnected, interdependent, and essentially integral world."(66)
The first step in reducing tension and increasing trust between nations 
was to enter upon the path of disarmament. Points three through five in 
Gorbachev's outline are interconnected. Point three reflected Lenin's counsel to 
Party functionaries that they should grasp the new socioeconomic and political 
situations. Having done this Gorbachev had come to the conclusion that war 
could no longer be used as a tool of policy. Since war cannot be won there is no 
need to maintain massive arsenals. Furthermore, if (a) conventional warfare 
leads inevitably to a nuclear conflagration, or (b) conventional weapons systems 
have become so destructive in their own right as to have an effect equal to that of 
nuclear weapons in devastating agricultural, industrial and political centres, was 
there a rational reason for maintaining the massive stockpiles which NATO and
■3 ,
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the WTO oversaw? As Alexei Arbatov has pointed out, "a mere 400 nuclear 
warheads of the megaton class could destroy up to 70% of the US industrial 
potential."(67) Four hundred warheads barely exceeded 10-15 per cent of the 
former Soviet Union's arsenal.(68)
s
Realising that parity might no longer prevent war followed from a critical 
analysis of the world situation and objective conditions. In an article which 
appeared in Kommunist  vooruzhennykh sil in 1990, Colonel V. Strebkov 
argued that the existence of conventional weapons did not prevent World War
II. Why then should we assume that a nuclear presence would save us from a 
third world war? As he stated, a "direct cause and effect connection between 
nuclear weapons and prolonged peace on the planet does not exist."(69) 
Previous Soviet foreign policy had maintained that such a relationship did exist, 
and thus the basis for a policy of deterrence was laid. By rejecting deterrence 
Gorbachev had in effect condemned the foreign policy of the past.
The implication of Gorbachev's foreign policy was that while war might 
no longer be an instrument of policy, peace was. Christopher Donnelly, former 
head of the Soviet Studies Research Centre at Sandhurst, summarised Lenin's 
interpretation of Clausewitz's dictum in this way, that "the policies of war are the 
violent continuation of the policies of peace, {therefore} the policies of peace {are} 
only the non-violent continuation of the policies of war."(70) The policies which 
Gorbachev hoped to pursue through peaceful means were those stated above, but 
of immediate interest to the average Soviet citizen were the proposed reforms of 
the political and economic systems. It was the general consensus of the Soviet 
elite that the United States had attem pted to lead the Soviet Union into a 
devastatingly costly arms race with the aim of breaking the Socialist system.(71) 
In order for the USSR to recover from this exhausting competition it needed to
: r |
desist from the military build-up and rechannel the funds into the civil sector.
Very few nations would wish to commence disarmament if they felt 
themselves to be in a weak position vis-à-vis their neighbours or opponents. 
While Gorbachev acknowledged this point of view he also felt that the military 
reserves of the USSR were sufficient to withstand the transfer of funds to the 
civilian sector. Indeed, the General Secretary claimed that the USSR had reached 
the point of equilibrium , or parity, w ith the US under the Brezhnev 
administration. He asserted that as parity had been achieved it was now 
necessary to engage in disarmament, negotiating from a position of strength. 
Gorbachev had both long-term and short-term goals w ithin the disarmament 
process. In 1986, as General Secretary, he announced his three-point process for
the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.(72) The short-term goal 
was the organisation of the armed forces based upon the precept of "reasonable 
sufficiency". Gorbachev was not the mastermind behind this doctrine, rather he
was its champion. He had begun to promote the idea of "reasonable sufficiency" 
in 1983, however, it was not formally unveiled until 1986 at the Twenty-Seventh 
Party Congress. Born out of a debate in the General Staff during the early 1980s I
over the need to reform Soviet military doctrine, the policy calls for the 
reduction of force strength, both conventional and nuclear, to a level appropriate 
only for defensive measures.
Reasonable sufficiency has two components, the political and the military. 
At the qualitative level, the policy demands that security be based on political
Irather than military means. If the emphasis of security rests upon the political then a state is placing its security within the context of the security of other 
countries. There will be an increased willingness on the part of the state 
adopting  th is new doctrine to engage in dialogue and to agree to
•3,
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compromises.(73) If on the other hand, a state's security is based purely on 
military strength, w ith no channels open for negotiations, then that actor is 
placing its security in opposition to international security. The Soviet Union 
previously claimed that its defence doctrine represented the former scenario, 
while wholeheartedly following the latter. Despite the presence of the USSR 
within an alliance, so long as it based the majority of its foreign policy on the 
level of ideological confrontation it placed its security above that of the world 
community. The policy of reasonable sufficiency, by placing emphasis on 
political interaction rather than military confrontation, calls for states to look at 
every international actor, rather than a few ideological brethren, as possible 
allies.
However, reasonable sufficiency is not solely concerned w ith political 
doctrine, it also calls for the ability to repel aggression. First and foremost, a 
nation should "restrain its leaders from unleashing war", but should they fail 
then a balance of forces should be in effect, the ability to "evaluate the 
hypothetical potential of the other side" should be present, as well as the ability 
to take account of the intentions and interests of both sides.(74) Returning to 
Machiavelli's recurring theme of the threat, not only m ust the strength of the 
armed forces be accounted for, but it should also be accompanied by an analysis of 
the political, social, moral, psychological, historical and cultural features of the 
opponent.(75)
Reasonable sufficiency is in effect a two-pronged attack on international 
politics. By promoting this policy the Soviet government attem pted to shift 
NATO and WTO relations "beyond parity to mutual confidence and beyond 
national security to m utual security".(76) International stability and security 
were to be achieved through a marriage of political and military doctrines.
i
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While it could be said that most states attempt to unite these two doctrines it 
could also be argued that the nature of the confrontation between the two 
superpowers caused their foreign policies to grow increasingly militant, adopting 
themes of conflict and confrontation. Reasonable sufficiency is a means to re- 
politicise foreign policy, increasing the opportunities for dialogue and 
compromise. Should negotiations fail then security can still be m aintained 
through military action, although at a reduced level.
Two questions surround the concept of reasonable sufficiency. First, how 
large or small a force is considered sufficient? Second, to repel an attack 
successfully must not a defensive force be capable of offence? In response to the 
first question while initially no fixed numbers were given, the Soviet military 
elite and now the armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
have seen the need to restructure the military. The majority view is that 
reasonable sufficiency should be whatever it takes to defend the country 
adequately. The former first deputy minister of the USSR, Petr Lushev, stated 
that military potential should be "reduced to limits that are necessary only for 
defence and not for attack."(77) At the same time, although not clarifying what 
that limit might be. Marshal Dmitri Yazov, former Soviet Defence Minister, 
stated that a mere reduction of numbers, excluding a modification of structures 
and weapon mixes, would serve the purpose of providing only "defence against 
attack from outside."(78) This attitude was eventually changed. Prior to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union the armed forces had initiated the restructuring of 
their m ilitary formations and strategy in order to accommodate the rapid 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. As troops and tank divisions were withdrawn 
the remaining divisions were reorganised to provide greater flexibility on the 
front lines. Smaller units were expected gradually to cover greater distances. A 
similar restructuring process is underway in NATO.
;k
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This leads us to the second question: can a defensive formation be purely 
defensive? The offensive nature of traditional Soviet tactics was clear from 
stated requirements. The first requirement was that the armed forces should be 
able to prevent large-scale destruction of the homeland; the second, that the
military be capable of repelling the aggressor and pushing him back into the
depths of his territory rapidly; the third, that the armed forces be strong enough 
to terminate the aggressor's offensive by defeating him and destroying him 
instantly.
It has been argued that a defence can be purely defensive. In W inning 
Peace: Strategies and Ethics For A Nuclear Free World. Dietrich Fischer, W ilhlem 
Nolte and Jan Ob erg of the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future 
Research outline the methods by which security could be based on wholly 
defensive measures in both the military and non-military fields. It was argued 
that a dual message should be presented to dissuade aggression:
(1) if he attacks he will suffer, but
(2) as long as he does not attack he has nothing to
fear. (79)
The threat of retribution lies behind the concept of deterrence. Yet retribution 
and counter-attack cause instability. Machiavelli believed that a nation 's 
strength would impress its neighbours and lead to national security. This is true 
up to a point. An excessive military build-up may unnerve an opponent and 
lead him to believe that he must strike before the other state has the opportunity 
to do so. By incorporating a defensive defence into a military doctrine a nation is 
able to demonstrate to its neighbours that it does not pose a threat, and that 
therefore they have nothing to fear.
But what is a defensive defence? To Fischer et al., it is a doctrine which
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calls for the complete restructuring of the armed forces. Troop reductions and 
the elimination of certain weapons are both recommended. Those weapons 
m aintained m ust be a short range, and of limited destructive capability. 
Furthermore, the attitudes of those in charge of the weapons systems should 
change, with a conscious decision to reject the concept of offensive defence being 
made. Defence would be based on a knowledge of local circumstances, such as 
geography, topography, and political culture. Trust of the civilian population 
would be a foremost priority, since it is they who are being defended. It is 
proposed that the civilian population be incorporated into the overall defence 
strategy. In addition, the authors suggest that each state become self-sufficient in 
matters of defence and reduce the level of foreign involvement in its security as 
well as its level of involvement in the security of others. This is how the 
authors of Winning Peace define a defensive military posture.
The Soviet Union tried to adopt such a posture. D isarm am ent 
negotiations and treaties were slowly reducing the num ber of long-range 
weapons. Short-range nuclear weapons also fell victim to the axe, and their 
elimination helped to reduce tension in the political arena. So long as some 
nuclear weapons rem ain in the arsenals of the United States and Russia, 
however, the military must maintain plans for their deployment and use. Even 
as disarmament negotiations have continued, the leaders of Britain and other 
NATO states have continued to discuss plans for updating and replacing the 
remaining weapons. As long as nuclear weapons exist there will exist the threat 
of their use, and instability will remain.
The adaptation of the Soviet military to local circumstances was thrust 
upon them a little sooner than they would have desired. This was due to their 
own reduction proposals, but more importantly the demands of their Warsaw
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Pact allies for their w ithdraw al. As the WTO nations overthrew  their 
communist regimes they demanded the removal of the shackles which bound 
them to those systems, the presence of the Soviet military. Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland all requested that the Soviet arm y speed up its 
withdrawal.(80)
As for trusting their citizens, it was equally important within the former 
Soviet Union for the citizens to trust the military. The unrest in the Central 
Asian Republics, the Caucasus and the Baltics and the intervention by Soviet 
troops destroyed any alliance or affinity those people might have felt towards the 
military. The armed forces as a result felt alienated from the people and betrayed 
by the government. They claimed, and rightly so, that they never should have 
been used in any internal conflicts, that that was the responsibility of the KGB 
and the MVD guards. The role of the Soviet military was to protect the people, 
not to turn its weapons against them. The collapse of centralised control has in 
one respect wiped the slate clean for the military establishment. Because the 
individual republics are now in charge of their armed forces it could prove easier 
for the military to renew its ties with the community.
CONCLUSION
John Garnett's definition of military power would appear to be a universal 
one, for while successive generations of politicians and theorists have debated 
the issue of when force is applicable they have not denied the fact that war or 
military power is a form of violence legally sanctioned by governments. The 
policies of new thinking and reasonable sufficiency were the latest contributions 
to this subject matter.
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Central to both policies was the belief that political rather than military 
means should be used in pursuit of foreign policy objectives, Gorbachev argued 
that by analysing our political and economic conditions and recognising that we 
are members of a "contradictory bu t interconnected, interdependent, and 
essentially integral world" we would realise that peace not war should be the tool 
by which we achieve our aims.(81) Inherent in this theory is a rejection of the 
belief that we must overcome the will of our opponent. Essentially our aims, so 
Gorbachev proposed, are the same, therefore there is no reason for one state to 
subjugate another.
If every nation shares the aim of political, economic and environmental 
stability then, Gorbachev suggested, ideological differences should not be allowed 
to get in the way. Generally, the promotion of differences succeeds not in 
furthering understanding but in developing antagonisms. When an ideology is 
supported by a sizable military force it can appear threatening to the opposing 
state. When a threat is presented it must be met. Unfortunately, the response 
can appear equally threatening.
In promoting new thinking and reasonable sufficiency Gorbachev rejected 
elements of the theories of Clausewitz, Machiavelli and Lenin. War could no 
longer be used as a tool of policy, nor could the concepts of the threat and 
ideological confrontation be the basis of international relations. In pursuing his 
new policies Gorbachev appeared to reject or at least to ignore the other aspects of 
military power. To return briefly to Garnett's definition, military power can be 
used as a symbol of national prestige, as an instrument of national unity and as a 
means of ensuring security. As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the 
importance of these elements on the national psyche was overlooked. As a 
result, the pursuit of the foreign policy programme and military reforms would
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have severe repercussions for political and economic reforms.
The im plementation of new thinking and reasonable sufficiency was 
economically m otivated as was the initiation of the conversion programme. 
Machiavelli had argued that war had a bearing on the everyday activities of the 
state. I would argue that this idea should be thoroughly understood if a 
transition from a "war system" to a "peace system" is to be accomplished. While 
Gorbachev's theories appeared manageable, his failure to adequately assess each 
aspect of military power severely limited their effectiveness. The economic and 
social consequences of force reductions and conversion were not taken into 
consideration. Gorbachev would soon learn that peace, like war, can create new 
political situations.
i
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CHAPTER TWO 
SURVEYING THE FIELD
AN INTRODUCTION TO CONVERSION
For as long as there have been weapons there have been demands for their 
destruction and the release of men and materials for more "productive" use. 
The process by which hum an and financial resources are transferred from the 
defence sector to its civilian counterpart is known as conversion. It is generally 
hoped that the initiation of a conversion programme will result in a large scale 
"peace dividend". The very name given to the collective benefits of conversion 
implies a financial gain, and certainly the success of conversion is reliant upon 
the basic structure and flexibility of any given state's economic system.(1) It 
should be stressed, however, that conversion is also a political, defence and social 
issue. A political decision must be taken to pursue a course of disarmament. 
The political decision will impact on the security of the state, an aspect which 
m ust be considered during the decision-making process. Once a government 
has decided to initiate a joint programme of disarmament and conversion it 
m ust also consider how it will assist military personnel in making the transition 
to civilian life as well as how it will promote the development of new civilian- 
oriented product lines within the defence industries and assist in any retooling 
of those enterprises and retraining of personnel. The level of success which a 
conversion programme will enjoy is dependent upon the amount of time and 
preparation given, at all levels, to its initial implementation.
Over the years there have been num erous publications which have 
addressed the possibilities of and the potential for defence conversion. There has 
been a general consensus on both sides of the East-West divide about the benefits 
which could be derived as well as the problems that might be encountered.
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Some of those anticipated benefits include:
1) an increase in standards of personal consumption of 
goods and services;
2) an expansion or m odernisation of productive 
capacity through investment in new plant equipment;
3) the promotion of housing construction and urban 
renew al, includ ing  slum  clearance and  ru ra l 
development;
4) an im provement and expansion of facilities for, 
among others, education, health, welfare, social 
security, cu ltu ra l developm ent, and scientific  
research.(2)
The only area where there has been disagreement is over the best method of 
achieving the peace dividend. Will a free market or centrally planned economy 
meet w ith greater success? The debate has centred around two issues, the 
existence of a m ilitary industrial complex and the very structures of the 
respective economic systems.
■
1THE EXISTENCE OF A MIC
The concept of a military-industrial complex (MIC) was introduced into 
political and social parlance by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his "farewell 
address" in 1961. Prior to that speech it had been widely assumed in Western 
societies that civilian politicians acted independently of particular economic and 
military interests.(3) Their main aim was to promote the public's welfare. To 
accomplish this, policies were form ulated within and legitim ated by a 
democratic parliamentary assembly. However, Eisenhower suggested that this 
democratic procedure was being undermined by the MIC. Composed of senior 
military personnel and defence industrialists, the MIC had but one interest, the 
protection and development of the defence industries.(4) Conspiracy theorists
have argued that MICs, in pursuit of their goal, have been willing to goad
politicians into war and even, when necessary, assassinate those individuals who 
have failed to fully support the defence sector. While there is disagreement over
the lengths to which MICs will go, there is little doubt that such complexes exist 
w ithin the Western democracies. The existence of a similar type of organisation 
within the former Soviet Union is a matter more open to debate.
W riting in 1975 Egbert Jahn argued against the existence of a "western
type" MIC within the Soviet Union. In order to derive that conclusion he felt it
necessary to raise two questions.
Does the armaments complex - i.e. in particular the 
leaders of the military apparatus and the armaments 
industry - differentiate itself from other social groups 
in Soviet society? Does the armaments complex, or a 
portion of it, pursue an independent policy? (5)
Jahn first turned to Marxist-Leninist theory for the answers to these questions. 
Inherent in the concept of an MIC is the notion of a conflict of interests, the 
defence industrialists versus the common people and their democratic 
representatives. According to the Soviet Marxist thesis the notion of a Soviet 
MIC had to be rejected on the grounds that the system did not contain "vested 
in terest groups with particular interests, standing in opposition to one 
another".(6) The argument continued that militarism was only peculiar to a 
class society which is inherently antagonistic. Socialist society was not an 
(antagonistic) class society, therefore m ilitarism did not exist. A simple 
examination of the stated Soviet policy did not necessarily prove or disprove the 
existence of a military-industrial complex. Jahn recognised this and thus he 
began to scrutinise the state structure for clues.
He did not deny the fact that the Soviet Union possessed a large army and 
navy which were supported  by num erous defence m inistries and their 
enterprises. Not only were the armed forces the recipients of institutional 
backing, they also received the broad support of the population. Jalm contended 
that because the entire society was working for security, because society was
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highly militarised, there was no reason for one sector to pursue the goal on its 
own and to the disadvantage of others. The unity of the people was represented 
in the bureaucracy which had become "something of a class ... and the 
governmental instrument itself. In Soviet society master and overseer [had] 
become one".(7) For this reason a military-industrial complex could not exist.
Vernon Aspaturian derived a different conclusion when he addressed the
issue. In his article, "The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex - Does It Exist?"
(1972), he established two possible definitions for a Soviet MIC.
...the term military-industrial complex suggests, in its 
broadest sense, a deliberate and symbiotic sharing of 
interests on the part of the military establishment, 
industry and high-ranking political figures, whose 
collective influence is sufficient to shape decisions to 
accord with the interests of these groups at the expense 
of others in Soviet society. In a more restricted sense, 
the concept implies an interlocking and independent 
structure of interests among military, industrial and 
political figures, that enables or impels them  to 
behave as a distinctive political actor separate from its 
individual components."(8)
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Aspaturian believed that a complex of this second type would exhibit a high 
degree of policy unity and that no such organisation yet existed in the United 
States, the Soviet Union or any other country. Karl F. Spielman in an article 
written in 1976 attempted to demonstrate the truth of Aspaturian's argument.(9) 
Spielman chose to look at the Soviet defence industrialists and their relationship 
with their main consumer, the armed forces. He argued that the structure of the 
defence sector and the nature of the relationship between supplier and consumer 
precluded the existence of a military-industrial complex. At the time that he 
wrote his article there were eight defence ministries, each of which oversaw the 
operations of several hundred enterprises and design bureaux. These eight 
ministries developed the weapons for, and sold them to five different military 
services. Because each ministry covered a different aspect of weapons production.
e,g tanks versus fighter planes, they did not necessarily target the same services. 
Nor could it be argued that at any given time a minister was representing all of 
his enterprises equally. There were occasions when one design w ould be 
prom oted over another. Spielman concluded that while defence industrialists 
m ight cultivate relationships with each other, with the military and w ith the 
politicians they did not create a cohesive group. However, to argue that because 
ministers may at times act at cross purposes in order to garner support for a 
particular weapons system a military-industrial complex does not exist overlooks 
the fundamental purpose of such a complex. If we look again at the original 
definition proposed by Eisenhower as well as Aspaturian's first description it is 
clear that the main priority of such a grouping is to ensure its overall security. 
This is done by encouraging a government to pursue an economic policy 
conducive to the defence sector. The main bargaining tool is the security of the 
nation, something which no government would wish to jeopardise. When 
A spaturian's first definition is applied it becomes apparent that a military- 
industrial complex exists in any country that has both a military establishment 
and an industrial sector.
Nowadays, there is no objection to saying that a m ilitary-industrial 
complex existed within the Soviet Union. While Soviet writers m ight have 
doubted the truth of that statement in the 1970s, by the 1980s they were using the 
term to denote their own defence sector.(10) Furthermore, the "conflict of 
interests" which Jahn claimed did not exist became increasingly apparent as 
Gorbachev attempted to initiate reforms within the defence sector. As will be 
detailed elsewhere in this thesis, reform was greeted cautiously by both defence 
industrialists and senior military personnel. As the reforms cut deeper into the 
sector efforts were made to subvert the course of the programme. These attempts 
were frequently played out on the political stage, two examples being the
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formation of the Scientific-Industrial Union {Nauchno-promyshlennyi soiuz or 
NFS) which was intent upon slowing the pace of reform, and the participation 
of Marshal Yazov, the Minister of Defence, Oleg Baklanov, deputy chief of the 
Defence Council, and other leading military and defence industrial personnel in 
the attem pted overthrow of Mikhail Gorbachev. While Gorbachev hoped to 
redefine security in terms of the economic and social well-being of the state there 
were others who continued to believe in the primacy of military strength. As a 
result sections of the political elite began to work at cross purposes.
SIMILAR SYSTEMS: AMERICAN & SOVIET MICs
In the concluding statements of "The Merchants of Death, Then and 
Now" (1972) Robert Ferrell complained that the MICs of the United States and 
the Soviet Union did not pay enough attention to each other.(11) True, they 
looked to see which weapons were being developed and by whom, but they did 
not spend enough time analysing how their respective organisations worked. 
Americans tended to assume that the complex within the USSR was a mirror 
image of their own, while Soviet analysts examined American military policies 
through the prism of Marxist-Leninist thought. Neither approach provided a 
clear picture of the abilities and limitations of the two defence sectors.
A country's armaments programme is determined by both government 
policy and the structure of the defence sector. While the declared policy aims of 
the Soviet and American governments were radically different, and the overall 
structures of their military-industrial complexes bore little resemblance to each 
other, there remained striking similarities in the day-to-day operations of both 
institutions. This was apparent as early as the 1950s. In his memoirs Nikita 
Khrushchev recalled a visit to Camp David. During a walk in the garden
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Eisenhower explained how his military leaders would approach him and ask for 
money for a new project. His protestations that money was not available were of 
little consequence for the military would simply argue that the Soviet Union had 
already allocated funds for a similar programme and that America was running a 
very real risk of falling behind.(12) Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Armed 
Forces used the same tactics, "blackmailing" him with the threat of American 
superiority. (13)
The similarities did not end with political blackmail. In Dismantling the 
Cold War Economy Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken detail the history of the 
American military-industrial complex. They talk at great length of a "domestic 
economy scarred by prolonged commitments of physical, technological and 
human resources."(14) A range of industries have been created and nurtured by 
the Department of Defense (DOD or Pentagon). Within these industries work an 
elite corps of engineers and scientists. They are in a sense the product of the 
corporations for which they work. Recipients of various grants, they start their 
connection with the firm at a young age, and are generally recruited straight out 
of university. The high level of prestige associated with such a career is coupled 
with above standard wages, continuous on the job training, and the opportunity 
to work with equipm ent not available in most civilian industries.(15) The 
process of recruitment was similar in the former Soviet Union. A career in the 
defence industry often seemed the natural conclusion to a lengthy academic 
career studying chemistry, physics or engineering. The rewards once again 
included a high level of prestige and job satisfaction, improved wages, better 
quality of goods and services, better housing, and the opportunity to use 
advanced technology. In return for these privileges scientists and engineers in 
both countries must in effect sign an intellectual property agreement.(16) Their 
discoveries or creations are the property of the firm and the industry. The highly
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secretive nature of the work demands that the system operate in this way.
While recruitment was the same, overall structure was different. In the 
Soviet Union the Ministry of Defence coordinated the activities of the armed 
forces while the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) performed a similar 
function for the defence and civilian ministries (of which there were 8 and 6 
respectively) that operated in this sector. (17) On the purely defence side these 
included the ministries of aviation industry (Minaviaprom), defence industry 
(Minoboronprom), general machine building (Minobshchemash), radio industry 
(M inradioprom), shipbuilding industry (Minsudprom), electronics industry 
(M inelek tronprom ), civil av ia tion  (MCA), and  telecom m unications 
(Minsviazi).(lS) These m inistries combined with the state committee for 
inform ation processing (GKVTI) formed the M inistry of Defence Related 
Industries (MGCP).(19) They directed the operations of the design bureaux (KBs) 
and enterprises working within a related field. The design bureaux would 
compete for a contract from a particular service. For instance Mikoyan might
Enterprises and Design Bureaux
compete against Sukhoi for an air force contract. The MiG (Mikoyan design) 
might win this particular bid but Sukhoi might win an army contract later. The
ministries attempted to enhance yet stabilise competition within their sectors.
Diagram 2.1
The Structure of the Soviet Military-Industrial Complex
VPK
MOOP
Minelektronprom Minsudprom Minsviazia MG A GKVTI
Minaviaprom Minoboronprom Minobschchemash Minradioprom
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In the United States the system was and is slightly more centralised. In 
the place of the Ministry of Defence and the eight defence industrial ministries 
there is but one Department of Defense which contracts work out to a limited 
num ber of enterprises.(20) The m anufacturers, in competition w ith one 
another, design a product, be it a plane, tank or ship, and upon approval by the 
Pentagon in turn tender out the work for the component parts.
These dissim ilar structures operated under comparable conditions. 
Markusen and Yudken, in describing the system that still prevails, have stated 
that "military-led industrial policy in the United States...operates as a command 
segment of the economy; the outright purchase of material, equipment, and 
research is its major mechanism".(21) This is in opposition to the free and 
competitive markets which operate elsewhere in the economy. Within a 
competitive system a num ber of companies compete against one another in 
order to satisfy consumer demand. This competition forces firms to ensure 
efficient and low cost production.(22) The consumer achieves the maximum 
benefit under this system. The consum er/supplier relationship is different 
w ithin the defence sector. The consumer, in this case the government, finds 
itself dealing w ith a handful of dom inant sellers (oligopolists).(23) Since 
competition, and therefore choice, is restricted the consumer is forced to pay 
higher prices. The government is not an innocent party in this relationship; 
over the years it has been willing to subsidise marginal firms in order to 
maintain an indigenous defence industry.(24) Further collusion is evident in the 
prom otion of an industrial policy. Markusen and Yudken argue that the 
government has systematically promoted the defence sector and particularly the 
aerospace industry as a potential growth sector. As a result it has provided
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Ifinancial and capital support, encouraged industrial collaboration, shaped : 
competition, developed a trade policy and provided a guaranteed domestic 
market. (25)
This policy of state managerial capitalism resembles the approach adopted 
in the former Soviet Union.(26) It is the nature of a centrally planned economy 
to substitute the financial regulators of demand, supply and price w ith an 
economic administration which decides for itself how to allocate resources and 
plan production.(27) In the Soviet Union this task was performed by the State 
Planning Committee (Gosplan). While it devised plans for every sector of the 
economy, the defence sector, as detailed above, received special privileges in the 
form of increased levels of financial and capital investment. (28) As in the 
United States there was an industrial policy tailor-made for the defence sector.
The similar nature of the two systems means that the same types of 
problem were bound to be encountered in any attempt to initiate a programme 
of conversion: problems in dealing with the retraining of personnel so that they 
might operate in a more economically competitive environment and be able to 
enjoy the same level of job satisfaction; in retooling defence enterprises; and in 
easing the transition of the enterprise as a whole to the competitive market.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS?
Until the 1980s the solution to these problems was believed to rest within 
the economic systems themselves. In a 1962 United Nations report it was 
suggested that.
In the economic life of all countries, shifts in the 
pattern of demand and in the allocation of productive 
resources are continually occurring in response to
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changes in technology, foreign trade, consumer tastes, 
per capita income, the age distribution  of the 
population, migration and many other factors. Some 
industries grow more rapidly than others, while the 
output of certain industries may even decline in 
absolute terms. Such shifts involve a transfer of 
m anpow er and capital betw een  occupations, 
industries and regions. The reallocation of productive 
resources which would accompany disarmament is in 
m any respects m erely a special case of the 
phenomenon of economic growth.(29)
It was argued that in the case of the United States the government need only 
increase expenditure on other types of goods and services, maintain a high level 
of consumer demand and apply fiscal and monetary policies in the appropriate 
m anner.(30) In essence it was argued that the market would be able to adjust to 
the new conditions.
Stefan Doernberg of the Institute for International Politics and Economics 
in Berlin (GDR) was less sure of this approach. In his paper to the 1973 
symposium on Economic and Social Aspects of Disarmament he argued that in 
capitalist societies the profit mechanism stood between production and needs. 
Because the satisfaction of the material, social and intellectual needs of the 
w orking people contradicted capital's need to ensure profit, the m arket 
mechanism would not be able to solve the types of problem which would arise 
as a result of conversion.(31)
It could be argued that the supremacy of the profit mechanism results in 
the overly defensive nature of the western military-industrial complex. The fear 
that profits will be reduced encourages actors within the complex to work as a 
more cohesive group in order to undermine the natural democratic processes of 
the state so that their position is ensured.(32) The relationship of the state in the 
capitalist system to its defence sector is one of both contractor and purchaser.(33)
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As a result of this and because of the very nature of the defence system, as 
detailed above, the actions of the government in relation to the defence sector 
can have far reaching effects throughout the economy. It is perhaps for this 
reason that Soviet writers argued that militarisation and defence spending were 
essential to "the prosperity and even the survival of the capitalist system."(34)
In his article "Economic Consequences of Disarmament: The Soviet View" 
(1968) Joseph Wieczynski noted a change in the attitudes of some Soviet writers 
towards the role of the military-industrial complex in capitalist societies. L. 
Gromov and V Strigachev in particular viewed military production as waste
production.(35) This classification was based on a belief that m ilitary 
production yielded no lasting benefit to society. Defence expenditure created only 
a temporary economic boom. Over an extensive period of time militarisation 
would prove to decelerate the growth of overall production, retard technological 
progress, excessively develop heavy industry at the expense of light industry, and 
reduce the standard of living through higher taxes.(36)
W estern writers have generally been split over the "wastefulness" of 
military production. It has been argued that money spent on the development 
and production of new weapons systems and the training and maintenance of 
m ilitary personnel could be better spent on education, healthcare and other 
services. Massimo Pivetti in his review article, "Military Expenditure and 
Economic Analysis", put forward the alternative argument that war production 
acts as a boost to economic development. He attributed the success of the US 
economy in the periods 1947-48 and 1967-68 to government purchases of goods 
and services. He claimed, correspondingly, that the deteriorating performance of 
the economy after 1969 was to a large extent the result of a reduction of 
governm ent purchasing, which was 20 percent lower in real terms than in
Le win also proposed that war be considered a stabilising factor rather 
than a waste. By operating completely outside the framework of the economy of 
supply and demand, war production becomes the most effective way in which to 
deal w ith the surpluses, be they surpluses of production or of population. 
According to this argum ent military spending acts as a stabilising factor in
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1968.(37) An increase in defence spending in the 1980s produced a similar effect. 
Military expenditure rose at a rate of 6.7 percent per annum between 1980 and 
1986.(38) Increased government spending resulted in a general boom within the 
economy and an increase in imports.(39) This would appear to have been a 
positive outcome for the US economy, but it was offset by the development of a 
sizable deficit. President Reagan's economic policy, popularly known as 
Reaganomics, called for lower taxation as well as stricter control of the money 
supply. In order to cover the increased expenditure the government had to raise 
its borrowing requirements, which in turn raised the national interest rates.
High levels of interest coupled with low rates of inflation lured foreign 
investment causing the value of the dollar to rise to an unsustainable level 
which in turn caused competitiveness and thus exports to decline.(40) The 
outcome of Reagan's defence and economic policies closely resembles the 
hypothesis put forward by Gromov and Strigachev in the 1960s. It would appear 
that while increased expenditure in the defence sector can lead to an economic 
boom in the short-term, in the long-term it leads to decline. But, is it wasteful?
In Leonard C. Lewin's polemical treatise. The Report From Iron M ountain 
(1967), it was argued that war, here implying not only the act of war but the 
production of weapons for war, could not be considered wasteful. To do so 
would imply a failure of function.(41) This, he argued, is not the case. Weapons 
are used to protect the state and its interests and, when properly used, this is
Iwhat they do.
j
This question is not one which is easily resolved; however a compromise
preventing economies from advancing too rapidly. At the same time it helps to 
structure the economy.(42) Advancements in weapons technology can hold 
benefits for the security of the state as well as the further development of the 
economy.
7 ':Vhas been suggested. Rasler and Thompson in their 1989 survey of war and the 
economic growth question argued that,
■7:!
all or most wars probably involve some obvious and 
subtle mixture of destructive and constructive effects 
on war participants, [and thus] we are left w ith the 
possibilities that the net war impact on economic 
growth can be positive, negative, variable (positive for 
some cases, negative for others), or insignificant.(43)
Perhaps then the important question is not whether war is wasteful but whether 
it is cost-effective. Is the maximum benefit being derived from the level of 
input? Because each state is organised in a different manner for war the answer 
will vary from state to state. In the case of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev 
determ ined that the m ilitary's claim on the state budget was no longer 
sustainable while the economy was experiencing negative growth. Thus the 
decision was made to redirect funds to the civilian sector.
Prior to the 1980s articles concerned w ith conversion appeared 
infrequently in the Soviet press and were generally concerned with the subject in 
the context of the capitalist systems.(44) When attention was turned towards the 
possibility of conversion within the Soviet Union it was presum ed that few 
difficulties if any would be encountered.(45)
The arms race was considered the fault of the capitalist West, particularly
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of the United States, In the socialist countries armament expenditure was 
determ ined "exclusively by the necessity of defence against a potential 
enem y."(46) Indeed Nikita Khrushchev while still First Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) argued that were it not for the 
arms race the money would be spent on housing and education. (47) Should the 
military competition cease, then conversion could begin.
Stefan Doernberg claimed that while the socialist countries, like their 
capitalist counterparts, would encounter problems of organisation and planning, 
of economic proportion and the allocation of manpower, of retraining and 
dislocation of the workforce, they would find solutions in the very nature of the 
socialist planned economy. Such a system provided for the active participation 
of the workforce in the planning process and its implementation.(48) While this 
claim would later be disproved by Soviet academics in the 1980s and the failure 
of the Gorbachev conversion programme, it was widely accepted in the 1960s and 
1970s. Two separate United Nations documents supported this view. In the 1962 
UN Report it was frequently suggested that the "framework of the general 
economic plans [would] ensure a desirable balance betw een dem and and 
resources."(49) In a subsequent document it was concluded that within Soviet 
m ilitary enterprises and establishm ents no great alterations or wholesale 
replacement of equipment would need to occur, nor would there be any need for 
the relocation of labour or mass retraining.(50)
Two periods of Soviet history are generally cited in discussions of 
conversion, post-World War II and the Khrushchev era. It is arguable whether 
the first should be described as a period of conversion or a period of rebuilding.
As a result of the enormous destruction and devastation which occurred during 
the war much of the equipment was unsalvageable.(51) In addition, those
I
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enterprises which had been constructed during the war were geared entirely 
towards military production and thus "less convertible" than enterprises built 
during peacetime.(52) The relocation of the workforce also proved difficult 
because vast num bers had been evacuated east in advance of the German 
onslaught. Problems were encountered in physically moving people back to 
their homes and in rebuilding houses and a community infrastructure to 
support them. As a result there was a decline in industrial production in 1945 
and 1946.(53)
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The second period, the Khrushchev era, initially received a more 
favourable press. Attention was concentrated not so much on plant conversion 
as on the demobilisation of the armed forces. The 1962 UN Report claimed that 
no significant problems were encountered.(54) While remaining unspecific, 
Alexei Kireyev in a 1989 article argued that positive economic outcomes had 
been achieved as a result of the unilateral arms cuts of the 1960s.(55) Lincoln 
Bloomfield, Walter Clemens and Franklyn Griffiths have stated that the 
conventional ground force reductions which occurred between 1955 and 1958 
were undoubtedly motivated by scarcities in agriculture, housing, light industry 
and in m anpower.(56) Undoubtedly it was to these areas that the released 
m anpow er was redirected. The transition was not as smooth as has been 
asserted. In an article which appeared in Izvestia  in 1991 officers voiced their 
concern that the Gorbachev disarmament programme would be handled as badly 
as the Khrushchev initiative.(57) They blamed poor planning on the part of the 
governm ent for high levels of unemployment among officers and housing 
shortages. The system had not functioned as effectively as had been predicted. 
In 1979, Milton Leitenberg in an article in the Journal of Peace Research cited a 
Soviet spokesman who declared that the USSR would encounter problems in
converting their defence industries.(58) It was unclear what these problems
m ight be, yet Leitenberg was convinced that they would be easily resolved.
The tru th  of the matter is that because neither system was exactly as it 
seemed or exactly as its government claimed it to be, neither economy was or is 
guaranteed a successful conversion programme. The American defence sector 
was coddled from an early age. The creation of an industrial policy specific to the 
defence sector has m eant a highlevel of governm ent involvem ent in its 
operations, an involvement not experienced in any other sector of the economy. 
The absence of normal market regulators within the industry still limits its 
ability to adjust to peaceful production. Not only must the firms develop new 
product lines, they must also learn a whole new set of rules. The end of the Cold 
W ar and the commencement of a period of prolonged disarmament have left the 
defence enterprises with two options: 1) divestment or 2) concentration.(59) 
Some firms have chosen to reduce dependence on arms sales and have sold off 
some of their m ilitary assets in order to improve liquidity. Other firms, 
particularly those with a civil and military product mix, have decided to sell off 
the civilian aspects and concentrate on increasing their share of a shrinking arms 
market. It must be said that the second option is the one more frequently chosen 
by large producers.(60)
The Soviet Union's experience of conversion, which is the specific topic of 
this thesis, differed from that of the United States. Lack of government impetus 
resulted in the inefficient operation of the planning system. While Gorbachev 
pursued a rapid disarm am ent program m e, proper conversion appeared to 
remain an afterthought. Consideration was not given to the myriad ways in 
which disarmament would affect both the economy and society. The second 
problem was that any attempts to plan for conversion were hindered by the 
Soviet Union's lurching progress towards market reform. The defence sector
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w ith 5,000 enterprises and approximately 40 million employees essentially 
existed as a planned economy w ithin an even larger transitional m arket 
economy. (61) The very nature of this arrangement meant that the success of 
conversion would be limited.
ESTABLISHING AN HYPOTHESIS
If neither a free market nor a centrally planned economic system can 
ensure a smooth transition from an armed economy to a disarmed economy 
then what other methods are available to a government? Some authors have 
argued that it is not the economic system but the state structure which holds the 
key to successful conversion.(62) In its ideal form the state exists to protect its 
citizens from both external and internal threats. In order that this duty may be 
carried out society sanctions the use of force by the state.(63) As has been detailed 
above, the state develops a military-industrial complex which will enable it to 
defend society. This complex appears to be subordinate to the government, for it 
is the promotion of an industrial policy which gives rise to its existence. Leonard 
C. Lewin’s Report From Iron Mountain proposed a different interpretation, that 
"war", including the preparation for war, is a social system in its own right.(64) 
Support for this claim was to be found in the relationship between "war" in this 
sense and the state. (65) The author argued that it was incorrect to assume that 
"war", as an institution, is subordinate to the social systems it is believed to 
serve.(66) If war were subordinate, if it existed only as a tool of policy, than 
disarmament and conversion would be a procedural matter; the system would be 
as easily dismantled as it was created. This is generally not the case. The Report 
used as evidence the limited success of conversion. D isarm am ent and 
conversion are understandably linked. When a program m e of total and 
complete disarmament is pursued conversion is bound to be successful; note the
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cases of Japan and Germany. When a government is interested only in a limited 
form of disarmament than conversion is far less successful.
Pursuit of a lim ited disarm am ent program m e dem onstrates that a 
government believes that peace will not last and thus that it is unwilling to 
damage its defence infrastructure. This signal is received both at home and 
abroad. Defence enterprises are encouraged that their services will be needed 
again, thus during the "famine period" they are willing to tighten their belts but 
they are not necessarily willing to restructure. (67)
For those enterprises unable to survive this period and forced to release 
their employees the demands that they place on the social sector in terms of debt 
relief and unemploym ent benefit have the potential to offset the economic 
savings the governm ent would have hoped to have m ade as a result of 
disarmament. In order to prevent such a fate, enterprises, employees and 
m em bers of the local com m unity attem pt to influence governm ent by 
threatening the w ithdraw al of their support.(68) The m ilitary-industrial 
complex, contrary to popular belief, is not a faceless organisation; it is made up of 
individuals who are bound to suffer unless appropriate support programmes are 
in place when conversion begins.
Although the same type of democratic process could not be said to have 
existed in the Soviet Union, at least until its last two years, the military- 
industrial complex as a whole was still able to influence policy. The military did 
not defy Khrushchev openly, but neither did it give him its full support in 1964. 
In 1991 members of the MIC and the armed forces participated in the attempt to 
overthrow Gorbachev. Subsequently members of the defence sector have tried 
through various Russian parliam entary parties to m oderate the course of
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reform. In each instance it has been argued that government policy has put the 
security of the state and the stability of the defence regions at risk.(69) To 
w ithstand such criticism takes a strong political will, a coherent vision of the 
future and a great deal of organisation.
IA state must be organised for peace just as it is organised for war. The 
Report proposed that the "fact that a society is organised for any degree of 
readiness for war supersedes its political and economic structure".(70) This 
argument is reminiscent of the one put forward by Machiavelli, and outlined in 
Chapter One. In The Prince he argued that war was the very basis of the state. In 
The Art of War he declared that a state had to have the means to protect its civic 
institutions and that these same institutions must in essence be geared to their 
own protection. The way to achieve this was to maximise the level of political 
organisation.(71) Within this context war becomes a factor which shapes both 
the external and internal structures of the state, thus fulfilling the foreign policy 
and unifying roles described by Garnett.
The political structure, created out of a need to defend society from an 
external attack, is maintained by the threat, however unlikely, that force will be 
used within a domestic context. The evaporation of a war system's credibility 
can therefore lead to the government's dissolution.(72) At least two incidents can 
be cited from Russian history in which a weak showing on the field of battle was 
immediately followed by a popular uprising. The first case was the 1905 
Revolution. Following a resounding defeat at the hands of the Japanese, the 
Tsarist regime was then faced with a revolution which, although eventually 
suppressed, forced the system to change in certain respects. Again in 1917 
revolution followed close on the heels of a poor military showing. Granted the 
Russian people were revolting against general economic and political situations;
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nevertheless, if war had not aggravated the conditions, would the revolutionary 
flame have flared so high? When all is said and done, will the history books 
state that Gorbachev's attempts to curtail the military and its influence in Soviet 
society added impetus to the rebellions in the various republics?
It was argued in the Report From Iron Mountain that the political role of 
the armed forces and the war system is augmented by their social function. The 
military is a symbol of national unity, instilling pride and patriotism within the 
citizenry, tying it to the state. These bonds are further strengthened when 
national service is enforced, thus creating a shared experience. M ilitary 
institutions are used to provide a moral code and a role in the social structure. 
They are also used to absorb excess labour, thus fulfilling one of war's economic 
functions.(73) These are themes which have been expressed elsewhere, most 
notably in Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America. (74)
Governments interested in achieving complete and total disarmament are 
faced with the same question: how can all of the internal and external functions 
of war be fulfilled? The Report established a set of criteria for an alternative to 
the war system. According to these requirements the new system would have 
to provide an external necessity for a society to accept political rule; new 
institutions would have to be developed that were able to control the "socially 
destructive segments of society"; and, the system would need to balance the 
surpluses of production and population.(75) These criteria are essentially 
concerned with the political aspects of disarmament and conversion. If war is 
the basis of the state, then what reason does the state have for existence if war is 
removed? Can environm ental decline or economic com petition provide 
sufficient justification for the continuance of the state? Does society need to re­
think the state and market structures?
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Authors who have considered these types of questions have tended to 
adopt an economic rather than a political approach. They believe that economic 
and environmental issues can provide sufficient cause for the continuance of the 
state.(76) There has been a subtle change in the perceived function of the state, 
with a return to the liberal traditions of the 18th and 19th centuries.(77) In 1990 
Vladimir Sokolov declared that the three main functions of the state were to 
provide "STABILITY of laws and economic relations, CONTINUITY in the 
commitments of successive governments and PROTECTION from crime and 
social upheavals".(78) Markusen and Yudken have proposed a fourth function: 
to provide a vision.(79) Their vision for America was a national economic 
development strategy.(80) Instead of having companies compete against one 
another to achieve short term economic gain the government should promote a 
vision of what the future could be if all individuals and corporations worked 
together. (81)
Soviet academics made similar proposals. In a country where until the 
late 1980s the government planned all aspects of economic development, Soviet 
specialists on the subject asked only that the state create the framework of 
conversion and allow the enterprises to see it through.(82) Soviet analysts 
appeared to fall in line with the recommendations for capitalist societies made by 
the 1962 UN Report on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament. 
They spoke specifically of three rules which should be implemented: (1) the laws 
of supply and demand should guide the enterprises in their activities; (2) 
enterprises should adapt output to what they are technically capable of 
producing; and (3) enterprises should bid or compete for government contracts. 
These recommendations, made in light of the market reforms which were 
occurring or being considered during the Gorbachev era, brought Soviet and
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American positions together on this issue and demonstrated that the two sets of 
assumptions and approaches were not so very different.
There was further agreement on proposals that conversion be planned 
well in advance of its implementation, that primary responsibility for planning 
occur at the enterprise level and that local and national governments should be 
involved in the process of capital redistribution.(83) There is one other area in 
which government needs to be involved and that is in the area of support for 
military and defence industrial personnel. Seymour Melman suggested in 1970 
that the United States needed an equivalent of an economic bill of rights. Such a 
piece of legislation would cover retirement pay, separation pay, support for 
occupational retraining and relocation.(84) In the Soviet Union where 
responsibility for such matters initially rested w ith the enterprise frequent 
demands were made for state involvement as will be demonstrated in Chapter 
Five.
CONCLUSION
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Contrary to popular opinion military-industrial complexes are neither 
impersonal structures nor completely divorced from the societies which they 
serve. They consist of individuals who, on a daily basis, perform what they 
mostly believe to be their patriotic duty, either by manufacturing weapons or by 
serving in the armed forces. Employees and military personnel contribute to 
their local economies while the defence enterprises, under suitable conditions, 
can contribute to the economic growth of the country as a whole.
I
Whether "war" is declared a social system in its own right, or the strong
.link between the defence and civilian sectors is recognised, careful planning
Si
seems to be necessary if a "peace system" is to be established. The state's function 
is to provide both stability and vision. The way to accomplish this is initially to 
plan carefully for conversion. Any programme should have a recognisable 
beginning and end lest a new dependency be created.(85) An industrial policy 
which incorporates an economic bill of rights may be necessary. Once the state 
has created the basic framework for conversion, then it is up to the enterprises 
them selves to ensure its im plem entation. Policies of centralisation and 
decentralisation will need to coexist. (86)
Proposals for such a programme were a radical departure for both Soviet 
and A m erican analysts. Calls for greater en terp rise  in itia tive  and 
implementation of normal market regulators went against the basic principles of 
the Soviet command economy. But these ideas were in line with the radical 
proposals being put forward for the rest of the economy during the late 1980s.(87)
In the United States demands for an opposite course of action were being made, 
that the state should become more not less involved in economic policy. Both j
countries seemed to be moving towards a middle ground, the formation of a 
policy of state managerial capitalism. Of the two countries the Soviet Union was 
the more dedicated in promoting such a policy, partially because its needs were 
greater.
The level of success enjoyed was limited because, while specialists on 
conversion considered a policy of state managerial capitalism to be the correct 
approach, the governm ent, for m ilitary security reasons, favoured the 
continuation of a high level of state involvement in the defence sector. Another 
problem, one which has generally not been addressed by either American or 
Soviet writers, was the social role of the armed forces. The government curtailed 
the social remit of the military without providing it w ith a new role. In this
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instance the government failed to provide a vision for the future and thereby 
caused political instability. Subsequent chapters will detail how the Soviet 
government failed to provide stability, continuity, protection and vision.
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CHAPTER THREE 
DISARMAMENT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE SOVIET MILITARY'S ROLE IN SOCIETY,
1986-1991
Mikhail Gorbachev had a vision of a world in which a state’s security was 
defined by its political and economic health and stability first, and then by its 
military power. It was hoped that in the future the Soviet Union would not be 
deemed a "one-dimensional superpower", its world standing resting solely upon 
its military might.(1) Initially, Gorbachev believed that slight reductions in the 
armed forces would be sufficient to encourage more open relations between East 
and West and that the policy of uskorenie  (acceleration), introduced in 1986, 
would succeed in promoting economic growth. However, the problems within 
the economy were much more severe than Gorbachev initially realised. It soon 
became apparent that much more radical reform would have to transpire. This 
would include a reform of the armed forces so that the defence burden might be 
reduced.
Initially the armed forces were willing to support Gorbachev. However, 
troop reductions coupled with economic and political reform forced the military 
to transform its traditional role in society and in doing so shook the organisation 
to its core. As a result, dissent within the ranks, in addition to the upheaval of 
the reform programme, would prove to be a direct cause of political instability 
and Gorbachev's subsequent overthrow.
The purpose of this chapter is three-fold: 1) to establish the problems and 
limitations of the economic system and thus come to a better understanding of 
w hy disarm am ent was necessary; 2) to chart the course of disarm am ent, 
demonstrating how rapid and acute the cuts were; and 3) to analyse the effect of
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the programme on the military.
THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY
In emphasising military strength over economic growth and stability, 
successive Soviet leaders had created a "militarised" economy. Yet, the armed 
forces merely exacerbated economic problems, they were not their cause. 
Leonid Abalkin, a leading Soviet economist, argued in 1988 that a centralised 
economy had two main functions: '1'
1) The management of the national economy as a 
unitary whole. This included issues such as the 
strategy of economic growth, the determ ination of 
goals and priorities and the form ulation of an 
industrial policy.
2) The creation of conditions for the effective, 
independent and responsible action of the basic links 
of the economy. (2)
■Abalkin, and fellow economists Buzgalin and Kolganov, shared the opinion that 
the system had become over-centralised.(3) Enterprises were no longer the focus 
of nor participants in the planning system. (4) All too frequently plans were the 
result of a deal between representatives of different departments.(5) As a result 
there were two negative repercussions. First, decisions were m ade for the 
republics and regions without looking at how they were integrated into the 
overall system.(6) Second, the military benefited at the expense of the civilian 
economy. Because the government’s top priority was security it was willing to 
ensure that the defence sector received all of the resources it needed.(7) So, while 
defence plants were allowed to maintain their own autonomous suppliers, they
?!were also granted leave to pilfer the supplies of civilian enterprises should their 
stockpiles run low.(8) In prioritizing the smooth and efficient running of the 
m ilitary economy the governm ent ensured inefficiency w ithin the civilian
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economy by allowing for the disappearance of equipment, spares and raw 
materials.(9)
The ability of the civilian sector to support its military counterpart and 
compete in international markets was further hindered by a failure on the part of 
the government to allow for technology transfers between sectors. Known as 
"spin-off", the transfer of technology between the military and civilian sectors 
has resulted in the West in advances in computer, communications and 
aeronautical technology, with benefits for both sectors. Soviet civilian industry 
did not enjoy the same level of benefit.(10) As a result, the lack of innovation 
led to a decrease in efficiency which in turned curtailed the civilian economy's 
ability to support its military counterpart in the arms race, a race which was 
increasingly technology led.
Failure to fully integrate the two sectors and examine the system in its 
entirety also meant that the adverse trends and difficulties which arose during 
the 1970s and 1980s were not corrected.(11) In the past accelerated rates of growth 
had been the result of dramatic increases in capital investm ent.(12) These 
increases in conjunction with an extensive use of resources had enabled the 
system to cope with imbalances (shortages of supply).(13) In pursuing such a 
policy the Soviet Union had, however, exploited its reserves of high quality, 
readily available raw materials. It became necessary to rely on poorer quality 
resources extracted from further afield. An increase in the overall production 
cost was necessary in order to cover the rise in transportation and purification 
charges.(14) The lack of technological innovation in civilian industry combined 
with the declining quality and supply of raw materials resulted in a decline in 
industrial output of 40 percent. (15) Declining rates of growth in other sectors, 
such as agriculture, limited the potential for capital investment and the pursuit
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of an extensive  policy of development (using resources to promote growth) in 
the 1980s (See Table 3.1).(16) Slowing rates of economic grow th were 
accom panied by sm aller increases in national income. This led Abel 
Aganbegyan, Gorbachev's chief economic advisor, to state that "unprecedented 
stagnation and crisis" had occurred in the period from 1979 to 1982,(17)
Against this backdrop, Soviet military expenditure continued to increase 
in real terms by 2 percent per year in the early 1980s and by 3 percent in 1986.(18) 
By the late 1980s it was believed that the defence sector's share of Soviet GNP was 
between 22 and 30 percent.(19) Competition between the defence and civilian 
sectors for resources could no longer be maintained and indeed the Soviet 
military seemed to recognise this fact.(20) The arms race was increasingly 
technology led and it was clear that the Soviet Union, with its aging industrial 
base, could not compete. (21) Some form of change was necessary.
Table 3.1
Aggregate Economic Performance 1955-87 (%) (22)
Average Annual Growth
1955- 1965- 1971- 1976- 1981- 1984-
1965 1970 1975 1980 1983 1987
GNP 5.4 5.2 3.7 2.7 2.3 1.6
Industry 7.5 6.3 5.9 3.4 1.5 2.1
Agri­
culture 3.5 3.5 -2.3 0.3 4.2 0.8
Services 4.0 4.2 3.4 2.8 2.1 N /A
Consum ption 4.7 5.3 3.6 2.6 1.7 2.4
Investm ent 9.1 6.0 5.4 4.3 4.2 3.0
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It was believed that the solution to slowing rates of economic growth was 
a reform  of the economic m echanism and the dém ocratisation of the 
m anagem ent process.(23) The form of ownership did not need to change 
necessarily, just the method of directing the economy.(24) Proposals for reform 
of the economic mechanism were the result of a debate which had occurred in 
the 1960s between those economists who favoured the status quo and those who 
desired change.(25) The latter group believed that a shift towards "normal" 
m arket relations should occur. They argued that the science production 
association should be the basic economic unit and that contractual relations 
between customer enterprises and supplier enterprises should be promoted.(26)
They also placed an increased emphasis on commodity-monetary relations and 
encouraged enterprises to become self-financing and accountable for costs. For 
twenty years the belief that economic methods were more efficient in optimising 
economic interests than administrative methods was largely dismissed by the 
government.(27) One possible reason is that the necessity for economic reform
" ' Èwas not evident until the 1980s, or perhaps it was because economic reform 
deprives politicians of power and Soviet ministers were unwilling to relinquish ?
S,£
control.(28) By the time Gorbachev came to power, however, reform could no
■longer be neglected.
1
In 1986 Gorbachev began to promote the policy of uskorenie. The purpose 
was to subordinate the economic mechanism to the task of accelerating the 
nation's socioeconomic development, not its military security.(29) In this 
instance acceleration would have to be achieved by improvements in scientific- 
technological capability, in organisation and in labour productiv ity  and 
effectiveness.(30) The problem  of labour productivity  was tackled by 
implementing an incentive programme and an anti-alcohol campaign. Both 
met w ith limited success, and the decision was taken to implement a more
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radical restructuring programme, perestroika, from 1987. The governm ent 
attempted to modify the organisational structure by allowing greater enterprise 
initiative. The individuals who drafted the 1987 Law on the State Enterprise 
took their cue from the economic debate of the 1960s and made the enterprise the 
prim ary economic actor. As a result the involvem ent of enterprises in 
establishing their own plans and contractual arrangements increased.(31) These 
aspects of reform would be meaningless, however, w ithout a corresponding 
reform of the pricing system. Although guidelines were established in 1987 and 
price reforms began in certain sectors in 1990 and 1991, the government, rather 
than the market, continued to set the price for many goods.(32) This was in 
opposition to one of the basic tenets of reform, that the state should plan overall 
strategy and not be involved in "micromanagement".(33)
The promotion of improved scientific-technological capability was one 
area in which the governm ent could not decide w hether to m aintain a 
controlling interest or allow greater enterprise initiative. In 1987 two pieces of 
legislation were passed which allowed Soviet enterprises to establish joint 
ventures w ith their counterparts in CMEA and Western countries. The 
government hoped that the formation of such links would result in an increase 
in foreign investment and technology transfers. However, the legislation was so 
restrictive that foreign interest did not meet expectations.(34) The only
alternative to improving the technology base was conversion of the defence 
sector. Governm ent planners and civilian analysts alike believed that 
conversion and the transfer of technology from the defence to the civilian sector 
would result in an improvement in the capital stock and an increase in the 
production of consumer durables. There was also a general consensus that by 
cutting the defence budget and diverting funds back into the civilian economy
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growth could be im proved.(35) As will be detailed in Chapter Five, the
government, as a result of pressure placed upon it by the military establishment, 
had to limit the extent of reform in the MIC. As a result, the defence and civilian 
sectors of the economy remained separate. Yet, initially, it was considered 
possible to divert resources from the defence sector, by reducing the Soviet 
Union's dependency on military security.
ON THE ISSUE OF DISARMAMENT
In the public lexicon disarmament is often confused with other issues. 
Under certain conditions disarmament connotes peace. In more general usage 
disarmament has become interchangeable with arms control and vice versa. 
Disarmament on its own means the complete elimination of conventional and 
nuclear arms from the political arena. Proponents of disarm am ent have 
generally viewed the existence of weapons as a direct cause of the arms race and 
war.(36) If the weapons did not exist they could not be used, and if they could not 
be used then there would be no pretext for war.
Supporters of arms control, on the other hand, believe that "wars are 
brought about by causes deeper than armaments".(37) Effectively, war begins in
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the minds of men — a thought reminiscent of that expounded by Clausewitz 
concerning "hostile feelings and hostile intentions".(38) As a result of these 
beliefs, arms controllers have resigned themselves to the fact that weapons will 
always be present within the political arena. Therefore their aim has been to 
supplement "unilateral military strategy by some kind of collaboration with the 
countries that are potential enemies".(39) The hope is that this method will 
mitigate the potential level of fear between the adversaries by eliminating the 
aspect of surprise. A balance is sought in the levels of "good" (defensive) and 
"bad" (offensive) weapons, so that neither side will feel at a disadvantage.
I  I
Whereas, in the disarmament scenario, an increase in arms is bad, it may not 
necessarily be so in the context of arms control if it is used to balance against i 
another type of weaponry.
Prior to 1987 the arms control approach was preferred to that of 
disarmament. The latter was perceived as Utopian because it dem anded a 
dramatic change in human and state behaviour patterns.(40) Arms control was 
for the most part considered a more feasible alternative. One reason is that it had 
until recently been able to side-step the issue of verification. Furthermore it took 
into account that man always strives to produce goods and implements bigger 
and better than those which have gone before. Arms control allows for growth 
and advancement in the military sector.
Gorbachev and like-minded politicians considered disarmament, rather
domestic reform. A reduction in armaments and expenditure would also free 
valuable resources for the civilian economy. Economic and political instability as 
well as a failure on the part of Gorbachev to adequately assess the role of the
programme.
than arms control, as the key to creating a politically and economically stable 
Soviet Union. The disarmament process would guarantee international security
■ :and thus provide a w indow of opportunity for the government to initiate
arm ed forces w ithin society would limit the benefits of the disarm am ent
-
Change within the military sector occurred quite rapidly, starting in 1986. 
It was in January of that year that Gorbachev made public his three step process 
for a nuclear free world. The initial stage of the programme called for the two 
superpowers to reduce their arsenals by 50 percent, setting a new ceiling of 6000 
warheads per side in the remaining categories of weapons. Five to eight years
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were allowed for the two countries to reach this new level. During this period 
Britain and France would halt the manufacture of any additional weapons, and 
an indirect freeze would be applied on other countries, thereby prohibiting the 
two superpowers from supplying weapons to their allies.(41)
All of the nuclear powers would be involved in stage two, scheduled to 
commence no later than 1990. During a five to seven year period the existing 
level of nuclear arms would be frozen world-wide and the stationing of one 
nation's missiles on another's territory would be prohibited.(42) Tliis phase was 
set to surpass the first in reducing world stockpiles. Once the 50 percent mark 
had been met all the nuclear powers would begin to eliminate tactical nuclear 
weapons, i.e. all systems with a range of up to 1000 kilometres. At the same time 
the Soviet and American accord on the prohibition of space strike weapons 
would become multilateral and the testing of all nuclear arms would be stopped. 
An additional ban would be established on the development of non-nuclear 
arms "based on new physical principles that in terms of their destructive 
capability approach nuclear or other means of mass destruction".(43) These 
weapons were subsequently defined as beam, radio wave, infrasonic, geophysical 
and genetic weapons.(44) The elimination of all remaining weapons would 
occur in the final phase. Ideally, by the end of 1999 none of these systems would 
remain on earth. Their reappearance would be prevented by the signing of an 
accord.(45)
This type of proposal was not new. Over the years both the United States 
and the Soviet Union had expressed their desire to see a world free of nuclear 
weapons. What was significant about this proposal was its timing. The Plan for 
the Year 2000 came at a time when Soviet and American relations were at an all 
time low. Ronald Reagan, the US president, frequently referred to the Soviet
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Union as the "Evil Empire", claiming that the Soviet government could not be 
trusted. Members of the Soviet government and the armed forces felt the same 
way about the American administration. Gorbachev's announcement of January 
16, 1986 was an attempt to dispel the distrust on both sides. His generals claimed 
that his proposal was not an idle promise, and suggested that the very existence 
of such a detailed plan was proof of the Soviet Union's sincerity.(46)
Yet, the programme was not that detailed. While it provided dates for the 
completion of each stage it did not establish a strong legal or political framework 
for disarmament. There was no consideration of the nature of security relations 
in the post-nuclear era. Such issues would need to be discussed if a workable 
programme were to be drafted.(47)
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Perhaps what gave the greatest boost to the disarmament process was not 
the plan itself but the government's willingness to act unilaterally and allow 
concessions. For example, the issue of verification had always been a stumbling- 
block in the disarmament and arms control process. Previously the Soviet 
Union w ould allow only national-technical means of verification, i.e. spy 
satellites. The United States had been pushing for some time for on-sight 
inspections. During the negotiations on the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty 
(INF) Gorbachev finally agreed to this plan of operation, and the rules for and 
the limitations on these inspections were incorporated into the Protocol on 
Verification attached to the INF Treaty.
Although Gorbachev abandoned his ultimate aim of a nuclear free world 
by the year 2000 he remained committed to reducing the stockpile levels if only 
to free resources for the development of the economy. The INF Treaty was the 
first significant step in this process. Signed on December 8, 1987 the Treaty
76
applied only to 4 percent of all nuclear weapons, yet it was important because it 
succeeded in eliminating categories of weapons. Furthermore, it served as a 
catalyst for change in many other areas.
The Treaty called for the elimination of medium-range missiles (1000 - 
5500 km. radius) and shorter-range missiles (500 - 1000 km. radius). In the USSR 
this classification covered the SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, ground launched 
cruise missiles and the SS-12 and SS-23 shorter-range missiles. On the US side it 
encompassed the Pershing 1-A, Pershing 2 and BGM~109G missiles.(48) All 
missiles of a range of 500 to 5500 km. were to be destroyed, except for the 15 
allowed to each side for museum purposes.
The Treaty succeeded in reducing the level of tension between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. It also appeased the West Europeans, who had been 
opposed to the deploym ent of m edium -range m issiles in Europe, thus 
im proving  Gorbachev's and the Soviet Union's stand ing  w ith  them . 
Furthermore, by discontinuing production in these categories the Soviet Union 
was able to initiate a program m e of conversion w ithin the now  idle 
enterprises.(49) This was treated as an experiment into the possibilities of a large- 
scale conversion programme. It took some time, however, to assess the results of 
that experiment.(50)
The initial response of the Soviet military to the INF Treaty and the 
resultant conversion programme was one of general support. Leading figures 
within the General Staff assured the public that the elimination of these missiles 
was in line with the Soviet defence policy.(51) The Soviet generals agreed with 
Gorbachev that it was impossible to win a nuclear war and that therefore it was 
necessary to restructure the defence policy,(52) On the issue of economic reform
the military hierarchy again gave its support. The opinion of Colonel N. 
Karasev, a Candidate of Economic Science, was typical of the feelings publicly 
expressed by military personnel in 1987 and 1988. He stated that perestroika 
would lead eventually to the full satisfaction of the socioeconomic and defence 
requirements of the state.(53) Initially the military was willing to make sacrifices 
if it would improve their capabilities in the future.
The Soviet Union had enjoyed reasonably stable relations w ith the 
Afghan government since the 1920s. Any cooling in relations had generally
I
One area in which the military was forced to make repeated sacrifices was 
in manpower. Generally, reductions in force strength demonstrate a certain 
commitment to peace and disarmament because a state is curtailing its ability to
pose a threat and to react to one.(54) Gorbachev's speech to the United Nations
,on December 7, 1988 marked the beginning of major force reductions. Because
I
he believed that international relations should no longer be conducted on the 
basis of ideological confrontation and military aggression and that states should 
instead work together in order to achieve solutions to common problems, he felt 
it necessary that both sides systematically withdraw from points of Cold War 
conflict.(55) To this end he outlined the Soviet Union's plans for the settlement 
of the conflict in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe
■and the Far East.
The stand-off between NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe was 
one of the most obvious symbols of the Cold War. Afghanistan, however, was an 
area where the superpowers had allowed the Cold War to grow hot. Although 
the armed forces of the USA and the USSR did not directly confront each other 
in Afghanistan, their governments armed the various factions of the republic.
I
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em anated from the Afghan side when the governm ent feared too close a 
relationship with the USSR. During the 1950s the governm ent of Prince 
M ohammed Daud turned to the Soviet Union for help in m odernising the 
country. The USSR provided this assistance in return for guarantees that 
Afghanistan would remain a non-aligned country.(56)
In the mid-1970s the stable relationship began to change. Prince Daud, 
who had been out of power during the 1960s, returned to government in 1973 by 
siding with the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA or 
DPPA). In 1975-76 in an attempt to widen the support for the government Daud 
began to pull away from this grouping. Fearful that Afghanistan would drift into 
alignment with the United States and her allies the Soviet government under 
Brezhnev decided to back the PDPA rather than Daud. In April 1978 a coup was 
staged and Daud overthrown and subsequently killed. The new government 
was able to maintain a semblance of control until December 1979, but the 
internal splits within the party as well as the opposition forces which consisted of 
feudal lords, former officers and officials and the Islamic clergy finally succeeded 
in creating too much chaos within the country.(57) On December 27, 1979 Soviet 
forces moved in to restore order.
The Brezhnev Doctrine, form ulated in response to the uprisings in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 (the Prague Spring), indicated that once a foreign country 
had embraced a form of socialism acceptable to the Kremlin, it was to be 
prevented by the Soviet military from abandoning that position. Gunter Knabe 
has suggested that the decision to intervene in Afghanistan was based on this 
doctrine. Although not strictly part of the Socialist camp, Afghanistan was 
viewed as part of the larger family.(58) The main objective in the invasion was 
to replace the existing regime with a more stable and moderate government.(59)
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While the reasons for the intervention may have been ideological, the reasons 
for maintaining an armed force were strategic. Anthony Arnold, a former 
analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has argued that there were 
essentially four reasons for maintaining a military presence. First, there was the 
belief that should Moscow demonstrate weakness in Afghanistan it would affect 
its hold on Eastern Europe. In a related argument it was put forward that other 
Third World nations might begin to suspect Soviet steadfastness as an ally. 
Failure to succeed in Afghanistan also had domestic implications. Afghanistan 
shares its borders with the Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union. There
Yet if these were the strategic considerations for maintaining a presence, 
then the strategic losses resulting from continued involvement were equally 
severe. First, like the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union succeeded in 
alienating itself from the support of the local population. The longer the Red 
Army remained in Afghanistan, the more likely it became that the m ujahedd in  
would seek the assistance of the United States and that Washington would be 
willing to provide aid. Second, the occupation of Afghanistan became one of
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was great concern in the Moscow at the time that the j ihad  which had been 
launched in Afghanistan could be extended to these Islamic republics. Finally, 
the constant underlying fear was that Afghanistan might in the end become 
allied with the West and that the US would use the republic to spy upon or 
launch an attack against the Soviet Union. (60) Relations with China could also 
have been a motivating factor for the initial invasion of and the continued 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Indeed, in 1988 Milan Hauner, Professor of 
International Relations at the University of Wisconsin, proposed that Soviet 
action could have been based on a desire (1) to bring a decisive pressure to bear 
over the subcontinent by exploiting the conflict India had with both Pakistan and 
China; or (2) to complete the encirclement of China.(61)
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three main obstacles to any future improvement in relations with China. Third, 
and most importantly, the invasion of Afghanistan brought to an end the
_détente process. President Reagan would use this act of aggression as a prime 
example of why the United States could not and should not trust the USSR.
By the time of Gorbachev's speech in December 1988 steps had already 
been taken to settle the Afghan situation. The Soviet Union had agreed to the 
Geneva Accords which stipulated that all foreign troops m ust quit Afghanistan. : t
Gorbachev had wanted a resolution to the political situation prior to the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops, but had realised in the end that the political and
economic costs of maintaining a force of over 100,000 men were becoming too 
great. As a result of glasnost' more media attention was being paid within the 
Soviet Union to the Afghan war. Ethnic groups and coalitions of soldiers' 
m others were demonstrating against Soviet involvement in a war which by 
1986 had claimed the lives of 10,000 soldiers.(62) The economic cost of the war 
was also substantive. Former Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov estimated the
cost of the war at R5 billion per annum.(63) A cessation of hostilities would
save the government several billion roubles, reduce the potential for domestic 
conflict at home and improve diplomatic relations with the United States and 
China. From the governm ent's point of view the negative impact of a 
w ithdrawal from an unresolved conflict was outweighed by the very positive 
benefits. It was a sacrifice worth making.
In addition to the statements on Afghanistan, Gorbachev also announced 
the partial w ithdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and Mongolia. 
Concessions within these two areas would prove to both the West and Asia that 
new thinking in Soviet foreign policy was not merely empty rhetoric but a true 
shift from the politics of confrontation. They would also signal the beginning of
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was a general fear that the cutbacks would be unorganised. As will be discussed 
in below, this fear became reality.
Regardless of the hesitancy felt within the armed forces, the Soviet Union 
began bringing its men home. By 1989 perestroika was already well under way
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a large scale withdrawal from points of Cold War conflict. In his address to the 
United Nations Gorbachev announced that Soviet troop strength would be 
reduced by 500,000 men. Of that number 50,000 were to be removed from the 
territories of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary. Six armoured divisions were to be w ithdraw n from those same 
countries and disbanded. The number of troops within the European sector of 
the USSR was also to be decreased. All told the Soviet armed forces would lose
10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 warplanes.(64)
This decision was greeted with surprise both in the West and the East.(65) 
Some Western analysts said that the numbers did not add up, that the number of 
men and tanks being withdrawn did not equal six tank divisions.(66) Gorbachev 
and his staff countered these accusations by stating that Soviet defence policy had 
been reformed and that all withdrawals would be made in line with the policies 
of new thinking and reasonable sufficiency.(67) Within the Soviet m ilitary 
scepticism was a little more difficult to dispel. General Sergei Akhromeyev 
announced his resignation following the statem ent on troop reductions. 
A lthough the official line taken was that he was being replaced by Mikhail 
Moiseev so that he could fulfil other duties, rumours spread about the state of 
his health and his opposition to the unilateral action.(68) Within the lower 
ranks, officers were said to be uneasy about the cuts.(69) Of the 500,000 men to be 
withdrawn, one-sixth were in the officer corps.(70) As stated previously, there
I
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in the USSR, and as the programme developed it became apparent that the
82
■
government could not conceivably continue to spend such a large portion of its 
Gross Domestic Product on defence.(71) Therefore, the deployment of troops in 
Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union was no longer a tenable position. The 
December 1988 announcement of a partial withdrawal would prove to be the 
beginning of a much more extensive programme.
That program m e consisted of a reduction of political and m ilitary 
involvement in Eastern Europe. While Gorbachev favoured some form of 
perestroika within the East European nations as a result of his policy of new 
thinking, a policy which advocated a hands-off approach, he could neither 
actively encourage or oppose reform in other countries.
The abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine surprised some of the Soviet 
Union's allies, particularly East Germany. As that country was being swept away 
by a series of mass demonstrations in 1989 its leader, Erich Honecker, looked to 
Gorbachev for support that was not forthcoming. The East German government 
had been prepared for a Tienanmen Square type of assault on the demonstrators, 
but this proposal was vetoed by Moscow. The Soviet government may have 
considered a change of leadership sufficient to stabilise the situation in East 
Germany, however it later became apparent that this would not suffice.(72)
j
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The overthrow of communist rule in Europe in 1989 occurred in part 
because Gorbachev was willing to allow the WTO countries to chart their own 
courses. It can also be seen as a knock-on effect from the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops. The removal of the physical rem inder of Soviet authority gave 
dissidents and reformers more leeway while at the same time restricting the 
manoeuvrability of those in power. %
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Moscow maintained that, so long as the GDR was both willing and able to 
continue as a state, unification should be rejected. The opening of the Berlin
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The result of the events in 1989 and of the reunification of Germany in 
October 1991 was that Soviet troops were forced out of Eastern Europe and back 
on to their own territory. As Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany and 
Poland developed more democratic political systems demands grew for the rapid 
removal of the physical evidence of 40 years of repression. Czechoslovakia was 
the first to call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. On January 9, 1990 the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs demanded the removal of the "temporary" troops, 
and by February 26 a treaty had been concluded.(73) The army had retreated by 
April 1991.
A similar arrangem ent was made with Hungary; negotiations with 
Germany and Poland, however, were much more difficult.(74) The decision to 
leave the GDR was not one the Soviet government could make on its own. 
Instead it was forced to solve the issue within the framework of what became 
known as the "2 + 4" negotiations.
Although the Gorbachev administration had been unwilling to bolster 
the faltering East German government in the summer and fall of 1989, it was 
nevertheless reluctant to condone the unification of the two Germanys in the 
w inter of 1989 - 1990, especially if they were to be united within NATO. 
Gorbachev was prepared to accept extensive political change in the GDR, but he 
was unwilling to accept the right to German national self-determination.(75) It 
was believed that the acknowledgement of this right would lead inexorably to 
the dissolution of the borders between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
and the GDR and thus to the weakening of the Warsaw Pact.(76)
W all in November 1989 and the almost immediate "depopulation" of East 
Germany as people streamed towards the West forced the Soviet government to 
change its stance. Gorbachev gave his tacit agreement to reunification in January 
1990; however, he stressed that the process should be carried out slowly and with 
all due consideration given to any potential difficulties.(77)
During the course of 1990 representatives of the USSR, the US, the United 
Kingdom and France as well as from the two Germanys met to discuss the 
external aspects of reunification. One of the main stumbling blocks was a united 
Germany's role in the security structures of Europe. The Soviet government was 
loathe to see Germany solely in NATO. East Germany was perceived as the 
cornerstone of the Warsaw Pact. It was believed that without it both the alliance 
and the European security structure as a whole w ould be destabilised. 
Unfortunately for the Soviet Union her allies did not share the same view.(78) 
As far as Hungary and Czechoslovakia were concerned the removal of Soviet 
troops from their own territory meant that it was only a matter of time before the 
pact disintegrated. Despite pressure from his own military establishm ent 
Gorbachev was forced to concede Germany's membership of NATO in July 
1990.(79)
The "2 + 4" treaty was eventually signed on 12 September 1990. It was 
consum mated by a series of Soviet - German agreements in October and 
November of that year. One of the five agreements dealt with the removal of 
Soviet troops from East German territory by the end of 1994. Another of the 
accords stipulated the terms of a generous financial offer of assistance on the part 
of the Germans to repay the Soviet Union for its willingness to allow German 
reunification.(80)
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The withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany was an issue closely 
tied to the removal of the Northern Group of Forces (NGF) from Poland. Wary 
of a reunited Germany, the Polish government was initially reluctant to see 
Soviet troops leave its territory until guarantees had been made to ensure its 
security.(81) However, once the government discovered that the Soviet Union 
intended to transport 350,000 service personnel, 150,000 civilian personnel and
500,000 family members across its territory, without prior consultation, it decided 
to act.(82) The Western Group of Forces could not cross Poland until the fate of 
the 58,000 strong Northern Group of Forces had been decided. Demands were 
made for the withdrawal of the NGF by the end of 1991. Initially, the USSR was 
unable to comply owing to the logistical problems of housing all returning 
troops within the territory of Russia. Eventually a compromise was reached and
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the main body of the Soviet combat force left Poland at the beginning of 
November 1992.
During this period troops were being withdrawn not only from Europe but 
from all major outposts. The initial withdrawal from Mongolia was the result of 
Gorbachev's statement to the United Nations in December 1988. Of the 500,000 
troops mentioned, 200,000 would be removed from the Far East, including 50,000 
servicemen from Mongolia. As the three divisions of ground forces and all of 
the aviation units were being withdrawn it was decided that all Soviet troops 
should leave Mongolia. In March 1990 an agreement was reached, and the 
troops were withdrawn by the end of 1992.(83)
A reduction in Soviet troop strength in Asia had always been a 
prerequisite for im proved relations w ith China. The decision in 1988 to 
w ithdraw  troops from both Afghanistan and Mongolia contributed to the 
normalisation of relations between the two countries at the May 1989 Sino-
Î
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Soviet summit.
Soviet relations in Europe im proved w ith the signing of the 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). Both the beneficiary and the 
victim of the period in which it was negotiated, the initial im petus for 
discussing such a treaty had come from the Soviet unilateral withdrawal from 
Europe. It was believed that if the USSR was willing to withdraw partially from 
Europe and restructure the remaining forces then perhaps the Western powers 
should be able to do the same. The negotiations between the member states of 
NATO and the WTO began in March 1989 in Vienna. The two main aims were 
to (1) follow on from the unilateral action and achieve an even lower balance of 
forces deployed in the Atlantic to the Urals zone (ATTU); and (2) eliminate the 
ability to launch a surprise attack or to launch and sustain large-scale offensive 
operations. The two parties were beginning to reorganise their armies in terms 
of what the perceived to be 'reasonably sufficient' force considering lower levels 
of international tension.
I
■;The treaty did not deal with specific limits on personnel because it was 
assumed that there would be further unilateral reductions on both sides of the 
East - West divide and that a future CFE II agreement would establish appropriate 
guidelines. Instead, the treaty, signed on November 19, 1990, set a series of 
ceilings on weapons for the "collective holdings of each group of parties, for 
geographic regions and for individual member states". Each alliance would be 
limited to 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 armoured combat vehicles,
2,000 combat helicopters and 6,800 combat aircraft.(84) A sufficiency limit had 
been set of 13,300 tanks and 13,700 artillery pieces for any one country; the Soviet 
Union, however, was forced to accept different totals because its allies wanted a 
greater share of the weapons. In the end the USSR was limited to 13,150 tanks
and 13,175 artillery pieces. The Warsaw Pact was forced to destroy 50,700 pieces of 
equipment. The Soviet Union’s share of that was 25,000.(85)
Although the CFE Treaty went a considerable distance in limiting the 
forces of NATO and the Warsaw Fact it was quickly outpaced by events. 
Following Gorbachev's lead the member states of the Warsaw Pact began 
unilaterally reducing their own armed forces. On July 1, 1991 a treaty was signed 
which formally dissolved the Warsaw Pact, thus placing the structure of the CFE 
Treaty with its "group of parties" and "zonal sub-limits tied to geographic 
regions" into question. The break-up of the Soviet Union during the course of
1991 further hindered the im plem entation of the Treaty.(86) The former 
republics of the USSR, as well as some of the East European states, began to argue 
that the ceilings set by the CFE Treaty were no longer applicable.(87) In January
1992 General Ivanovich, Commander of the Rostov-on-Don military district, 
expressed the opinion that much as both sides wanted to see the ratification of 
the CFE Treaty, it might no longer be possible,(88)
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His pessimism in the end was unfounded. As a result of a great deal of 
negotiation during the course of 1992, a solution was finally found to the 
problem of which states were responsible for the weapons of the former Soviet 
Union. In May 1992 at the Tashkent sum m it the m em bers of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) agreed that quotas would be set 
among them to apportion the weapons of the FSU. In an initial proposal Russia 
had argued that the share of weapons should be based on the total area of the 
state, the size of the population and the length of the borders which had to be 
defended. Under this formula Russia would have held 54 percent of the total of 
the 5 categories of weapons, the Ukraine 22 percent and Belarus 6.6 percent.(89) 
The non-Slavic European republics would have held 17.5 percent of the total
inventory.(90) In the end this was not the formula which was adopted. Russia 
received 51 percent, Ukraine 27.5 percent and Belarus 12 percent.(91)
Once the shares had been apportioned, it was necessary for each state to 
ratify the treaty. On July 10, 1992 the CFE Treaty was signed by 29 states.(92) The 
ratification process took nearly as long as the initial negotiations. It is fortunate 
that CFE I did not deal with reductions in personnel levels because in the 
scramble of the former Soviet republics to establish their own armed forces it 
might never have been settled.
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and the Treaty on 
Conventional Forces in Europe, while dealing with different subject matters, 
have many similarities. Both treaties succeeded in significantly limiting various 
classes of weapons. The protocols on verification contained within each treaty 
also helped to create greater levels of openness and transparency in military 
relations. Both treaties were also plagued with difficulties as a result of the 
break-up of the Soviet Union.
Although START was conceived in a different era than CFE, its ultimate 
ratification hinged on the passing of the latter treaty. Negotiations began in June 
1982 in Geneva, although no real headway was made until 1986. It was in that 
year at the Reykjavik summit and again at the Washington summit in 1987 that 
Reagan and Gorbachev began to outline the ultimate treaty. The negotiations 
were concerned with four questions, three of which dealt with how mobile land- 
based cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and sea-launched 
cruise missiles (SLCMs) should be defined and counted. The fourth question was 
concerned with the link between reductions in strategic offensive weapons and 
the limitations on strategic defences.(93)
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During the course of 1989 compromises were reached on both sides. Two 
of the greatest obstacles to the talks had been issues of strategic defence and sea- 
launched cruise missiles. The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI or Star Wars) was 
a project close to the heart of President Reagan. Gorbachev and the Soviet 
negotiators strongly objected to it. Reagan saw the system as being inherently 
defensive while the Soviet side believed that the project would lead to the 
militarisation of space and that it was thus inherently offensive. Although 
headway had been made on the START negotiations in 1986 and 1987 it was 
believed that more could have been achieved if Reagan had not clung so strongly 
to SDI.
George Bush, who succeeded Reagan as president in 1988, continued the 
White House's support of SDL In the interest of obtaining a treaty the Soviet 
government backed down and agreed that SDI would be discussed outside the 
START framework. The Soviet government was also willing to concede that 
SLCMs should be limited within a separate framework. George Bush had been 
adamant that they should be protected from START and at the Malta summit in 
1990 this had proved a hindrance to further negotiations.
In the end each side was limited to no more than 1,600 strategic nuclear 
delivery vehicles (deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles or ICBMs, sea- 
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers); 6,000 total accountable 
warheads; 4,900 accountable warheads deployed on ICBMs or SLBMs; 1,540 
accountable warheads deployed on 154 heavy ICBMs; 1,100 accountable warheads 
deployed on mobile ICBMs; and an aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs 
and SLBMs equal to 3,600 million metric tonnes.(94)
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Simply agreeing the terms of the limitations did not mean, however, that
Soviet/A m erican negotiations were at an end. Initially there was some
hesitancy on the US side over the treaty. Links were m ade between the
ratification of START and the delayed ratification of the CFE Treaty.(95) i
Gorbachev himself adm itted that there might indeed be problem s w ith
ratification. Fie is quoted as saying that, i
there will be talk of unilateral concessions here in 
Moscow, and of concessions to the Soviet Union in 
Washington. Others will say that the new treaty fails 
to live up to all the hopes for a peace dividend, since 
destroying missiles will also take considerable 
amounts of money....(96)
In the end it was the actual break-up of the Soviet Union rather than questions j
on concessions or fraudulent inform ation transfers which delayed the 
ratification of the treaty.
At the time of the August coup it was believed that the Soviet Union held i
approximately 27,000 nuclear weapons of various classifications (air, land, and 
sea launched; and tactical and strategic). Of this total, 80 to 85 percent were 
presumed to be located within the territory of the Russian Federation (RSFSR), 
leaving approximately 4,500 warheads in other locations,(97) As the central i
command structure of the old state dissolved the individual republics began to 
claim ownership of the weapons. They linked the possession of nuclear 
warheads with an increase in international recognition and prestige.
Of the four republics which held nuclear stockpiles, two, Belarus and 
Ukraine, declared their intention to become nuclear-free zones — on their own 
terms. The Ukrainians were most vociferous in their distrust of the Russians' 
ability to dispose of nuclear weapons-grade material. The Kravchuk government |
also decried Russia's attempts to position itself as the leading state of the CIS. \
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While Washington and Moscow wanted the START Treaty to remain bilateral, 
Kravchuk argued that all the former Soviet republics which held nuclear 
weapons should be treated equally.(98) Kravchuk won the argument in the end. 
On May 23, 1992 representatives from the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan met in Lisbon to sign a protocol to START which recognised the 
responsibility of each of the signatories for the disposal of the nuclear weapons 
positioned on its territory.
Like CFE, START has formed the basis for further reductions. On June 16, 
1992, less than a month after the protocol had been signed. President Bush and 
President Yeltsin of Russia agreed to make further cuts in the level of strategic 
nuclear weapons. It was proposed that by the year 2000 each country would 
retain no more than 3,800 to 4,250 nuclear warheads on strategic missiles, while 
the Russians would be allowed to keep 6,000 warheads on heavy missiles. In the 
second stage which would run until 2003, the total limit of weapons allowed to 
each country would be limited to 3,500. By the end of December these proposals 
had been formalised in the text of the START II Treaty, which was signed by 
Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on January 3, 1993. Within a ten-year period the two 
sides were expected to reduce their nuclear arsenals from approximately 10,000 
warheads to about 3,000 strategic nuclear warheads for Russia and 3,500 for the 
United States.(99) Within the larger total each side would be allowed to retain 
approximately 500 land-based long-range missiles and 1,750 SLBMs.(100) In 
addition the US would be allowed 1,250 bomber-based warheads and missiles, 
while the Russians would have to reduce their arsenal to 750.(101) Despite the 
fact that the treaty went a significant way in reducing the nuclear arsenal of the 
two superpowers it did encounter opposition. Yeltsin's opponents threatened a 
rough passage for the treaty through parliament, claiming that Russia had 
perhaps given too much away.(102) Yeltsin was also accused of acting like
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Gorbachev in courting the West.(103) Ratification of the treaty was delayed, but 
even if it had been passed quickly problems would still have arisen over the 
destruction of the weapons systems. As at the time of writing Russia does not 
have adequate facilities for storing or dism antling nuclear weapons-grade 
material. Unless it receives greater financial assistance from the West, it will not 
be able to build these facilities, and the treaty, as a result, will not be worth the 
paper it is written on.
A CHRONOLOGY OF SOVIET DISARMAMENT, 1986-1992
Date
16 January, 1986 
8 December, 1987
Treaty/Action
Plan for the Year 2000
Intermediate Nuclear Forces
7 December, 1988 UN Speech
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Aims
The proposed 
elimination of all 
nuclear weapons.
The elimination of 
approximately
5.000
medium and short- 
range missiles. The 
initiation 
of
conversion 
programmes in 4 
enterprises.
Settlement of the 
conflict in 
Afghanistan, 
with the 
withdrawal 
of 100,000 soldiers 
and a savings of 
R4.7
billion per annum 
(R300 million per 
year continued to be 
spent on 
arming
Afghan troops 
until 1992). 
Reduction in size of 
the Red Army by
500.000 troops and 
six tank divisions 
(to be withdrawn 
from Eastern Europe 
and the Far East).
- I .
January 1990
February 1990
12 September, 1990
19 November, 1990
23 May, 1992
November 1992
Full Scale Withdrawal From 
Eastern Europe Begins
Negotiations begin for the 
withdrawal of remaining troops 
in Mongolia.
'2 +4" Treaty
Conventional Forces in Europe
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
Troops begin to leave Poland
Total of 123,000 
troops withdrawn 
from Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia.
The withdrawal of
350.000 servicemen,
150.000 civilian 
personnel and
500.000 family 
members. Receipt 
of
economic aid from 
Germany.
Sets limits on
conventional
weapons
for alliances and
individual
countries.
USSR forced to 
destroy 25,000 
pieces
of equipment.
Places a ceiling on 
the
number of nuclear 
weapons held by 
the
US and USSR. A 30 
percent reduction in 
the nuclear arsenal 
results.
58.000 servicemen 
return to the USSR.
The rapidity  and scope of the Gorbachev disarm am ent program m e 
achieved two positive outcomes. First, it succeeded in reducing tension within 
the international arena. Although not all of the treaties were signed and ratified 
on schedule, a new era of co-operation had begun. Both East and West were 
willing to reduce their arsenals, conventional and nuclear, and work together in
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establishing a new type of security. This major accomplishm ent allowed 
Gorbachev a window of opportunity in which to initiate deep and wide-scale 
reform. This was the second positive outcome. It was hoped that reductions in 
the defence budget and the initiation of a conversion programme would make a 
significant contribution to the development of economic reform.
On January 18, 1989 Gorbachev declared that over a two-year period 
reductions of 14.2 percent and 19.5 percent would be made in defence spending 
and defence production respectively. Both Soviet civilian and Western analysts 
questioned how, if the total figure of defence spending was not made available, it 
could be reduced by 14.2 percent. As stated in Chapter One, defence spending had 
been listed at approximately 20.2 billion roubles for several years, and this figure 
appeared highly unrealistic. Fyodor I. Kushnirsky, in an article in Europe-Asia 
Studies  (1993), has attempted to explain this figure. He believes that this sum is 
realistic if, as he suspects, it applies only to the Ministry of Defence's share of the 
budget.(lG4) Money for R&D and the construction of military goods would be 
contained within the budgets of the various ministries in charge of production.
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:The revised figure for the proposed 1990 defence budget attempted to take 
into account spending in other sectors (See Table 3.2). The total defence outlays 
for 1990 were recorded at 70.9 billion roubles. This was a reduction of 6.3 billion 
roubles or 8.2 percent from the 1989 budget. Although the more detailed figures 
were welcomed, debates still continued over their accuracy. In a comparison of 
US and USSR spending on defence in 1989 it appeared that despite the vast size 
of the Soviet armed forces expenditure was still significantly less than in the 
United States (See Table 3.3).
a.
Table 3.2 
1990 Proposed Defence Budget
(in billions of roubles)(105)
Outlav Categorv Cost
Procurem ent 31.0
Research and Development 13.2
Maintenance of Army and Navy 19.3
Overall Military Development 3.7
Pensions for Military Personnel 2.4
Other Outlays 1.3
Table 3.3
Comparative Expenditures in 1989 Prices
(in billions) (106)
Outlay Category United States Soviet Union
M aintenance $160 R20.2 ($31.9)
Procurem ent $80.7 R 32.6 ($51.5)
Research and Development $37 R15.3 ($24.1)
Space $29.6 R6.9 ($10.9)
(Official Roubles to Dollar Rate = 1.58:1)
Major General Medvedev, a Professor of Technical Sciences, in his 
response to an article written in 1990 by the Head of the Institute of US and 
C anadian Studies, Georgii Arbatov, claimed that these figures proved 
conclusively that the United States consistently outspent the USSR in defence. 
Arbatov rejected this claim arguing that if the figures were to prove anything 
they had to be true and accompanied by the prices of each type of item.(107) 
Arbatov's distrust was shared by other analysts in the Soviet Union and the 
West. Research demonstrated that if subsidies to defence manufacturers and 
hidden costs military police, civil defence measures, military aid, etcetera) were 
taken into account then Soviet military expenditure would range from R115
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billion to R200 billion.(108)
The defence budget continued to appear underestimated. The projected 
spending for 1991 was amiounced as being R65 billion. This was a cut of close to 
6 billion roubles from the 1990 budget, or an 8.5 percent reduction in 1990 
prices.(109) The forecast for 1991, however, used numbers calculated on the basis 
of old, centrally fixed prices and the projected, free prices as of January 1, 1991. 
When this forecast was adjusted to account for inflation and a change in the 
system of taxation, 65 billion roubles became 96-98 billion roubles.(110)
Inflation caused a steady rise in the apparent figures for defence spending. 
For 1991 the planned allotment for defence was 96 billion roubles of which 39.6 
billion were to be spent on weapons procurement; 12.4 billion on Research and 
Development (R&D); 30.7 billion on maintenance of the armed forces; 6.3 billion 
on capital investm ent; 4 billion on pensions and 3.2 billion on social 
provisions.(Ill) The revised estimate on total defence expenditure rose to 173 
billion roubles.(112) A proviso was added which stated that by 1992 the figures 
for 1991 might rise to 250 billion roubles once the price increases were taken into 
account. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union it was estimated that the 
defence budget for the USSR could be as much as 529.4 billion roubles with 
Russia's share constituting 61.3 percent of the total.(113) It was forecast that in 
1993 Russia's defence budget would reach between 1.55 and 1.65 trillion 
roubles. (114)
While inflation forced prices to spiral out of control, governm ent 
ministers and advisers continued to claim that the defence budget was being 
reduced. Akhromeyev, while adviser to Gorbachev on military affairs, stated in 
1991 that there had been an 8.5 percent reduction in defence spending.(115) In
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December 1991 Yazov, then Defence Minister, proclaimed that expenditure on 
procurem ent had been slashed by 23 percent in 1991 and that this rate of 
reduction would continue in 1992.(116) External analysts challenged the validity 
of these pronouncements. One article in particular stated that by using 1991 
prices and conditions the defence budget would actually increase in 1991 from 
8.56 percent of GNP to 8.75 percent.(117) A subsequent report produced by the 
Institute of the USA and Canada (1993) stated that in Russia, which had agreed to 
support 65 percent of the budget of the Supreme Command of the Unified 
Armed Forces (the successor to the Red Army), actual defence spending had 
exceeded initial budget requests in 1992.(118) A lthough spending on 
procurement had been reduced, there had been sizable increases in spending on 
pensions and wages, on new housing for active and retired personnel, for the 
withdrawal of troops from Europe, and for the destruction of weapons resulting 
from the INF, CFE and START treaties.(119) It is debatable as to whether these 
costs had been calculated when Gorbachev initially announced reductions in the
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defence budget.
While the military initially supported reductions in the defence budget, it 
was very much aware that a diversion of resources would have a limited impact 
if structural reforms of the central planning system did not occur.(120) General 
Vladimir Lobov, who would later become Chief of the General Staff, argued in a 
1990 article that the entire m ilitary administrative structure, political and 
economic, would have to change.(121) He believed that in terms of the
economic structure, a transformation of the processes of military production and 
purchasing would need to occur; and that the laws of the market would need to 
prevail. Yet, as will be detailed in subsequent chapters, this did not happen.
'Indeed, attempts at reducing the defence budget and reforming the military 
sector appeared to be done in a piecemeal fashion. As perestroika progressed the
Î  
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One of Gorbachev's aims had been to depoliticise the armed forces, to
98
General Staff developed the opinion that financial sacrifices on the part of the 
military contributed little to the development of the economy and succeeded 
only in limiting its ability to defend the nation.(122)
THE SOVIET MILITARY'S CHANGING ROLE
Between 1988 and 1991 the Soviet governm ent agreed, through 
disarm am ent treaties and unilateral actions, to cut its arm ed forces by 
approximately 1,031,000 men, to destroy 25,000 pieces of conventional military 
equipment and to limit its nuclear capability. Understandably, such dramatic cuts ■
would have a serious impact on any military organisation. In the case of the 
Soviet Union, a country which was simultaneously undergoing major political 
and economic reforms, it meant a complete transformation of the military's role 
in society.
i
From the conception of the Worker and Peasant Army in 1918 the Soviet 
military had been entrusted with four equally important tasks: to maintain the 
peace, to defend socialism, to unify the state, and to educate the youth of the 
nation. In order to perform these charges effectively the Soviet military was 
integrated in to the Party and political systems.
limit their involvement in the process of political decision-making. This 
particular reform went against one of Lenin’s strongest beliefs. In his "Armed 
Forces and the Revolution" he had stated that "the armed forces [could not] and 
should not be neutral".(123) He believed that for the armed forces to maintain 
its many guises — defender, unifier and educator — it was necessary to take on an 
increasingly political role. Marshal Grechko reasoned that the armed forces were
:
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"of the people and for the people and this fact determine[d] their place in the 
political organisation of Soviet society".(124) While Gorbachev no doubt 
believed that the armed forces were "of the people and for the people", he 
concluded that they could better serve those people if their involvement in the 
decision-making process was limited. This did not necessarily mean that the role 
of the Party in the armed forces should be limited, just that their role in the 
higher Party structures should be.
Prior to reform, the military's main role in the decision-making structure 
had been as a supplier of information. Although this was clear, for many years 
the process itself was not. From the 1950s to the 1970s there was some confusion 
amongst Western analysts over the way in which decisions concerning the 
military were made. The primary question was the nature of the relationship 
between the Defence Council and the Politburo. The second question centred on 
the num ber of administration and information bureaux involved in supplying 
them with data. The supreme organ of the Party, the Politburo, was responsible 
for the coordination of information on economic, social, and defence issues. 
Prior to the reforms of the government structure which were implemented 
between 1988 and 1990, the Politburo held ultimate control of defence policy.(125) 
Once that policy was outlined, however, it was up to the Defence Council, as the 
state organ, to oversee its implementation.
Officially defined as the supreme organ of leadership of all military, 
paramilitary, and state security forces, the Council concerned itself w ith 
developing and strengthening the combat readiness of the Soviet armed forces. 
It dealt with questions of internal and external policy in economics, ideology, and 
diplomacy. In the early 1980s David Holloway and Howard Frost proposed two 
possible scenarios of operation. They suggested that the Council might have
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investigated matters for which the Politburo did not have time, leaving major 
policy issues in the realm of the Politburo. This scenario placed the Council in a 
distinctly subordinate position by implying that it merely gathered information 
without analysing it. The second possibility set the Council on a more equal 
footing. Information available at the time tended to support the hypothesis that 
it analysed all major policy issues and made recom m endations to the 
Politburo.(126) It was then responsible for providing an aggregated view of 
current situations, supplying details on economic and social trends, formulating 
policy, and presenting it to the Politburo for a vote. In this scenario the Council 
had far more responsibility and a greater capacity for influencing the Politburo's 
decision.
Information networks for the Politburo and the Defence Council were 
separate. The Politburo relied on data provided by the Central Committee 
Secretariat. Within the Secretariat were departments which dealt with military 
affairs. Again there was some discrepancy over the num ber of sections in 
existence, Holloway outlined three sections while Frost added a fourth. The core 
departments were (1) the Main Political Administration which was concerned 
with the moral and political state of the armed forces; (2) the Administrative 
Organs Department (ADD) which dealt with personnel matters; and, (3) the 
Department of Defence Industries (DDI) which oversaw military production. (127) 
Frost incorporated a fourth institution for the supervision of production, the 
Department of Machine Construction (DMC).(128)
W ithin the state structure, the Defence Council was at the pinnacle of a 
structure which consisted of the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff, and the 
Main Military Council (Collegium). Heading the hierarchy of the Ministry of 
Defence was the minister himself and two to three chief deputies who presided
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over the institution. Beneath them were the deputy ministers who were 
typically the commanders-in-chief of the main branches of the armed forces. 
Next in line were the collateral staffs composed of the General Staff and the Main 
Political Administration. The division of labour among the collateral staffs was 
a prime example of "dual subordination", a theory frequently propounded when 
discussing any form of bureaucracy. This theory calls for the organisation of 
ministries and staffs on both horizontal and vertical lines. In the case of the 
Soviet military the General Staff was both a branch of the Ministry of Defence 
and a decision-making institution in its own right. The Main Political 
Adm inistration existed as a component of the Central Committee Secretariat. 
Beneath the collateral staffs lay the base tier which consisted of the operating 
commands. These bodies directed the operations of the military districts (of 
which there were 15), the air defence districts (2), the fleets (4) and the groups of 
Soviet forces stationed abroad (4).(129) The Soviet Ministry of Defence was 
undeniably a "uniformed empire".(130) Matthew Gallagher and Karl Spielman 
described the Soviet Ministry of Defence as.
both the steward of government in military affairs 
and the representative of the military in the councils 
of government. It [leaned] more to the second of these 
two roles, in part because of the professional habits 
and institutional interests of those who [manned] 
it.(131)
The loyalties of the Soviet officer were not unlike those of his Western 
counterpart.
While all the ministerial departments were charged with the duty of 
compiling information there was only one branch responsible for judgments on ï| 
this material. The General Staff was dubbed the "brain of the army" by the late 
Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov. The responsibilities of the Soviet General Staff, as 
in any military establishment, were fairly comprehensive. Its tasks included the
detailed planning for the deployment of nuclear weapons, the control of military 
intelligence, and the organisation of training for the armed forces.(132) While 
this description of duties is substantial it does not seem to warrant the accolade,
"brain of the army". What set the General Staff apart from other ministerial 
departm ents was its ability to conceive a functional military strategy from 
political doctrine.
Military doctrine consists of the views held at any given time by a state on 
the "purposes and character of a possible war, on the preparation of the country 
and the armed forces for it, and also on the methods of waging it".(133) Military 
doctrine is composed of two elements, the political, which should be the more 
dominant of the two, and the military-technical. The former aspect is concerned 
with the purposes and character of the war, while the latter deals with the 
m ethods of waging war. Under previous Soviet leaders the nature of 
international relations was defined by ideological confrontation. During 
peacetime emphasis was placed on the development or restructuring of the 
military forces to better combat possible opponents. Gorbachev's policy of new 
thinking encouraged a shift away from ideological confrontation tow ards 
cooperation. While this change of emphasis did not mean that the General 
Staff's central task, the conception of military doctrine, had changed, the manner 
in which it was accomplished had.
SInitially the changes inflicted upon the military by Gorbachev, although 
noteworthy, were of a superficial nature. The two main areas in which his 
influence could be felt prior to 1990 were in the role of the Party and in 
personnel. In order to further his economic programme Gorbachev had found it 
necessary to im plem ent political reform. As discussed above, the 
démocratisation of the management process had been perceived as an important
3Ï
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element in prom oting economic growth. Yet, to initiate this type of reform 
within any one sector without similar changes occurring throughout the system 
would have proved ineffectual. The policy of glasnost ', initiated in 1986, allowed 
for more open discussion of the problems facing the Soviet Union. In line with 
this, Gorbachev attempted to democratise the Party, Its destruction was not the 
intended goal, rather, it was hoped that a reformed Party would be able to lead 
the people into the 21st century.
The January 1987 Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee 
addressed the issue of démocratisation of society. Gorbachev proposed reform in 
three main areas: on the shop-floor, within the electoral system, and within the 
Communist Party itself.(134) While few sectors of civil society were exempt from 
the proposed reforms, the military appeared beyond criticism. Gorbachev 
claimed that the armed forces were "fulfilling their international duty with 
credit".(135) Various generals, however, disagreed. Marshal Sergei Sokolov, 
then M inister of Defence, declared that many of the criticisms m ade by 
Gorbachev about the lack of democracy w ithin political and economic 
institutions and the general level of ideological training could just as easily be 
applied to the military. (136)
Although 90 percent of the officer corps were members of the Party its role 
within the defence sector had actually been declining since the death of Stalin. 
During the Brezhnev era the military grew in size, strength, and importance 
while the political and ideological control of its operations withered. The Party 
Programme adopted at the 27th Party Congress in 1986 had attempted to change 
this state of affairs. The role of the Party was to be strengthened and under its 
guidance policy issues concerning the nation’s defence and security as well as 
Soviet military doctrine were to be developed and implemented.(137)
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Other reforms were suggested for the local level. The Red Army had
always played a special role in Soviet society. It served to unify the nationalities.
Mikhail Frunze, a Red Army commander, described the situation in these terms.
The USSR is a union of working people of different 
nationalities. Tlie Red Army is its reflection. It is not 
a national army, it is a union, a military union, to 
which every Soviet republic contributes her sons.(138)
I
The various republics had given their sons to the Red Army for the greater good 
of the people. The army in turn felt that it had an obligation to the people not 
only to defend them but to educate the young men and boys in its care. Thus 
closely allied to the role of unifier was the role of educator. Military service was a 
type of "nation-wide university" through the doors of which nearly all Soviet 
men passed. This "university" was not a new creation, indeed there was a direct 
link to the Tsarist system. From 1870 onwards young officers frequently 
considered themselves enrolled in a "national university" which united the 
empire, taught them patriotism and provided peasant conscripts w ith a basic 
education.(139) The Soviet curriculum included lessons on the art of war, 
organisation and discipline, physical training and ideological indoctrination.(140) 
Ideological training was the responsibility of the Party cells. Commissars and the
.
MPA. Their goal was to indoctrinate the servicemen in the teachings of 
Marxism-Leninism and to instil greater loyalty to the Socialist Motherland.
M arshal Sokolov, then Minister of Defence, suggested several ways in 
which basic ideological training could be improved. He called for an increase in 
the "influence of the central apparatus on the maintenance of organisation and 
order among the troops", namely through the increased role of the MPA; for the 
strengthening of military discipline; for the enhancement of the role of political 
and theoretical training and the ideological and moral tempering of generals and 
officers; and, finally, for an overall increase in respect for the responsibility
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exercised by officers.(141)
Many of these suggestions mirrored attempts to improve the political 
reliability of the troops in the late 1960s. Following the 23rd Congress of 1966, the 
Party, by expanding the authority of the MPA, tried to ensure the absolute loyalty 
of the officer corps to itself. Special schools were established at that time to 
produce political officers who received the rank of deputy commander and were 
made responsible for relaying Party policy and Party ideology to the troops.
Deputy commanders in charge of ideological education rem ained in 
existence until the fall of 1991, however their task grew increasingly difficult. 
Gorbachev had progressively shifted power away from the Party apparatus to the 
state structure. The Party's right to indoctrinate servicemen was called into 
question when demands for the rejection of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution 
were made at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum in February 1990. Uie clause 
which had guaranteed the CPSU a monopoly on power was duly reformulated 
on March 3, 1990. As a result the MPA was forced to fight a losing battle. Its 
directive stated that it was responsible for the morale and well-being of the 
Soviet troops, as well as for their ideological education. As the Party’s position 
became less secure the MPA began to emphasise the former aspect of its directive 
rather than the latter. Tire education of the troops became its main focus. The 
August 1991 coup settled the issue of the Party's role within the armed forces 
once and for all. Following the collapse of the coup, Boris Yeltsin, as President of 
Russia, issued a decree on 22 August which called for the disbandment of Party 
cells in all army units located in the RSFSR. He declared this action necessary 
because of the support given by Party leaders in the arm ed forces to the 
Emergency Committee.(142) This action was followed by others of even greater 
significance. On 23 August Yeltsin suspended the activities of the Russian
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Com m unist Party. The USSR Supreme Soviet, following Yeltsin's lead, 
suspended the activities of the Party throughout the nation. Its bank accounts 
were frozen and ownership of its buildings transferred to local councils.(143) As 
a result of these various actions the armed forces were transformed. The army 
was no longer the army of the Communist Party, the defender of socialism, but 
the army of the people.
During the transitional period as Party control weakened, Gorbachev 
attem pted to assert personal control of the military. He began by initiating 
changes in the personnel structure. By 1989 almost 200 generals of the rank of 
lieutenant general had been retired or dismissed.(144) They were replaced by 
younger officers who shared the views of the General Secretary. An early 
opportunity to reshuffle the Ministry of Defence fell out of the sky in 1987 when 
a young West German pilot by the name of Rust managed to fly through Soviet 
air space undetected and land his Cessna plane in the middle of Red Square. 
This provided the perfect excuse for removing both the Minister of Defence, 
Marshal Sergei Sokolov, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Defence 
Forces, Marshal Aleksandr Koldunov. Overlooking some forty marshals and 
senior generals, Gorbachev appointed the former commander of the Far Eastern 
Military District, General of the Army Dmitri Yazov, as Sokolov's successor. 
Yazov had previously served as the Army General in charge of personnel. 
While in that office he had initiated a programme of personnel changes designed 
to advance the cause of perestroika in the military.(145) Yazov's prom otion to 
Minister of Defence, although surprising to the West, made sense in terms of 
further implementing perestroika in the armed forces.
Gorbachev's reasoning was understandable. At the time he was trying to 
integrate the military into a broader policy process, while at the same time
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strengthening the Party's -- and his own — control over that process. By retiring 
older generals who m ight have carved out their own little niches in the 
ministries and by promoting younger officers to fill the gaps Gorbachev was 
attempting to build his own loyal cadre. He wanted this cadre to be composed of 
men like himself who had come of age during the Khrushchev reform era. 
These men supported Gorbachev and his policies until it began to appear that he 
had lost control of the reform movement.
Gorbachev's first attem pt at changing the defence decision-making 
structure occurred in 1988. For many years the chairmanship of the Defence 
Council had been awarded to the General Secretary of the Party despite the fact 
that it was not formalised within the Constitution. In amendments to the 
Constitution in December 1988 a stipulation was added that the Chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet, i.e. Gorbachev, also acted as the Chairman of the Defence 
Council. This was the first attempt to clarify and centralise control under the 
state's rather than the Party's auspices.
The reins of control were tightened further by Gorbachev's attainment of 
the Presidential office. The pow ers perm itted to the President were 
comprehensive, and where they concerned the military they inspired unease and 
curiosity. At the time the legislation was passed General Moiseev, then Chief of 
the General Staff, gave his support to the reforms and the centralisation of 
power.(146) He believed that the creation of the presidency would eliminate 
bottlenecks and discrepancies in policy which had occurred under the previous 
decision-making structure.
In the amended constitution of 1990, Article 127 firmly declared the 
general powers awarded to the President in relation to the military. He was the
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supreme commander of the armed forces and as such was responsible for the I
"defence of the sovereignty of the USSR", its security and territorial 
integrity.(147) In order to achieve this he was responsible for "[coordinating] the 
activities of the state organs for guaranteeing the defence of the country".(148) In 
the eventuality that the Soviet Union should ever be attacked, the President was 
responsible for initiating general and particular mobilisation and for informing 
the Supreme Soviet.(149) Furthermore, in critical instances the President had 
the ability to assume total control, thereby relieving the other administrative 
organs of their responsibilities. To assist him in the "realisation of the general 
directives of foreign domestic policy" a Presidential Council was created.(150) Its i
makeup was similar to that of the Cabinet in the United States, w ith men i
representing internal affairs, the foreign ministry, defence, and economic and 
cultural interests.(151) The constitution was not explicit in its description of the 
role of the Presidential Council. In reality it turned out to be mainly a short­
lived advisory body with the ultimate decisions being taken by the President.
For a time Gorbachev managed to tighten the reins of control but there is i 
little evidence to suggest that the inform ation channels were radically 
restructured before he was ousted. While glasnost' managed to affect most areas 
of Soviet society the Ministry of Defence remained aloof. Although data on 
military expenditure were published they were by no means a full account of the 
defence budget. How much the military spent and what it spent it on remained a 
secret. W ithout this information it was very difficult, if not impossible, for an 
unbiased and open debate to occur within any of the legislative bodies. 
Although Gorbachev headed many of the legislative organs the briefs which 
reached him concerning the armed forces were still processed in the same 
m anner as under the previous administrations with only selected information 
making its way to the final report. Thus the military maintained its ability to
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influence political decisions.
Eventually certain members of the upper echelons of the armed forces 
attem pted to influence policy in another way. They actively participated in a 
coup against Gorbachev. While it initially appeared to analysts in the West that 
Gorbachev had strengthened his position by becoming President, head of the 
Defence Council, the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies, this 
was not the case. Throughout 1990 and 1991 he found himself desperately 
bargaining with the conservatives and the liberals to ensure that his reform 
program m e went forward. This vacillation betw een the two sides cost 
Gorbachev a great deal of respect at home and confusion abroad.
Increasingly, the military could be seen as the victim, rather than the 
formulator, of policy. The armed forces had been forced into a rapid, massive 
and disorganised withdrawal from Europe and the Far East. They had witnessed 
the abandonment of the principles upon which the Soviet Union was based, 
thus calling into question their role as the defender of socialism and the belief 
that the military was a national university. Their ability to halt or prevent these 
m onum ental changes had been curtailed by the political changes occurring 
within the Soviet Union.
On the domestic front they perceived a country in turmoil. Perestroika 
had not succeeded in promoting economic growth, despite its increasingly radical 
nature. Political reform had achieved a certain am ount of openness and 
democracy, but members of the military felt that this lead to a weakening of the 
ties which bound the republics to each other, and to an increase in political 
unrest. The military found itself usurping the traditional roles of the MVD and 
KGB as it was sent in to quell uprisings in Tbilisi and Nagorno-Karabakh in 1989
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and the Baltic republics in 1990 and 1991. This was a role they were unsuited for, 
and they found that they were losing the support of the people they were there to 
defend.(152)
Conservatives within the military and other sectors of society felt that the 
proposed union treaty was the final insult. The treaty made no reference to a 
union of socialist republics, only sovereign ones voluntarily joined together
' .1within a democratic structure. Socioeconomic development, social, education, 
energy, and transport policies would be determined jointly by the republics and 
the central government. Only security and foreign policy, law enforcement and 
the all-union budget would remain under central control.(153) A decision was 
made to halt the progress of disintegration.
The organisation of the coup began months in advance. As early as 
February 1991 General Boris Gromov, First Deputy M inister of the MVD,
'conducted exercises in Moscow to test the ability of the troops to react in a crisis 
in a major industrial city. Could they secure the power centres? (154) As a result 
of these exercises it was believed that the troops would react appropriately. What 
the members of the Emergency Committee failed to take into account were the 
attitudes and beliefs of the junior officers.(155) Within the KGB, MVD and the 
arm ed forces the lower-ranking officers, while not necessarily caring for 
Gorbachev, supported the reform movement.(156) A military exercise was one 
matter, but an attem pted coup was completely different. The Emergency 
Committee was able to seize power from Gorbachev but was unable to secure any 
area other than the Kremlin. Many of the elite forces which the Committee had 
counted on pledged their support to men like Yeltsin and the mayor of St. 
Petersburg, Anatolii Sobchak.
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The Emergency Committee affected policy but not in the m anner 
intended. Its aim had been to regain control of the faltering system and proceed 
with reform at a slower pace. The result of the coup, which only lasted from the 
19th to the 21st of August 1991, was to accelerate the rate of change. Upon his 
return from his place of captivity on the Black Sea, Gorbachev attem pted to 
regain control of the situation, but it was too late. Frightened by the thought of 
any type of union, the republics declared their independence. The main link 
which had joined them, the Communist Party, was banned. Gorbachev had 
become the leader of a rapidly disintegrating state. This situation lasted until 
December 1991 when a series of meetings between the Slavic and Central Asian 
Republics created the Commonwealth of Independent States.
As the state structure changed so too did the military establishment. The 
participation of Yazov initially affected the civil-military relationship w ithin 
Russia. Immediately following the collapse of the coup, Boris Yeltsin was able to 
assert greater control of the military, although this lasted for only a short period. 
The military eventually reasserted itself. But while Yeltsin was able to dictate to 
the armed forces he was able to choose the high command, promote civilians
within the defence establishment, and restructure the civil-military relationship.
Following his return to Moscow, Gorbachev appointed General Mikhail 
Moiseev, then chief of the General Staff, as acting Defence Minister. W ithin 
twenty-four hours he was stripped of his command as a result of his alleged 
involvement in the coup. Yeltsin played a leading role in determining who 
should then wield power in the military. He promoted those who had chosen to 
side with him during the coup. Marshal Evgenii Shaposhnikov was selected to 
replace Moiseev. General Vladimir Lobov became the chief of the General Staff 
and Colonel General Pavel Grachev became the deputy Defence Minister and
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Chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Defence and Security.(157)
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the 
emergence of the CIS, the various republics began to establish their own defence 
ministries. While Yeltsin and other Russian officials had argued that joint 
control of the armed forces should be maintained they were not slow to create 
their own defence establishment. On March 16 1992 President Yeltsin issued a 
decree which created the Russian Defence Ministry. It is responsible for 
personnel policy, budgeting, procurement of arms, and the provisioning of the 
Russian armed forces. (158) At the same time that Yeltsin created the Ministry he 
also named himself as acting Minister of Defence.
In subsequent decrees Yeltsin abolished the post of state counsellor for 
defence and dissolved the state committee for defence which had been in 
operation during the transition from Soviet republic to independent state. In 
late March he also ordered the creation of a state commission which would lay 
the groundwork for the new minis try. (159)
During this period of restructuring civilians were considered for defence- 
related positions. During the search for a new defence minister the names of 
Galina Starovoitova, advisor to Yeltsin, and Andrei Kokoshin, the Deputy 
Director of the USA and Canada Institute and Director for the Centre of 
Conversion and Privatisation, were put forward. In the end a military man 
received the top position, when Pavel Grachev became the Russian Minister of 
Defence in May 1992.(160)
CONCLUSION
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In an attem pt to defend the homeland successive Soviet leaders had 
achieved the militarisation of the state. The phrase "militarised state" generally 
connotates a society run by a military dictator. The Soviet Union was never 
governed in this manner. What made it a militarised state was not so much the 
overt actions of the military in government as the willingness of government 
and Party officials to subordinate the interests of society to those of the armed 
forces. Through the channels of decision-making and the adm inistrative 
command system the resources of the state were used to ensure the growth and 
continuance of the military. It is this which caused the USSR to be termed a 
"militarised state".
While the military and civilian spheres were distinct, the reforms of the 
1980s affected them in similar ways. In the past the armed forces were referred to 
as the "barometer of Soviet society". This was a particularly accurate tag during 
the late 1980s. Like other sectors of the bureaucracy, the military was aware that 
reform needed to occur, yet it felt threatened by change. The Gorbachev reforms 
radically altered the role of the armed forces in society. In acting in the capacity of 
defender, unifier and educator, the military was fulfilling the functions of 
military power outlined by Garnett. When these roles were taken away from it 
there was little else to do. Attempts to act as a "domestic policeman" backfired, 
causing support for the armed forces to decline. As a result a traditionally 
conservative institution felt that it was forced to defend its position and act 
against the legitimate political authority.
Arguably, reform of the military needed to coincide with the restructuring g 
of society as a whole if a stable transition to a more democratic society was to 
occur. However, Gorbachev apparently failed to understand just how successful 
his predecessors had been in politicising the armed forces. They were closely
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linked with both the Party and state structures, and any reform within this area 
w ould affect them. Ideally, reform of the armed forces should have been 
comprehensive, as suggested by General Lobov. Instead the measures only went 
so far, causing upheaval without providing a clear cut role for the army in the 
future. By ignoring the role which the military plays in society Gorbachev 
encouraged the instability he desperately needed to avoid.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC  
REPERCUSSIONS  
OF DISARMAMENT
In the Report From Iron Mountain Leonard Lewin argued that military- 
industrial complexes have the power to shape their societies, for good or ill. 
Generally, only the negative effects are recognised. When an opportunity for 
disarmament arises governments immediately look to see what they can retrieve 
from their MIC. Immediately following the implementation of the INF Treaty in 
1988 and the unilateral Soviet disarmament proposal of the same year both East 
and West began to speak of the prospects for a "peace dividend". In the Soviet 
case claims upon the peace dividend were made by civil industry and also by 
agriculture, the health services, education, and other social services. The benefits
to these areas were not immediate. The proposed reduction of the Soviet
defence budget by 14.2 percent over a two-year period could not meet all the 
demands of society. Furthermore, the very act of w inding down the armed 
forces posed additional costs before society could ever recoup the peace dividend.
JIn Chapter Two an attempt was made to establish an hypothesis. It was proposed that if a state is to achieve a peace dividend through conversion, then 
the program m e, if it is to be successful, should be well planned, w ith a 
recognisable beginning and end. The state should be involved to the extent that 
it assists in the formation of an overall programme, developing what Melman 
term ed an economic bill of rights and promoting capital reallocation. It is 
important to remember that a conversion programme should be directed at the
employees of the defence industries and  military personnel, because both types 
of individuals make up the military-industrial complex. I
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W ithin this chapter some of the immediate economic repercussions of 
disarm am ent in the Soviet context will be examined. The ideal programme 
which was established in Chapter Two will be compared to Soviet policy between 
1986 and 1991. The specific areas of comparison will be employment policy in 
respect to personnel w ithin the MIC, the destruction of weapons and the 
restructuring of the military, and the reinvestment of funds.
EMPLOYMENT AND TROOP REDUCTIONS
The Soviet Union suffered for a number of years from labour shortages. 
There were several causes for this phenomenon. Enterprises needed to maintain 
sizable workforces to compensate for poor technology. There was little 
autom ation in Soviet industry, and while this allowed for full employment it 
caused the USSR to fall behind the West in competitive markets. This problem 
was perpetuated by a constant influx of semi-educated peasants. While the 
labour pool remained large there was no need to invest in more efficient 
technology, however as it shrank the need increased proportionally. Yet because 
the lag time between the development and implementation of new technology 
was quite substantial managers were forced to maintain ever larger workforces in 
order to meet production quotas.(1) The government encouraged this policy by 
basing m anagerial salary scales on the number of people employed by the 
enterprise, and by linking the bonus funds to the overall wage fund.
These excess labour reserves enabled enterprises to adjust to spurts in 
production due to infrequent delivery of material supplies, and they also helped 
to compensate for chronic absenteeism due to alcoholism and low worker 
morale. Finally, labour reserves allowed factories to assist in the work of the 
community, such as harvesting, road repairs, and construction of schools.(2)
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By hoarding personnel enterprises contributed to chronic labour shortages 
in regions such as Siberia. Few people actually wanted to settle in an area with 
poor living conditions. As a result labour was brought in on a contract basis. 
Once the contract expired the labourers took their money and returned to their 
homes elsewhere in the Soviet Union. As a result there was no sense of 
permanency or continuity within the community, thus further aggravating the 
labour problem within the region.
Economic reform in the Soviet Union created another em ploym ent 
phenomenon, one which was previously taboo: unemployment became a factor 
w ithin the national economy. There were two types of unem ploym ent — 
voluntary {nezanyatost') and structural. The first category included people who 
had wilfully chosen not to work, for example mothers of large families. The 
second was defined as the "chronic involuntary idleness of able bodied workers 
who are unable to find remunerative work".(3) This category of unemployment 
during the last days of the Soviet period was confined to small towns and cities 
in the southern regions. A shrinking birth-rate in the north coupled with the 
central planning agencies' predilection for placing new enterprises in the 
northern areas resulted in an over-abundance of jobs with too few people to fill 
the spaces. By contrast, rapid population growth outstripped the development of 
the local economies in the Central Asian Republics, and yet no knew jobs were 
created.(4) Structural unemployment is now more widespread throughout the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. Its very presence is the motivating factor 
for groups such as the Civic Union and their opposition to more radical
economic reform.(5)
Estimates of the level of unemployment in 1991 varied. The Russian
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ïFederation of Industrial Trade Unions and Komsomol'skaya Pravda in February 
1991 placed the unemployment rate in the Soviet Union at 1.5 percent. (6) This 
was considered a reasonable level in comparison with many Western nations.
Yet Soviet analysts were concerned that the rate could rise to 2-3 percent during 
the course of 1991 and even continue to grow beyond that.(7) The UN's 
Economic Survey of Europe for 1991-1992 stated that the num ber of people 
employed in 1991 in Russia was down 1.2 million compared with 1990.(8) By 
January 1992 60,000 people had registered as unemployed in Russian state 
unemployment agencies.(9) In the spring of that year the Russian government 
predicted that 2.2 million people would be receiving unemployment benefits and 
1.6 m illion w ould be undergoing retraining at the state 's expense. The 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimated that the figures would be 
substantially higher. They predicted that 10 - 11 million people would be 
unemployed by the end of the year, thus totalling 15 percent of the labour 
force.(10) This proved to be an overestimation, for while the actual figure were 
high, the num ber of registered unemployed totalled only 1,028,808.(11) This 
placed the unemployment rate at 8.8 percent. Official estimates suggested that 
more than 2 million Russians could be classified as "partially unemployed".(12)
S:
The grow th of unem ploym ent, and underem ploym ent, was directly 
related to the policy of perestroika and the transfer to the market. The policies of 
khozraschet  (self-financing) and contract brigades initiated the problem  of 
structural unemployment. Industries were encouraged to streamline production 
and cut costs and this invariably meant reducing the labour reserves. Those who 
maintained their jobs were those with highly technical, trained skills. As a result
■fewer new jobs are now being created throughout the CIS and the num ber of 
new entrants into the labour pool is increasing. If perestroika and the policies 
that have followed it are successful in improving the technological base of the
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economy then the num ber of man-hours worked will continue to decrease, 
thereby aggravating structural or forced unemployment.
Reductions in the armed forces have further aggravated this trend. As 
discussed in Chapter One, in a society with a market economy and volunteer 
armed forces, military service can act as a sponge, absorbing excess labour. In the 
Soviet Union where service was mandatory the military acted as a drain on the 
em ploym ent pool. Seventy percent of the Soviet arm ed forces were 
conscripts.(13) The average term of service for the 18-year old conscript was two 
years. That meant half, or roughly 1.8 million men, needed to be replaced every 
year. Although it was difficult enough to get sufficient numbers of able-bodied 
m en to fulfil the draft their release from active service, as a result of 
disarm am ent, caused problems w ithin the civilian sector by increasing the 
labour pool. This problem was most notable in the southern regions. The 
Soviet armed forces relied heavily on the ethnic minorities to swell their ranks 
(see Table 4.1). Once released from service they rejoined the ranks of the 
unemployed. In order to curb this problem various analysts suggested that out­
migration from these areas should be encouraged.(14) Viktor I. Perevedentsev, a 
senior research associate at thethen Institute of the International Labour 
Movement, also recommended that organisational, economic, and psychological 
assistance be given to those who wished to move from the countryside to the 
city. (15) He did not, however, suggest how the government should organise this 
assistance. Additional problems have arisen as a result of the collapse of the 
Union. Labourers are even less willing to leave their republics for work in other 
states.(16) Racial tensions have increased, partly as a result of the uncertain 
future of the economy, and have thus made living and working conditions even 
more adverse.
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Table 4.1 
Portrait of Nationalities in a Regiment in  
the Red Banner Volga Military District(17)
Russians — 43% Tatars -  15%
Chuvash — 12% Uzbeks— 6.3%
Bashkirs — 5% Mari —3%
Ukrainians — 2.1% Turkmenians — 2%
Kazakhs —2% Armenians — 2%
Georgians, Ossetians, M ordvinians, A zerbaidzhanis, Tadzhiks, and other 
nationalities combined formed 5.6% of the total.
t
The upper echelons of the armed forces were not immune to the rise of 
unemployment. As a result of the disarmament programme it rapidly became a 
major concern for the corps of junior officers. For example, in 1990 in the 
Belorussian military district there were 1,726 officers, but as of February 1991 
there were only 812 remaining.(18) In an interview conducted in November 
1990, General Moiseev, Chief of the General Staff, predicted that if widescale 
reform were to continue the result would be the loss of jobs for 3.0 - 3.2 million 
men.(19) The redundancies would be the result not only of troop reductions but 
also of the military's attem pt to liquidate duplicate and parallel organs and 
changes in the composition of central m anagem ent.(20) General Moiseev 
claimed that the outcome of such restructuring would be the release of 1,300 • '
generals, and reductions in the officer corps of 220,000 and in the corps of 
military and naval w arrant officers and sailors of 225,000: a total of 446,300 
m en.(21) The officers released were all highly qualified and intelligent men.
Many of them were specialists in engineering, radioelectronics, computers and 
computer-electronics. Despite these qualifications they feared that they would be 
unable to find employment as civilians. (22) They suggested that the state create a 
comprehensive pension scheme and provide training courses which would 
introduce them to the operations of a market economy.(23) In essence they were 
asking for the type of economic rights legislation recommended by Seymour
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Melman. He had argued that if a state wanted to ensure a smooth transition to a 
disarmed economy it needed to provide economic assistance for the retraining 
and relocating of personnel. The Soviet government did not provide this and as 
a result many of the servicemen felt disgruntled by the lack of government 
initiative. In an attempt to rectify this situation more enterprising officers tried 
to find alternatives. In Poland the Northern Group of Forces had access to
classes in economics run by the Polish government, while other officers, once 
released from the service, enrolled in courses at universities and institutes
located within their home towns.(24)
s
Many of the courses on economics and the market economy which were 
available w ithin the private sector were expensive. In 1993 a mission team 
studying the feasibility of a Russian officer conversion program m e for the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reported that 
tuition for these types of courses ranged from $50 to $500, placing them out of the 
reach of many retiring officers.(25) Unfortunately, the pay received by those 
serving in the Soviet military was not substantial. In general, per capita earnings 
of m ilitary families were 30 percent lower than those of a working class 
family.(26) Earnings were lower because 50 percent of officers' wives were 
unemployed — not because they wanted to be, but because there was no place for 
them .(27) Essentially, structural unemployment existed w ithin the defence 
sector. In 1990 Der Speigel reported that servicemen returning from Eastern 
Europe were attem pting to augm ent their family savings by selling their 
uniforms, guns, and even tanks on the black market.(28)
While the governm ent did provide pensions to ease the officers' 
transition, no significant unem ploym ent benefits were available initially. 
Several complaints were made about the pension scheme by those affected. The
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younger m em bers of the officer corps felt th a t the pension  was
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discriminatory.(29) The "Law on Pensions for Servicemen" was targeted 
primarily at individuals who had served for an extended period of time or who shad become invalids as a result of their service. Personnel who had served for 20 
years received 40 percent of their wage. For each additional year served they
I-received another 3 percent. They were entitled to up to 75 percent of their
j/;wages.(30) Assistance was also provided for the relocation of families.(31) For |
' '-I.junior officers, however, very little money was provided, on average 50 roubles a
Imonth, and no help was given for relocation. Furthermore, commendations 
arising from their service were not forthcoming.(32) In a sense they were 
dishonourably discharged. I
In 1991 the legislature of the Russian Federation addressed the issues of 
pensions and unemployment. Instead of creating a special pension scheme for 
service persomiel it included them in the general pension fund. The legislation 
was passed by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on January 15, 1991.(33) Pension 
contributions are made to the wage fund by the state, enterprises, organisations, 
and individuals.(34) While service personnel are dealt w ith in the pension ilegislation, many of those released from service as a result of disarmament are 
not covered. I■s;
The parliam ent continued its programme of social legislation when it 
passed the "Law on Social Guarantees for Labour" and the "Law on Public 
Employment" on April 19, 1991. Article 1 of the "Law on Social Guarantees for 
Labour" guaranteed a minimum wage of R180 per month as of October 1, 1991. |
This level was raised on January 1, 1992 to R195 per m onth in order to 
compensate for the liberalisation of prices.(35) The m inim um  wage was 
subsequently increased to 2,250 roubles a month. In January 1993 the Russian a
a.
Federation of Independent Trade Unions demanded that it be increased again to 
4,400 roubles per month, effective from the first of February. The unions also 
dem anded that it be gradually increased until it reached the m inim um  
subsistence level which was estimated at that time at R6,500 per month. It was 
argued that the minimum wage should be linked to inflation and reviewed on a 
quarterly basis.(36) Persons losing their job are still entitled to 90 percent of the 
lowest wage. (37)
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:The "Law on Public Employment" dealt specifically w ith the issue of 
servicemen. Article 2 of the law defined the various classifications of 
employm ent. People serving in the armed forces are considered to be
I
I
employed.(38) Article 3 officially recognised unemployment and detailed the 
procedures for registering as such.(39) Article 36, which dealt w ith military 
personnel made unemployed, stated that as soon as individuals registered their 
new status they would be entitled to compensation for twelve months. In the 
first three months they would receive 75 percent of their former wage. In the 
following four months they would receive 60 percent of that wage, and in the 
final m onths this would be reduced to 45 percent.(40) After that point they 
would become eligible for the minimum wage as determined by the "Law on 
Social Guarantees".
I'
We now turn our attention to civilian employees of the MIC. Ellen Jones 
has shown that civilians played a limited role within the Soviet MoD, although 
they were widely em ployed throughout the branches.(41) Non-m ilitary 
employees found remunerative work in the lower echelons of the MoD — areas 
such as military farms, schools, and academies, medical facilities, housing and 
supply organisations, and of course the MIC.(42) The Northern Group of the
Soviet Army comprised 58,000 Soviet personnel, approximately 8,000 of whom
were civilian white and blue collar workers.(43) It is to be assumed that a 
civilian contingent of this size or greater was attached to every military group of 
the Soviet army. As these groups were withdrawn from the various territories 
not only were the conscripts and some of the officers returned to the civilian job 
market, so too were those in auxiliary positions. Since the Russian government 
has now taken responsibility for returning service personnel it can be assumed 
that they will be subject to the provisions in the "Law on Public Employment".
This situation has led to an increasing number of calls being made to slow
Civilians employed in the defence industries have been particularly 
affected by disarmament and the resultant conversion programme. Prior to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union there were over 500 defence enterprises and design 
bureaux undergoing conversion in full or in part. They were required either to 
completely halt their military output and switch to the production of consumer 
items or to diversify their product line. In 1990 it was suggested that by 
converting Soviet industries perhaps more than 500,000 people would lose their 
jobs.(44) By February 1993 600,000 people had become unem ployed in the 
Russian defence sector alone, and only 300,000 of them had managed to find 
employment elsewhere.(45)
i
Enterprises in the civilian sector are also releasing workers as they attempt 
to cut costs and become economically accountable. Both the defence and the 
civilian sectors have this in common — they are both releasing the poorly 
qualified, low paid labourers. Engineers, qualified technicians and managers are 
in high demand and there is bound to be competition between the two sectors for 
their services. For the short term, disarm am ent will lead to structural 
unemployment for the uniformed and non-uniformed employee.
I
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down the reform programme in order to offer better social protection to workers. 
Part of this insistence upon greater social protection stems from the fact that the 
employment fund is not able to meet the demands placed upon it. As noted 
earlier, it is made up of contributions from the state budget and from employers. 
As a result of increasingly unstable economic conditions employers are 
w ithholding their taxes which form the basis of the state's contribution.(46) 
There is now simply not enough money to go around.
The Russian government's inability to deal with the economic situation 
during  the course of 1992 and 1993 was com pounded by the ongoing 
constitutional crisis. As a result of num erous amendments to the Russian 
constitution, which was originally adopted in 1978, it had become unclear which 
was the suprem e organ of legislative power, the presidential office or the 
parliam ent. This constitutional crisis was exacerbated by two very strong 
personalities, those of President Boris Yeltsin and the then Speaker of the 
Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov. The flash point for conflict was the 
economy and the reform programme.
In an attem pt to personalise the conflict the conservatives within the 
parliament, led by Khasbulatov, accused Yeltsin of dictatorial tendencies and the 
desire to create a cult of personality. He in turn claimed that the parliament did 
not have the country's interests at heart. Recriminations and compromises 
marked the political agenda of 1992. The compromises failed to hold and in 
March 1993 Yeltsin and Khasbulatov essentially declared a personalised war. 
Unable to work w ith the parliam ent in pressing through reforms Yeltsin 
declared presidential rule on March 20. Khasbulatov and the conservatives 
demanded his impeachment. Although 617 members of the Congress of People's 
Deputies voted in favour of impeachment they fell short of the required number.
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needing a further 72 votes.(47) Yeltsin survived, but so too did his rival, for only 
400 votes were cast to oust Khasbulatov, short of the 517 needed.(48)
Yeltsin attem pted to break the constitutional deadlock by staging a 
referendum , asking the people who they favoured and which economic 
programme they preferred. Achieving victory by a narrow margin in the April 
25 referendum, Yeltsin proceeded to draft a new constitution, one which would 
allow him to propose his own prime minister, to name other ministers without 
recourse to parliament, to call referenda, supervise foreign and defence policy, 
conduct in te rna tiona l nego tia tions and be v irtu a lly  im m une from  
impeachment.(49) These proposals aggravated an already difficult situation and 
the parliament reacted by continuing the legislative deadlock, passing legislation 
which contravened Presidential decrees. As a result, economic and political 
reform was allowed to drift during the course of 1993. Those pieces of legislation 
which did pass often did not resemble their initial form, having been curtailed by 
either the President or the parliament. The legal conflict was eventually 
resolved in favour of President Yeltsin, following his orders to dissolve the 
parliament on September 21 and the subsequent storming of the White House in 
October. Following the submission of his parliam entary opponents Yeltsin 
amiounced that elections for a new parliament which would be subordinate to 
the President would be held in December. However, this resolution failed to 
mitigate the effects of the crisis on the economy. The failure to assist military 
and defence related personnel adequately in the transition to the civilian 
economy, combined with ram pant inflation and general economic dislocation, 
would create further political unrest by giving support to hard-line nationalist 
groups, like Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democrats, who favoured a return 
to a more stable and structured political system. Zhirinovsky's model for the 
state promotes the ideas of stability, continuity, and protection (for some at least),
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concepts which Sokolov, as discussed in Chapter Two, suggested were the 
prim ary functions of the state. Zhirinovsky believes that such a state can be 
achieved through a resurgent military. The idea has proved very appealing to 
individuals who feel very dislocated as a result of disarmament.
WEAPONS REDUCTIONS AND MILITARY RESTRUCTURING
Should the political situation in Russia and the other republics deteriorate 
further the question of weapons will gain in importance. The purpose of treaties 
like INF, CFE, and START was to see not only the removal of various weapons 
from the theatre of operations but also their eventual dismemberment. The 
uninitiated believe that by destroying a weapons system a state can easily regain 
the money spent on its initial construction; unfortunately, this is not the case.
Both the INF and CFE Treaties established methods by which the weapons 
systems had to be destroyed. The INF Treaty envisaged the dismantling of all 
systems except for a quota of 15 missiles for museum purposes. Once the nuclear 
warhead device and guidance systems had been removed then the missile could 
be cut into pieces of specified dimensions, which could in turn be used for scrap. 
Demolishing any of the implements of war is naturally a long and arduous 
process. The metal used has been repeatedly fired and punched in order to bind 
the elem ents of m agnesium , titanium , stainless steel, carbon steel, and 
alum inium . This process is used to provide the utm ost protection to the 
occupants of the vehicle, making the item, be it a tank, warship, plane or 
submarine, as indestructible as possible. Therefore, to separate all these metals 
from one another a highly involved reverse process m ust be developed. In 
addition each element would have to be purified to remove any trace metals.
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The USSR found it difficult to comply with the Treaty because it did not
have an indigenous scrap industry. As a result it was forced to sell retired 
weapons systems to Western firms which turned them into scrap and then sold 
the components back to the Soviet Union. For example, warships were sold to 
foreigners at one dollar per unit of weight. Once the metals were melted down 
and purified they were sold back to the USSR in the form of imports for the 
increased cost of twenty dollars for the same unit of weight.(50) There was an 
added cost which had to be considered. The civilian enterprises would need to be 
retooled it they were to use these high alloy materials effectively. The Soviet 
Ministry of Automotive and Farm Machine Building Industries was unable to 
use titanium  and alum inium  alloys, certain plastics, and other m aterials 
requiring special processing without undergoing a thorough restructuring and 
retooling of its plants.(51) Although specific costs have not been detailed in 
Soviet literature on conversion it is clear that the retooling of plants and the 
development of whole new industries will incur additional costs before any 
money previously spent on the defence budget can be recouped, thus placing 
demands on monetary supplies not readily available. As a result, both the Soviet 
and Russian governm ents have advocated m ethods of destruction and 
conversion which do not increase expenditure substantially.
One such method was outlined in the INF Treaty. Once the payload was 
rem oved the m issile could be "elim inated by explosive dem olition or 
burning".(52) Those pieces not completely destroyed in the first stage would 
then be "burned, crushed, flattened, and destroyed by explosion."(53) The Treaty 
allowed for hundreds of missiles to be destroyed in this fashion. While this 
method did not allow for the recovering of money previously spent it did avoid 
further expense. No additional money was needed to set up a scrap industry or 
for that matter re-purchase scrap from the West at a distinct loss.
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While some of the prescribed methods of destruction outlined by the CFE 
Treaty (1990) were similar, e.g. severing and explosion, there were other 
recom m endations. Conventional weapons could be dem olished using a 
hydraulic press; smashed using a wrecking ball; or con verted. (54) It was this 
latter method which was the most appealing to the Soviet government. It was 
frequently claimed that swords could be turned into ploughshares, or rather 
tanks into tractors. It was unrealistic to assume that an entire tank with a few 
slight modifications could become an agricultural harvesting machine, however 
certain components did lend themselves to conversion (see Chart 4.2).
The final drive mechanism on a tank tread can be used on a tractor. The 
final drive is a wheel set slightly higher than the others w ithin the tread. 
Located at the front of Soviet tanks, the drive wheel works much like the gear 
wheel of a bicycle, shifting up or down and adjusting the chain to accommodate 
changes in speed and grade. In addition, the energy of motion for a tank is 
propelled outwards at right angles. The final drive assists in converting this 
energy outwards. A tractor works on the same principles of gears and the 
horizontal movement of energy from a base point. Thus the transfer of the final 
drive wheel is an obvious choice in the process of conversion. (55)
While the final drive mechanism can be used on other pieces of 
equipm ent the actual treads on the larger tanks have little use in the civilian 
sphere. The treads on the shorter tanks and armoured personnel carriers, if 
widened, could be used on bulldozers. A bulldozer manoeuvres like a tractor 
and the tank, thus facilitating the transfer of tracks from one piece of machinery 
to another.
The gun or cannon of the tank has been proven to have direct benefits for
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the civilian sector. The interior of each gun has a spiral track within it which 
facilitates the release of ammunition. The existence of this track makes it 
possible to thread the gun barrels together in order to from drill casings. The 
specially hardened metal used to construct these barrels makes them well suited 
for use as covers for drills in the mining industry. Guns were being used in this 
fashion as early as 1990. The 100mm gun was being used to puncture holes for 
field research and in the oil and gas industry they were being used to hammer 
anchor ties into the ground.(56) In the future it will become necessary to 
establish firms which can produce this type of equipment on their own. The use 
of guns for drill casings solves the immediate problems of what to do with 
retired military equipment and allows time for these firms to develop.
I
In a similar vein, the V-12 tank engines have been modified to fit the 
specifications of earthmovers, 100-ton cranes for strip mines, generators for 
m ining operations,tunnel equipment, and huge haulers. This equipm ent is 
needed in the areas in which expanded growth must occur to redevelop the
;econom ies of the new ly independen t states, nam ely agricu ltu re  and 
construction.
3
M obile m issile launchers have also p roved  quite  adap tab le . 
Advertisements frequently appear in newspapers and journals like Konversiya  
or AvtomohiVnyi Transport showing liquid fuel transports which are in effect 
converted mobile missile launchers.(57) Robotics also appear to be an area for
m utual civil-military development, as does computer technology. It would seem 
that these areas would provide the most benefits for conversion.
f
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Since 1991 the governm ent of Russia has m aintained the Soviet 
government's attempts to carry out "partial conversion" of equipment, making 
the transition into areas which still have some direct tie to the military and 
technological spheres. This is a sensible approach and one which can reduce the 
costs of disarmament. It is clear, however, that money is not necessarily regained 
by destroying weapons systems. Frequently more money m ust be provided in 
order to destroy the weapon and extract the scrap. Peace dividends do not come 
from destroying weapons but from halting their production. Not even the 
release of personnel from service will result in immediate benefits for the 
economy as a whole. As has already been noted the cost of upkeep for military 
personnel is transferred from the defence budget to the social services budget 
once disarmament takes effect. Some analysts do believe that long-term benefits 
for the economy can be achieved if a transition is made from a conscript to a 
professional army.
From 1988 onwards there was an ongoing debate within the Soviet Union 
on the merits of a conscript army versus the benefits of a professional, volunteer
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force. General Yazov initially denounced the idea of a professional army for two 
reasons. First, he believed that it was every man's duty to serve his country. 
Second, the General Staff considered the cost of converting to a professional 
army to be prohibitive. (58) The arguments in favour of a professional army were 
varied. They ranged from a need to bring perestroika to the military, to link 
military reforms to economic restructuring, and to mollify dissatisfaction in the 
republics with the existing system. In the final analysis the reasons for the 
transfer were all closely linked.
I
On of the chief obstacles to the reform of the Soviet system, in both the 
civilian and military sectors, was the reluctance of the bureaucracy to participate. 
Concepts like self-management were a direct threat to it. If decisions could be 
made at lower levels then there would be no need for the bureaucrats to make 
decisions affecting the tiniest details of life. Perestroika placed the jobs and the 
prestige of the apparatchiki in jeopardy.
In the Soviet Union the ratio of generals to soldiers was higher than in the 
USA, Great Britain, or the former West Germany. Captain V. Saitgareev called 
this phenomenon "general saturation".(59) He quoted statistics which showed 
that in the Soviet Union there was one general for every 700 servicemen, 
compared to 1:3400 in the USA and 1:2400 in the FRG.(60) The question arose, 
what did so many generals find to do?(61) The answer was literally everything. 
There were generals in charge of the hunting industry, of state printing offices, of 
sanatoriums, military orchestras, institutes, editorial boards, and there were even 
a num ber of generals, w ithout doctoral or professional qualifications, heading 
academic institutions.(62) As a result of these findings other questions were 
posed: were some of these appointments really necessary? Would some of them 
have been better filled by civilians? If so would not the advancement of civilians
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have cost the state less?
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In 1990 People's Deputy V Lopatin suggested that there should be a change 
in the personnel structure. He was in favour of reducing the number of highly 
paid officers and replacing them, where possible, with sergeants.(63) He also 
recom mended that the use of civilian specialists in the army and navy be 
examined, especially where they participated in adm inistrative organs, in
, 3 Îsupport services, in medicine, financial security, technology, and military science. I 
Where previously he had proposed that military restructuring be tied to overall 
economic reform, he now went further by suggesting that reductions and the 
reorgan isation  of staff levels should  coincide w ith  an increase in 
computerisation and the automation of management. Furthermore, and this is 
a point which is brought up by other authors, the remaining servicemen and all 
those who decide to join the services in the future should sign a contract of 
employment. (64) By enforcing such a regulation not only would the military be ■tadopting the trappings of a market-run economy, it would also be protecting the ,;y
rights of servicemen. x
,W riting in the same edition of Voprosy Ekonomiki , from their position 
as civilian analysts, S. Vikulov, I. Yudin, and V. Saitgareev also proposed that the 
armed forces should be run on economic principles, with wages and privileges
- i ';sguaranteed by a legal contract. They also called vehemently for a redefinition of ^
military tasks. No longer should the army be used for civilian construction work 
or to settle internal disputes. They felt that the army should become 
depoliticised.(65)
%Following the collapse of the August coup, the removal of Yazov as USSR |
Defence Minister and the appointm ent of Evgenii Shaposhnikov in his place.
military reform began to move forward. Many of the suggestions put forward by 
Lopatin, Vikulov, Yudin, and Saitgareev were adopted by Shaposhnikov and 
Lobov, Chief of the General Staff. In the days immediately following the coup 
Shaposhnikov advocated the depoliticization of the armed forces and their 
transformation into a largely professional army.(66) He and Lobov also argued 
that the Ministry of Defence should become a civilian department which would 
report directly to the all-Union President.(67) The two generals supported the 
idea of republican national guards but not the formation of national armies.(68)
The Soviet professional army, as perceived by Shaposhnikov and Lobov, 
would have been a mixed army employing both volunteer professionals and 
conscripts. New recruits would have served six months in a training unit in 
their home republics. After they had completed the initial training the would 
have been faced with two options. They could have signed a contract for 3-5 
years and in return have received free food, clothing, housing, vacation travel 
and a monthly wage of 300-500 roubles.(69) Upon completion of this contract 
they could have signed on for an additional five years at a higher level of pay 
and with family benefits. Alternatively, a conscript could choose not to sign the 
initial contract, in which case he would be obliged to serve on more year of 
service. Shaposlmikov claimed that within 7-9 years this system would provide 
the requisite number of servicemen and decrease the defence budget.(70)
Various economists have contributed to the discussion of the costs of a 
professional army. In countering Yazov's claims that a transition to a 
professional army was economically unfeasible, Lopatin stated that in the 1970s 
when the United States cut its troop strength from 3.1 to 2.1 million men the 
Defence Departm ent's budget was also reduced by 20 percent in constant 
prices.(71) When Great Britain reduced the number of men in uniform from
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816,100 in 1954 to 407,500 in 1964 its budget allocations also decreased by 18.4 
percent in real terms.(72)
Alternatively, Professor Vikulov argued that w hile a m ove to a 
professional army would hold long-term financial benefits, the effects would not 
be immediate. Just as the destruction of weapons systems required an initial 
financial outlay so too did reductions in force strength. He predicted that in 1990 
general expenditure on m aintenance for personnel w ould increase by 4-6 
times.(73) He contended that a reduction in the armed forces of 2.5 million men 
would result in an increase in expenditure of 3-4 times.(74) This would be the 
result of an increase in the num ber of pensions being paid to dismissed 
personnel and improved wages for the remaining servicemen. However, there 
would still be indirect benefits to the economy. According to his calculations, it 
cost the national economy 4.8 thousand roubles per year to support one 
serviceman.(75) If the num ber of men in uniform was reduced by 1 million 
there would be a benefit to the economy of 5 billion roubles.(76)
He also argued that the expense of offering training courses would 
decrease with a reduction in the number of incoming personnel. This would 
result in a one billion rouble savings for the civilian economy,(77) The final 
advantage was that lower personnel levels would lead to a decrease in armament 
supplies by 10-15 percent, allowing for a saving of 3-4 billion roubles.(78)
In his contribution to the discussion Professor Yudin began with an 
analysis of General Yazov's prediction that a transition to a professional army 
would cost the state no less than 40 billion roubles.(79) Yudin considered Yazov's 
estimates of required government expenditure to be exaggerated. In 1990 35 
percent of the Soviet military were professional servicemen. The remaining 65
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percent, consisting of soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and master-sergeants, accounted 
for 2.6 million men.(80) Yudin argued that if those 2.6 million men were 
replaced by professionals each m an released from duty  would receive a 
maximum monetary allowance of 500 roubles a month which equalled the sum 
of 15.6 billion roubles per year.(81) He also argued that skilled labour should 
have higher rewards than manual labour and thus the rate of pay for officers and 
warrant officers would have to be increased by 150-300 roubles a m onth.(82) It 
was expected that the government would have to pay out an additional 2 billion 
roubles in order to meet this pay increase.(83) In the Soviet period it was 
believed that army pensions and wages would grow to a maximum of 17 billion 
roubles during the transition to a professional army. (84)
Citing Yazov, Yudin agreed that monetary allowances would have to be 
paid  to soldiers, sergeants, sailors and senior officers, and their families. 
However, whereas Yazov had stated that a sum of 3-4 billion roubles would have 
to be paid only once, Yudin argued that money would have to be dispersed over 
4-5 years at a cost of one billion roubles per annum .(85) This w ould have 
brought the total monetary allowances for one year up to 18 billion roubles 
rather than the 40 billion claimed by Yazov.
The Russian governm ent now supports the view that a move to a 
professional army will help to decrease the defence budget. This is possible, but 
it may be that a decrease in the defence budget will appear as an increase in the 
social services budget once the onus of paying pensions and unemployment 
benefits to retiring personnel is transferred to a different branch of the 
government. The defence sector, however, remains faced with the difficulty of 
enticing new recruits into the service. Reports reveal that only 1 in 5 men 
answered the autumn call-up in 1992.(86) At present some divisions have only
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30 percent of the m anpow er required.(87) For a sm ooth transition to a 
professional army to occur the Russians needed to recruit 100,000 men in 1992. 
Only 13,500 volunteered.(88)
Shaposhnikov's original plan had been to attract volunteers w ith a
monthly wage of 300-500 roubles. As of January 1993 monetary compensation 
had risen to 6,000 roubles a month in an attempt to keep up with inflation.(89) 
According to statistics available in January 1993. Russian officers serving in areas 
of major ethnic conflict, like Tadzhikistan, were earning at least 50,000 roubles a 
m onth.(90) Some servicemen released from active duty have been tempted to 
act as mercenaries in return for high levels of compensation. One Russian 
officer was told by the Tadzhiks that they would pay him R2,000 for every hour 
of conflict, R10,000 per corpse, and R50,000 per tank destroyed.(91)
The Russian government had hoped to avoid these types of situations by 
keeping the armed forces under joint control, however, with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union each of the Republics laid claim to the Soviet forces on their 
territories in order to establish their own national armies.(92) One argument in 
favour of joint control of the military was that the cost of maintaining the armed 
forces would be equally distributed throughout the Republics. Russia claims that 
this has not been the case. The Russian government is financially responsible 
for the troops located on its territory and for CIS strategic forces in other 
Republics. Added to this is the cost of caring for the troops returning from 
Eastern Europe. Russia simply does not have the financial resources to cover all 
of these expenses.
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In addition to trying to meet the needs of the military all of the Republican 
governments involved m ust also deal with the demands of other sectors of 
society for their share of the peace dividend. The chance of a substantial windfall 
resulting from the reductions in the military budget were always going to be 
negligible. In 1988 and 1989, the Soviet government and society at large began 
discussing the prospects for a peace dividend, yet it was apparent as early as 1989 
that such a bonus would not stretch as far as the people wanted. If Western 
sources are used then the 1989 Soviet defence budget equalled approximately 
121.2 billion roubles.(93) It was at this time that a reduction of 14.2 percent was 
announced. Equalling only 8.54 billion roubles, it could hardly meet the 
conflicting demands placed upon it by the civilian and military sectors. The 
areas specifically targeted by the government, and covered in this section, were 
housing, agriculture and medicine.
There was a pervasive myth that all the materials and instruments used 
by the armed forces were of a higher quality and standard than could be found in 
the civilian sphere. In regard to military housing this myth was blatantly false.
'
Only 50 percent of military housing was equipped with basic conveniences.(94) 
Not only was it poorly fitted out, it was also overcrowded and afforded the 
soldier little privacy.
Despite this overcrowding a large proportion of Soviet officers were left 
homeless. This situation was aggravated by the rate at which troops were being 
w ithdraw n from Europe. In Belorussia, where many Soviet troops were
restationed, construction workers were able to promise only that two new 
apartment blocks would be provided by the end of 1990.(95) In the spring of 1990, 
as the first troops and their dependents arrived in Gorkiy oblast from 
Czechoslovakia, families were housed in garrison hostels while local authorities
?
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agreed to allocate space in the form of student hostels and apartments. Again it 
was prom ised that w ithin three years more than ten apartm ent blocks and 
children's preschools would be built.
By 1990 the number of service families without apartments had reached 
180,000. The average cost of a two to three room cooperative apartment was 
estimated at 15,000-20,000 roubles, therefore approximately 1.5-2 billion roubles 
would have been necessary at that time to build the requisite num ber of 
apartm ents.(97) Georgii Arbatov suggested that if the Soviet Union halted 
production on just one of the three aircraft carriers it had ordered there would be 
more than enough money to build at least 100,000 apartments for returning 
servicemen and their families.(98) While the General Staff m ight have 
considered security weakened by the loss of such a vessel, Arbatov argued that 
low morale and even poor health were far more detrimental.(99)
The General Staff was unwilling to forfeit its aircraft carrier and instead, in 
the negotiations for the 1991 budget, it asked for 1.65 billion roubles for housing 
construction. This sum was an increase from the previous year's allocation and 
was, the General Staff argued, connected with the program m e for social 
guarantees for servicemen and their families.(100) However, even this sum 
could not meet all the housing needs of the army. In conjunction with the "2 + 
4" Treaty (1989) the German government had agreed to provide the Soviet 
Union with 7.8 billion marks' credit to assist with the construction of housing for 
returning servicemen. This was to be spent on the creation of an infrastructure 
as well as the actual houses.(101) The German commitment in this area has 
continued, but even with this the plight of the former Soviet soldier is still a 
difficult one. There are reports that some men have waited as long as two years 
for adequate housing facilities.(102) The situation in Russia does not look like it
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will improve in the near future.(103)
The housing problem in the military has its mirror image in the civilian 
sphere. One of Gorbachev's early promises had been that every family would 
have its own flat or house by the year 2000. To fulfil this promise 40-42 million 
apartments would have had to be built. Existing Soviet apartments provided on 
average 14.6 square metres of floor space per person.(104) It was calculated that 
18.5 to 19 square metres would need to be allocated to each person in order to 
meet the requirement of a separate apartment for every family.(105) Changes in 
housing policy were expected to reduce demand and thus allow the construction 
budget to be stretched further. In 1988 three important housing decrees were 
issued which initiated the privatisation of the housing market. The first decree, 
passed in February 1988, was designed to "more fully [use] the increased spending 
pow er deriving from higher incomes and from money held in savings 
banks".(106) The decree, "On Measures to Accelerate the Development of 
Individual Housing Construction", encompassed four main points: I
1) Banks were to make credit available to enterprises 
intending to start or expand production of building and 
decorating materials.
2) People relinquishing housing in the public sector were 
to be given preference in the allocation of building plots.
3) Access roads and all public utilities had to be provided to 
areas under development.
4) State banks were allowed to make advances of up to 
20,000 roubles repayable over 25 years in the cities and 50 
years in rural areas.
Furthermore, as a result of this decree enterprises were able to sell their housing 
to employees.
The second measure, adopted in March 1988, took the process a step
further by allowing cooperatives to purchase buildings from local soviets at 
discount prices and renovate them for their own eventual use or else build them 
from scratch. The third decree, published in December 1988, allowed tenants in 
residence to buy their flats and non-residents to bid for unoccupied apartments. 
The issuance of privatisation vouchers by the Russian governm ent in the 
autum n of 1992 also enabled citizens to purchase their flats from the state. The 
actions taken by the Soviet and Russian governments sought to limit the state's 
responsibility  for the m aintenance of housing stock and transfer it to 
cooperatives and individuals. Since this legislation has not proven as successful 
as anticipated, the state must continue to play a role. In 1986 it was estimated 
that for roughly every two roubles spent on actual housing construction one 
rouble would have to be spent on the surrounding infrastructure. (107) Inflation 
in Russia has only increased the monumental bill which the government will 
have to pay. While converted military equipment can, and has, been used in the 
construction industry, it appears unlikely at this time that a transfer of funds 
from the defence budget will prove sufficient for housing requirements.
The production of medical equipment has also been a priority of defence
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In both the food industry and the health sector, the military's contribution 
has been technical rather than financial. In 1988 the Soviet government decided 
that it would spend 80 billion roubles over a seven year period to improve food 
storage and processing facilities.(108) The defence industries were directed to 
m anufactu re  equipm ent for various branches of the ag ro -industria l 
complex.(109) Specifically, 250 arms-manufacturing plants began designing and 
building new machines to improve the food processing industry.(llO) The
Russian governm ent has continued the com m itm ent to im proving the 
technological level within the civilian agricultural sector.(lll)
programme. While further evidence will be provided in Chapters Five and Six
152
enterprises undergoing conversion. The state of Soviet health services was 
appalling in Western terms. Infant mortality had increased and in some areas, 
most notably in Soviet Central Asia, it had come close to Third World levels. On 
average there were 26 fatalities for every 1,000 live births.(1120 Life expectancy 
had decreased dramatically, with men attaining the age of 64 and women 73 
years.(113) In 1988 the Soviet Union was ranked 50th in the world in terms of 
infant mortality and 32nd in terms of life expectancy.(114) It proved difficult to 
combat these trends as medicines and modern medical equipment were in short 
supply. However, the Soviet government did recognise the problem and tried to 
correct it. In 1988 the production of medical equipment increased by 7 percent in 
roubles over the 19?? value to a total of 1.2 billion roubles. Production of 
medicines also increased to 3.7 billion roubles. This sounded promising, yet it 
was enough to meet only 40 percent of the needs of the Soviet people.(115) 
M urray Feshbach calculated that 100 billion roubles a year was needed to halt 
these distressing trends and to bring the USSR back up to world standards.(116) 
Once again the Soviet government did not have the money, so they promoted 
the production of medical supplies within the converting defence enterprises. 
Products manufactured ranged from syringes to actual surgical equipment.(117) 
Following the Soviet governm ent's lead, the Russian governm ent has 
continued to target the medical sector as one of the key beneficiaries of 
conversion.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this chapter was to begin a comparison of Soviet conversion 
policy between 1986 and 1991 to the ideal programme established in Chapter Two. 
An initial observation dem onstrates the lim ited success of the Soviet
1
The treatment of retiring or discharged personnel may affect the state's
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to support this argument, it is clear from the evidence presented here that the 
Soviet governm ent did not form ulate an overall conversion program m e. 
Situations were dealt with as they arose.
At this stage, the primary evidence to support this argument is the lack of 
an economic bill of rights. A lthough civilian economists and servicemen 
repeatedly requested the creation of such a program m e, the governm ent's 
response was simply to group service and defence related personnel with other 
classification of the unemployed. This is a dangerous approach to adopt for 
several reasons. First, in indoctrinating servicemen the importance of loyalty is 
stressed; loyalty to one's comrades, loyalty to the state, and the state's loyalty to 
the soldier. If, in the process of disarming and converting its military-industrial 
complex, the state fails to recognise this service then it is likely that disaffection 
will grow among the ranks and show itself in the form of political opposition. 
The military is in a position of power, controlling as it does the weapons of the 
state. In the Soviet Union the military was actively involved in the decision­
making process, thereby underlining its power and importance. Despite 
Gorbachev's attempts to limit their role they were still able to voice their political 
dissent through military representatives in the Congress of People's Deputies 
and by support of politicians and parties. Civilian recommendations for the 
depoliticization of the armed forces and Shaposhnikov's and Lobov's attempts to 
pu t them into practice were admirable, however, they may have been naive. 
Lenin argued that it was impossible to depoliticise any military establishment 
completely. (118) This is true, for if war is to remain an effective tool of policy the 
military will always need to be represented in the corridors of political power and 
policy will have to be disseminated throughout the military establishment.
I
security as well as its stability. If an all volunteer force, or even one with a better 
ratio between volunteers and conscripts, were to be created in Russia then 
recognition for services rendered would become very important if new recruits 
were to be attracted. Arbatov had a very good point when he argued that morale 
may be as, if not more, important than a new aircraft carrier. In the Report From 
Iron M ountain. Lewin contended that a volunteer armed force could act as a 
sponge, absorbing excess lab our. (119) However, this is possible only if military 
service appears as a viable economic alternative to employment in the civilian 
sector.
Promoting new areas of economic development is the primary function of 
any conversion programme. Yet if it is to succeed it is important, once again, to 
ensure that the specialised job skills associated with the defence industry are 
properly utilised and not depreciated.(120) In some cases the retraining and 
relocation of personnel would be necessary in order to maximise their skills. 
Soviet and Russian legislation failed to deal with these circumstances adequately.
The Soviet governm ent did, however, achieve minor success in the 
prom otion of capital reallocation. The transfer of investments was strongly 
advocated, and while it did not occur in sufficient measure, various pieces of 
equipment were converted for use in the civilian sphere with positive results. 
As will be discussed in Chapters Five and Six, the conversion of factories proved 
slightly less successful.
Peace dividends provide long-term benefits, not short-term  economic 
windfalls. They are not achieved by destroying armaments but by halting their 
production and converting the industrial capabilities. The size of the dividend 
appears reliant upon the organisation of the plan and the am ount of
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restructuring necessary to maintain stability and security. In the case of Russia 
no real savings were achieved in the military field. In July 1992 the Minister of 
Finance, Vasilii Barchuk, claimed that the peace dividend had been used to cover 
the costs of establishing a Russian army, on the conversion process, the 
withdraw al of troops, the destruction of weapons, higher salaries and other 
personnel costs.(121)
If a state is fortunate the peace dividend can result in im proved 
technology rather than pure financial gain. Once again, however, the plan must 
be comprehensive. Soviet conversion policy in regard to the defence industry is 
the subject of Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISARM ING THE MILITARY ECONOMY: 
A FRAMEWORK FOR CONVERSION
An assessment of the long-term prospects of disarmament and conversion 
in Russia requires an analysis of the lim ited achievements of the Soviet 
program m e. Expectations of the conversion program m e were, perhaps, 
unrealistic. Insufficient allowance was made for the strong motivation on the 
part of vested interests to limit the effects of the programme and ensure only 
slow im plem entation occurred. Furthermore, the contradictions of the 
transitional system may have been too great to overcome. Central planning in 
one sector could not coexist with the initiation of market principles in another.
The strict definition of conversion {konversiya) is as a process involving 
change in productive output, from consumer goods to military supplies. Peace 
is assumed to be the prevailing condition until an outbreak of war requires the 
mobilisation of production methods to provide for conflict. W ar's end would 
theoretically lead to a reconversion to the manufacture of civilian goods.(1) 
Generally, however, conversion simply means the transfer of productive 
capabilities from one sector to another. In accordance with the 1920s policy of 
m ilitary assimilation {assimilyatsiya) the Soviet economic system had been 
structured in such a way that the transition from military to civilian production 
should have been relatively straightforward. As defined by S. Ventsov, then 
head of the mobilisation sector of the Red Army Staff, the policy had two 
components. First, m ilitary factories w ith excess capacity w ould produce 
consumer goods which shared a technological base with current military output. 
Secondly, conditions were to be developed within civilian enterprises to allow
165
for the manufacture of military hardware in the event of war.(2) It was hoped 
that this doctrine would provide adequate means for the production of military 
equipment but do so within a relatively small "core" of defence enterprises.
In fact the "core" of defence enterprises in the Soviet Union was never 
small. Those attempts made between the 1920s and 1980s to disarm a significant 
proportion of the armed forces and convert military production, proved largely 
fruitless. From the end of World War II until the late 1980s only one period 
could be described as a period of conversion, from 1953 to 1955. Premier 
Malenkov's commitment during these years to decreased military spending in 
favour of consumer goods represents the strongest evidence of a conversion 
policy pre-Gorbachev.(3) This is especially true in the context of increased East- 
W est tension and increases in Soviet troop numbers to five million by 1953. 
M alenkov was ousted in 1955 and succeeded by Khrushchev who had 
formulated his own military policy. Although Khrushchev initiated harsh cuts 
within the conventional forces and the surface fleet he did not couple this with 
significant reductions in R&D. Believing that the way to achieve parity with the 
rival superpow er was to obtain a nuclear capability he increased m ilitary 
appropriations by 12 percent in the late 1950s.(4) The specific areas which 
enjoyed benefits were R&D, the missile force and the submarine fleet, to the 
detriment of conversion.
By 1964, the year in which Klirushchev was ousted and Brezhnev was 
elevated to the post of First Secretary, the military had obtained a firm grasp on 
the finances of the state. The sector had become "hypertrophied", while its 
management had become "supercentralised", a trend which was to continue 
until the 1980s.(5) The management of the defence sector was discussed in 
Chapter Two. At this point, however, it is important to understand just how
:":E
large the defence sector was. By the 1980s there were approximately 5000 defence 
enterprises and design bureaus.(6) According to Dr. Romil K. Shchenin of 
IMEMO there were 10 million engineers and workers in the defence enterprises 
at this time. Another 20 million people worked w ithin military and civil- 
military design bureaux. He suggested that a further 10 million were involved 
in community support. In all some 40 million people, out of a total working 
population of 158,911,000, relied on the defence sector for their livelihood.(7) If 
conversion were to succeed in the 1980s the programme would have to address 
the supercentralisation of management and assist in the transition of defence 
employees to the civilian economy.
These issues were partially addressed in the governm ent's proposals. 
Although a formal conversion programme was not issued until the winter of 
1990, the governm ent did have a general idea of w hat it w anted defence 
conversion to achieve. W riting in Izvestiya Akademii nauk SSSR: Seriya 
Ekonomicheskaya  in 1989, the econom ist K.R Sam sonov ou tlined  the 
governm ent's proposals for conversion. It initially hoped to achieve a seven- 
point objective which ranged in topics from pure economics (the change in 
supply and demand curves), to financial differentials and the restructuring of the 
com m and-adm inistrative system. From the very beginning, however, 
problem s existed for the realisation of each of these seven points. The 
government hoped to improve the national welfare by increasing the production 
of goods for national consumption (consumer durables) and by developing the 
housing construction industry and the service sector. (8) To accomplish this a 
change in infrastructure needed to take place in both the civilian and defence 
sectors. This would have m eant a transfer of management skills, thus the 
retraining of staff. To improve the housing construction industry and increase 
civilian involvement in this sphere both money and resources needed to be
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redirected to the domestic economy. The government also hoped to eliminate 
financial disproportion.(9) For this to occur the budget needed to be not only cut 
but also restructured, with a careful reassessment and reapportionm ent of 
finances to different sectors.
Also on the governm ent's provisional agenda was the broadening of 
investment possibilities in the national economy. The government planned to 
increase the volume of capital investment in the civilian branches, transfer part 
of the equipm ent and production power of the defence sector to civilian 
production, increase the quality of original equipment, and reconstruct and re­
align branches of civilian industry, starting first with those which were most 
technically backward. Point four called for the transfer of technology from the 
defence sector to the civilian sector in order to improve the qualitative level of
Point five addressed the primary issue, the nature of the military system. 
It demanded that the defence and civilian sectors be clearly defined and treated in 
an equal manner with resources being distributed appropriately. (12) This could 
occur only if the laws designed for the civilian sector (for example the Laws on 
Enterprises and Cooperatives) were applied in equal measure in the defence
167
;production.(lO) The main source of increased capital investment was to be the 
cuts in the defence budget. But in proportion to the demands placed by the 
civilian branches, the money released by the defence cuts was insufficient. The 
transfer of equipm ent and production power proved more difficult than 
originally anticipated as civilian enterprises needed to undergo a complete 
overhaul to accommodate the new technology. Not only had the factory to 
undergo technical changes, but the staff also needed to be retrained. Some 
administrators felt that it would be easier to start from scratch than to overhaul
the enterprises.(11)
@I
I
sector. The programme also called for the disentanglement, requalification and 
increased efficiency of the utilisation of labour resources. The efficiency of labour 
resources w ould be merely a side issue of any conversion program m e. 
Unem ploym ent or shortages of employm ent fall in the realm  of social 
legislation. A conversion programme could cover only certain aspects of the re­
qualification of labour, the slack would have to be picked up by other legal 
decrees and social programmes.
The final point of the plan dealt with increasing the volume of foreign 
trade, perfecting the import and export structures, and broadening the export 
possibilities for machine construction.(13) This item depended on the successful 
achievement of each of the preceding goals and the issuance of new government 
directives on foreign imports and the export of Soviet goods for hard currency. 
During the 1980s the government made various attempts to improve its export 
earnings. One way was to allow joint ventures between domestic and foreign 
firms. While joint ventures contributed to the development of the civilian 
economy, foreign access to military enterprises was restricted. This is not to say 
that it did not occur (indeed one case is discussed in Chapter Six): it simply meant 
that the defence enterprise in question could not produce strategic items. If a 
joint venture was to be formed the enterprise had to be manufacturing goods 
with a civilian application already. The prospect of creating a joint venture and 
receiving foreign capital and technology was employed as a motivating factor for 
conversion.
Arms exports were another source of hard currency. Between 1980 and 
1991 the USSR sold a total of over a 166 billion dollars worth of armaments.(14) 
Arms transfers were perceived as more of a political tool than an economic 
benefit. As a result, the majority of weapons transfers went to the Third World
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in an attempt to swing support away from America. Generally, the recipients 
were not in a position to pay for the weapons, especially in hard currency, thus 
profits from this type of export were lim ited.(15) In the late 1980s it was 
suggested that the Soviet Union increase the number of arms transfers for hard 
currency in order to increase export income. To do this, however, would require 
the maintenance of the defence structure. This policy would be incompatible 
with the full implementation of a conversion programme. Due to limited hard 
currency reserves the Soviet government chose to give priority to continued 
military production for arms sales instead of pushing ahead with conversion.
As can be seen, all these issues were and are m utually connected and 
m utually conditioned; they depend on many factors — the scale of conversion, 
the urgency in solving different problems, techno-economic and technological 
capabilities, and political will.(16) As the number of problems considered urgent 
in the USSR grew these objectives had to be further compartmentalised. Further 
difficulties arose because while there was agreement on the aims of conversion, 
the methods were in dispute.
It is clear from Samsonov's outline of the government's intentions that 
several different policies were placed under the heading konversiya.  Alexei 
Kireyev, a political economist, denounced this approach. For him conversion 
could not be the "diversification of arms production resulting in munitions 
factories starting to furnish a wide range of goods in addition to their traditional 
ou tpu t".(17) Diversification, in his opinion, was merely an extension of the 
form er policy of assimilyatsiya and generally m anifested itself in the 
manufacturing of equipment for light industry and the agro-industrial complex 
in the defence industries.(18) The MIC had always been involved in producing 
consumer items such as televisions, radios, washing-machines and the like. He
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believed that if conversion were to be equated with diversification it would 
merely signify an increase in the scale of the Ministry of Communications and 
the radio industry's involvement in the household electronic market.(19)
Nor did Kireyev feel that conversion should be used to mean the transfer 
to civilian industries of "new technologies, inventions or know-how worked out 
in the military sector".(20) As he pointed out, in market economies this process 
is known as "spin-off". Although it holds benefits for the civilian economy and 
has been responsible for providing such things as high frequency radios, teflon 
and computers, it should not be confused with conversion.
Kireyev further believed that neither the sale of military hardw are and 
technology on the arms market, nor the sale of hardware at home or abroad for 
scrap should be used as examples of conversion. In his opinion, the Soviet 
Union had confused the issue by applying the term conversion to what were in 
reality processes of diversification, spin-off and sales. Conversion, for Kireyev, 
meant only one thing: the closing of defence industries, their refitting, and their 
eventual production of purely consumer goods.
Shchenin adopted a slightly different and perhaps more realistic stance 
from the one taken by Kireyev. Shchenin w rote that the process of 
diversification does hold certain benefits for defence enterprises. For many 
enterprises the cost of fully converting to civilian output is prohibitive. The 
process of diversification can be used to wean the enterprise from military orders 
and state financial support.(21) While he would agree with Kireyev that 
conversion should symbolise either a radical cut or the term ination of arms 
production, his method for this was in fact diversification. He argued that in 
pursuing the ultimate goal, conversion, the state should employ all available
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methods. Since diversification can facilitate the achievement of the state's aim it 
should not be dismissed out of hand simply because it was not conversion.
The definition of conversion was not the only issue in dispute, so too 
were its pace and scale. Despite the emphasis placed on conversion by the Soviet 
governm ent it was initiated on an amazingly small scale — either w ithin 
individual enterprises in accordance with the INF Treaty, or at the level of 
individual republics. Part of the problem was that conversion was subject to the 
pace and scale of disarmament, it did not dictate that pace. This had happened 
before in the Soviet Union and with equally negative results.(22)
The policy was also affected by confusion over the meaning of reasonable 
sufficiency. Samsonov theorised that before one could talk about conversion one 
m ust understand what was meant by "reasonable and reliable" sufficiency of 
defence. As discussed in Chapter One, reasonable sufficiency was "the marrying 
of political and military doctrines to achieve international stability and security". 
Reasonable sufficiency placed its emphasis on political discussion and 
compromise with just the hint of a threat of military force. A state had to decide 
how big a "hint" it wished to give. If it wanted to retain a large force then the 
opportunities for a comprehensive conversion programme diminish, w ith the 
factories continuing to produce items for the defence sector. If, on the other 
hand, the government felt that a large armed force was no longer necessary then 
more enterprises could undergo conversion, thus having a greater effect on the 
rehabilitation of the economy.
The lengthy debate in the Soviet Union over the level of force which 
qualified as reasonably sufficient had a delaying effect on the emergence of a 
comprehensive policy of conversion. The central question was, "how does one
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define a reasonable limit, provide the best correlation of expenditures in defence 
and the national economy and still guarantee the security of the country?"(23) 
Since 1992 the primary question for the Russian government has been "whom 
does it declare as its enemy?" If it has no known enemy how can it determine a 
level of defence which is reasonably sufficient? So long as these questions 
remain, conversion will be hampered, and limited benefits will arise for the 
economy.
A related debate concerned the reduction in levels of secrecy in Soviet 
society. Neither disarmament nor conversion could be achieved without greater 
openness or glasnost'. In an article entitled "From the Cult of Secrecy to the 
Information Culture", Vladimir Rubanov, the department chief at the scientific 
Research Institute of the USSR Committee of State Security, described secrecy as a 
"kind of indicator of the political development of society and the degree of 
démocratisation of its social institutions".(24) The bureaucracy had flourished 
under Stalin and Brezhnev. It had taken control of society and this control 
shrouded the state in darkness and ignorance. As Karl Marx stated, "the 
universal spirit of bureaucracy is the secret and secrecy."(25)
Rubanov believed that the regime of secrecy was allowed to grow because 
of the "dogm atism  of governing traditions and disorientation  in the
■determination of political, economic and social priorities".(26) In this case the 
word "disorientation" could be interchanged with "subordination". Social and 
economic interests were subordinated to the needs of the political. Foreign 
policy by nature generated secrets in order to protect the interests of the state. If 
social and economic interests were being subordinated to politics and foreign 
policy then they would either generate their own secrets or be enveloped in 
those of the foreign policy. The military by nature was a highly secretive
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organisation. When an entire state and its economy became militarised, for 
Rubanov, they necessarily became secretive. The process was further aggravated 
when information classification was uncontrolled, as was the case in the Soviet 
Union. So long as these conditions prevailed, power was alienated from society 
and "the constant reproduction of this alienation in politics, economics, and the 
social sphere" was promoted.(27)
Gorbachev initiated the programme of glasnost' in 1986. Its immediate 
effects were felt in the social sphere — the mass media no longer followed strict 
Party line and a more open coverage of the hardships of the Soviet people was 
allowed.(28) As restrictions were lifted from the voice of the people greater 
openness filtered into the government. Searching questions were asked and 
answers were expected. Glasnost' reached the military to the extent that there 
were debates on reasonable sufficiency and living conditions for service 
personnel, but other aspects of the military sector remained in concealment. The 
true size of the defence budget remained undisclosed until the 1990s. Soviet 
analysts had a general idea of what the items of expenditure were, but doubt 
remained as to how much was actually spent.
Rubanov believed that the limited success of glasnost' in the m ilitary 
sector was attributable to the fact that the "conversion of secrecy" was 
orchestrated by the very people who had the most to lose should it succeed. The 
"conversion of secrecy" was planned by the KGB, the MVD, Gosplan, the 
Ministry of Defence and the Academy of Sciences. As a result self-interest stood 
in the way of development. Real reform could not occur in this sector unless 
there were a programme for the classification of secrets.(29) The conversion of 
the defence industries was initially hindered by this failure to reduce the level of 
secrecy within the bureaucracy.
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Conversion was also adversely affected by a general uncertainty over the 
way in which it should be managed. Initially many writers on the subject felt 
that a superstructure needed to be established. They argued that conversion 
should be organised on an international as well as national level. Soviet 
m inisters and analysts considered an international plan for conversion 
justifiable considering that disarmament affected one and all and that complete 
disarmament could not occur without the cooperation of all the nations of the 
world. In his 1988 speech to the United Nations Gorbachev called for a 
program m e of conversion under its auspices. Following that speech an 
increasing number of Soviet academics called on international organisations to 
outline a policy for disarmament and development, for an international fund to 
be established to assist enterprises in their transfer to the rails of peaceful 
production, and for an international programme to guarantee the sale of goods 
from converted enterprises.(30)
Demands were also made of the Soviet government to develop a national 
framework for conversion. Since it was the national government which would 
define the terms of reasonable sufficiency it was therefore the government which 
would determine the number of facilities available for the conversion process. It 
was for this reason that people's deputies, economists and academics called for 
the creation of an all-Union conversion programme. Those who believed that a 
state program m e should be drafted also dem anded that it be ready for 
im plem entation prior to commencement of full-scale disarm am ent. They 
argued that the nation would be able to derive the greatest economic benefits if 
the plan were prepared in advance. This ideal scenario did not materialise. 
Large-scale disarmament began in 1987-1988. The INF Treaty was signed in 
December 1987 and implemented in April of the following year. It was also in
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1988 that Gorbachev announced his plan for unilateral disarm am ent. The 
official State Programme for Conversion was not passed, however, until the 
winter of 1990, a full two years after the implementation of the INF Treaty and 
the unilateral reductions.
Despite the fact that a national programme did not emerge until the close 
of 1990, from 1987 onwards attempts were made at the national, republic and 
enterprise level to initiate change in the defence economy. Sometimes these 
changes were coordinated between levels, but more frequently they were enacted 
independently of each other. The end result was confusion and the deterioration 
of the most profitable sector of the economy.
In an article entitled "Kuda poskachet kentaur?" (1990), economists Yurii 
Yarmenko and Evgenii Rogovskii argued that the scientific-technical and 
productive potentials of the defence enterprises were the last real resources for 
the national economy.(31) The policy of conversion had to preserve this 
resource, develop its potential and distribute it throughout the national 
economy. They stressed, however, that to orientate any program m e of 
conversion within the MIC would serve only to "preserve the organisational, 
economic and technological separation of the defence and civilian spheres of the 
economy".(32) One of the major obstacles to conversion in the former USSR was 
the barrier which existed between the defence and civilian sectors. Two early 
attempts to link these separate sectors were the Law on State Enterprises and the 
Law on Cooperatives.
The Law on State Enterprises (Associations) was implemented in the 
hope that it would transfer enterprises to the market economy. Adopted in July
■■1987, it was also supposed to apply to both civilian and defence industries, on the
I
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assumption that enterprises (both state and cooperative) were the basic unit of 
the "single national economic complex".(33) The main aim of this law was to 
push  enterprises tow ards full self-accounting, self-financing and self­
management. In order to promote this course of action the legislation also 
reduced the state's responsibility for the debts of enterprises.(34) Should an 
enterprise prove incapable of managing itself efficiently and find itself faced with 
bankruptcy the state reserved the right to cease production.
It was also intended that the Law on Cooperatives (May 1988) should be 
applicable to both civilian and defence sectors. It built upon the principles 
exemplified by the Law on State Enterprises. Cooperatives, like enterprises, were 
considered the main component in the "unified national-economic complex" 
(Art. 1(4)). As with an enterprise, a cooperative was expected to be run on the 
principles of socialist economic management, self-financing, and economic 
accountability (Art. 17(1)). Unlike enterprises, however, cooperatives were 
allowed to draw up their own plans independently, w ithout interference from 
the state (Art. 18(1) and Art. 29). Furthermore, cooperative activities were to be 
conducted solely on a contract basis rather than dictated from above (Art. 17(3)).
W ithin the Soviet defence sector there were approxim ately 5,000 
enterprises. Of this number only 400 together with 120 design bureaux were 
chosen to undergo some form of conversion/diversification.(35) It m ust be 
assum ed that in the first instance the 4,600 enterprises which were not 
undergoing conversion were not affected by these two pieces of legislation. They 
continued to receive orders from the state, their output was paid for by the state 
and they were given priority access to raw materials. (36) For the 520 institutions 
which were experiencing reform the application of these laws was not stringent. 1
It has been suggested that they were not really transformed at all. K. Gonchar,
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from IMEMO, has claimed that 90 percent of production capacities were being 
reserved for military output. Even the portion which was converted had to 
rem ain "w ithin the framework" of m ilitary-oriented technology.(37) Thus 
output continued to be determined by the state rather than the enterprise.
Yet despite retaining control of production decisions the government 
adopted a mixed approach in other respects, particularly when those decisions 
concerned non-strategic enterprises. There were a num ber of cases in which 
enterprises were forced to fund their refitting out of their own development 
funds, while in other cases the state was willing to assist enterprises faced with 
bankruptcy. (38)
A fundamental mistake, and one which was made repeatedly until the 
collapse of the Union, was that economic reform legislation was not applied in 
equal measure in the two sectors. For the defence industries to be regulated by 
supply and demand they needed to be placed on an equal footing with their 
civilian counterparts. The conversion of secrecy w ould have been an 
instrument in ensuring this equality. The blinkers needed to be removed so that 
a fair analysis could be made of the defence economy as a whole. To curtail 
expenditure or to transfer funds there needed to be an understanding of how the 
m ilitary economy worked. Military production is only part of the military 
economy.(39) Once the analysis had been made then the way would have been 
open to deregulate as much of the MIC as was possible or warranted, in effect the 
deregulation of the MIC in terms of "reasonable sufficiency" of the economy.
The second step in reforming the defence economy came with the signing 
of the INF Treaty. As a result of the treaty six enterprises underw ent full 
conversion while others involved in the production of missiles began the
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process of diversification.(40) Although there was no official state plan at that 
time, two "operative programmes" were in existence. Effective for the same 
time period (1989-1995), they covered the production of technological equipment 
for the light and food industries and for the output of "goods for national 
consumption" {tovary narodnogo potrebleniya, TNP). These target areas were 
chosen by the state, and the programmes developed by the VPK and the defence
branches of Gosplan. By organising the programme in this manner the heavy­
weight position of the military industries within the economy was maintained.
The organisation for new civilian production was supposed to be derived from 
the technological potential of the defence branches. This m eant that 
construction bureaus (KBs) and scientific production offices (NPOs) carried that 
burden of innovation and development. In order to cope with this burden these 
organisations attem pted to m aintain their special powers, enabling them to 
secure resources and investment from the state. This redirection of resources, 
particularly financial resources, caused a further depletion of materials within 
the civilian sector, and the transfer of ideas and technology did not occur. 
Effectively a second economy was created within the defence branches.(41) Under 
these conditions the potential success of conversion was limited.(42) I
The official state programme for conversion did little to improve this 
situation. Drafting of the programme began in 1989. Involved in its creation 
were the USSR State Planning Committee, the USSR Council of M inisters' 
Military Industrial Commission, the USSR Ministry of Defence and various civil 
m inistries and experts concerned w ith the question of conversion. The 
completed programme was presented to the Presidential Council in September 
1990.(43) The Council accepted its proposals and forwarded it to the then Prime 
Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, as representative of the Soviet government, for his 
signature.(44) He signed the document on December 14, 1990. The next stage in
I;
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the process was for the programme to be ratified by the Supreme Soviet.(45)
There appears to be general agreement that the final programme was not 
as detailed in its recommendations as earlier drafts had been.(46) This may have 
been because by autumn 1990 the government had already lost overall control of 
the conversion process. Very much aware of the mixed results of the "operative 
programmes", the government had to be seen taking a stand. Its action turned 
out in the end to be too little, too late.(47)
The broad aims of conversion were outlined within the programme, yet 
their implementation was not sufficiently detailed. The leading goal was to 
liberate the productive capabilities and the scientific-technical potential of the 
defence complex and reorientate them in order to satisfy the demands of the 
civilian economy. Light industry, the agricultural, medical and environmental 
sectors were deemed the areas most in need of assistance. The development and 
production of technology was to be increased in both the defence and civilian 
sectors. What benefits arose within the defence sector were, if possible, to be 
transferred to the civilian economy. The programme also called for a thorough 
review to be conducted of how defence expenditure and military procurement 
were to be reduced. It was the aim of the government programme to maintain 
the level of expenditure on military production and research and design at an 
absolute m inimum.(48)
More specifically the programme spoke of changing the field of aviation to 
facilitate the growth of passenger and transport services; of m odernising 
shipping and increasing the production of ships for transport and export services; 
of promoting space technology on the international market; and developing the 
fibre-optic industry and thus telecommunications.(49) It is interesting to note
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that the recommendations made within the State Programme were different 
from ones made in the operative programmes. The emphasis here was on 
provid ing  basic technology rather than finished products for national 
consum ption.
FINANCING CONVERSION
By prom oting the production of transferable technology rather than 
finished consumer goods the government hoped to reduce the costs associated 
w ith full-scale conversion. Even so, the expected costs proved to be quite 
substantial. In 1990 it was estimated 41.5 billion roubles was necessary for the 
refitting of approximately 300 newly built "frozen" military plants. (50) A further 
40.5 billion roubles was required for subsidies in R & D, this was apart from the 
substantial amount of hard currency necessary for Western know-how.(51)
Although the conversion programme was not as as detailed as it could 
have been it did make some proposals for finance and technology. The plan 
called for the establishment of a Conversion Fund by the beginning of 1992. 
State-run, the fund was used by enterprises to maintain their workforce or 
finance scientific research and development for the manufacture of consumer 
goods.(52) Another solution for the enterprises was to increase their exports 
abroad for hard currency which they could then reinvest in order to produce 
goods for national consumption. Initially the Soviet and Russian governments 
pledged to reduce arms sales, however, the need to obtain hard currency 
overrode political considerations. Although the Russians have become more 
overt in the way they market their defence products, organising airshows on the 
scale of Farnborough to promote their MiG-29s and other fighter planes and 
allowing the Kalashnikov factory in Tula to sell independently outside state
t
agencies, total exports of major conventional weapons have decreased.(53) 
Soviet arms exports were down from over $9 billion in 1990 to just under $4 
billion in 1991; the trend has continued in Russian exports.(54) There is concern 
that the sale of arms will hinder the progress of conversion and that arms 
proliferation will spiral, but so long as the Russian economy rem ains 
unreceptive to the goods produced by converting enterprises and Western 
markets remain closed to these same domestic products defence enterprises will 
have little choice but to sell the goods they manufacture best.(55)
Before the sale of weapons to the highest bidder was openly condoned 
academics and administrators alike attempted to devise alternative schemes for 
financing conversion. In the first edition of a publication entitled Konversiya  
(1990) several authors discussed the need for a bank geared towards servicing 
enterprises beginning the conversion process.(56) Vasilii Panferov, President of 
the international company Russian Experiments and Technology, called for the 
establishment of a share-holding bank for conversion which would be open not 
only to converting enterprises but to any other interested clients as well.(57) His 
contention was that if the converting enterprises were anchored to the 
commercial sector via a share-holding bank pressure would be removed from 
the state and there would be a greater chance for success for the enterprises. 
Panferov was correct in assuming that converting enterprises needed to be tied to 
the commercial sector. However, because of the rapidly deteriorating situation in 
the political and economic arenas these enterprises were not able to wait for the 
establishment of special share-holding banks. What they turned to were banks 
already in existence which could offer them special rates or programmes. The 
USSR Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development, for 
example, began to offer guaranteed credit and free financial advice for all 
economically efficient projects associated with conversion. (58)
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In line with another economic reform several defence enterprises were 
privatised. Setting a precedent, the Saratov Aviation Plant (SAP) and the 
Saratov Electrical Units Production Association (SEUP) became the property of 
their workers in January 1991.(59) The privatisation plan stipulated that the 
worker collectives should gain all the rights to ownership, use and disposal of 
their property and the right to appropriate and dispose of the profits and other 
revenues.(60) To facilitate the purchase of shares by employees 42 percent of the 
total value of assets at SAP and 48 percent at SEUP were donated to the 
employees in the form of a free down-payment.(61)
When Permavia, an aviation firm formerly known as Aviadvigatel, was 
privatised the share offer was opened up slightly. Starting in May 1991 Permavia 
began offering shares to employees who had been with the association for at least 
five years, and to legal entities (i.e. enterprises and organisations). Foreigners 
were still strictly prohibited from participating in the share offer. Individuals 
were allowed to purchase up to 100 shares, with one share priced at R250. It was 
hoped that the share offer would gross R4,000,000.(62)
Aviadvigatel had specialised in the development, testing, pilot production 
and exploitation of jet aircraft engines. The new Permavia planned to scale 
dow n this operational range. Instead the employee owners of Permavia 
intended to repair aircraft engines; promote the use of the IL-76 for cargo service 
and m anufacture lightweight m odern metal furniture and other consumer 
goods. Apparently the managers of the joint-stock company viewed engine 
repairs as the real bread-winner. They planned to increase the volume of repairs
,to 120 engines per year at a cost of R500,000 an engine. In accordance with the 
laws on enterprises and cooperatives Permavia was attempting to become self-
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financed and chose its own methods of operation.
Privatisation of defence enterprises on a mass scale has proved difficult. 
The belief persists, however, that the rapid privatisation of state assets will lead 
to a market economy. In the autumn of 1992 the Russians moved ahead with 
their privatisation programme. Vouchers worth R10,000 were issued to every 
Russian citizen. Initially these vouchers were only to be used in order to 
purchase shares of enterprises in which they had been em ployed.(63) 
Subsequently, the legislation regarding privatisation was liberalised. Voucher 
holders were allowed to purchase shares in the state and service sectors and in 
the housing market as well. Furthermore, they were no longer restricted to 
places in which they themselves were employed.(64)
The privatisation of defence industries is continuing, but only on a 
limited basis. While there is a great deal of Western interest in the military 
industries of the former Soviet Union, that interest can only be acted upon once 
the enterprise has been fully converted.(65) While that number is increasing, it 
remains a small proportion of the overall number of defence enterprises.(66)
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The stipulation that defence firms be converted prior to foreign 
involvement means that the hard currency which these enterprises and the 
economy as a whole need will be slow in coming. As early as 1988, when 
Gorbachev first mentioned conversion within an international context, the 
governm ent sought outside assistance in its attem pts to dem ilitarise the 
economy. At first politicians and academics alike spoke of the need for an 
international body to oversee conversion in all nations. Next they suggested that 
the West should guarantee the purchase of goods produced by converting 
enterprises. Finally they sought only straightforward financial assistance.
At the Group of Seven Conference (G7) in July 1991 Gorbachev asked for 
the involvement of foreign investors in the conversion of his state 's defence 
enterprises. He wanted Western companies to participate jointly with state-run 
industries in a $30 billion to $40 billion plan to transform the Soviet defence 
industry.(67) The response of the G7 nations was derisory. Immediately 
following the July conference a Japanese delegation visited the USSR in order to 
assess the situation. There were reports that the Japanese had pledged half a 
billion dollars to the conversion campaign.(68) Shchenin claimed that no 
money was received prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.(69) Nor was any 
money received from any other nations at that time.(70) Individual funding 
bodies have subsequently  established "conversion desks" to deal w ith 
programmes initiated by defence enterprises in the republics of the former Soviet 
Union, however, money is not always forthcoming.(71)
A lthough some foreign firms have been w illing to establish joint 
ventures in both the defence and civilian sectors, many businesses have held 
back from investing in the region. One of the initial obstacles to foreign 
investm ent in the USSR was the absence of guarantees for the export of 
profits.(72) During the course of 1992-1993 the most frequently cited excuse was 
that firms would rather wait until the political and economic situation had 
stabilised before they invested.(73) Yeltsin's liberalisation program m e has.
however, succeeded in attracting foreign investment. Continued investment 
interest is important for the success of conversion. Conversion is an expensive 
business. Sizable funds are required to convert productive capabilities, 
reorganise the personnel structure and modernise technology.
TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL
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A ttitudes tow ards the reallocation of the personnel structure have 
changed during the course of the conversion debate. Initially Soviet 
administrators believed that the easiest way to reform and revive the economy 
would be to transform the civilian industries into mirror images of their defence 
counterparts. Planners spoke not so much of retraining civilian personnel as of 
transferring military management teams. The argument behind such a proposal 
was that because the defence industries were in the habit of producing high 
quality goods for demanding customers, they must be run by very disciplined 
managers. Once these managers were transferred to the civilian sector they 
would be able to instil discipline and control among their civilian workers, and 
be able to do so w ithin the fram ework of self-financing and economic 
accountability. This argum ent proved false in two ways. First, the defence 
industries were never held economically accountable to civilian consumers, 
therefore defence managers had little experience to bring to the new look civilian 
sector. Second, the transfer of management teams did not allow for natural 
growth and development in the civilian sector. Instead it merely represented 
the imposition of a formula and style.
There is a further point which must be made. Frequently, both Soviet and 
W estern analysts have approached the issue of conversion with the belief that 
they can use ideas, technology, and personnel from the defence sector in order to 
transform the civilian economy. But can elements of the military economy be 
removed without changing its basic structure or must it too undergo a form of 
"perestroika"? Management is deeply involved in the structure of the military 
economy.(74) If the best and brightest of defence management were transferred 
to civilian enterprises it is doubtful whether the military industry would be able 
to meet its future obligations. It would be more efficient for both branches
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concerned to re-train personnel rather than relocate them. Should certain 
aspects of defence operations seem significant for the more efficient conduct of 
the civilian enterprises then by all means the lessons should be based on those 
points of reference. By the same token, the lessons learned by civilian managers 
in regard to khozraschet  should be passed on to the defence complex. Should 
further defence cuts be in the offing, or should more enterprises undergo full 
conversion, it can only help if the managers are able to operate within tighter 
budget constraints and if they have an awareness of what a market economy 
involves.
Conversion not only affects the managerial sphere, it also has a great effect 
on the individual workers. The economist A. Levin, in his article "Konversiya: 
opyt i problemy", discussed the issue of unemployment. He admitted that if a 
policy of conversion were followed this problem would be unavoidable.(75) As 
stated previously, some 40 million people relied on the defence sector for their 
livelihood. In 1990 it was suggested that 500,000 defence workers would lose 
their jobs as a result of conversion.(76) However, owing to the absence of a 
coherent defence policy the m ilitary-industrial complex had to curtail 
production. Furthermore, as a result of economic reform, industries were 
encouraged to streamline production and to cut costs. This invariably meant 
reducing the enterprise labour reserves. As a result, in 1992 the defence 
enterprises lost 600,000 personnel and the R&D establishments' workforce was 
reduced by 200,000.(77) These factors coupled with the break up of the Union 
and the headlong rush by the Republics tow ards the m arket w ill have 
undoubtedly contributed to the number of defence employees made redundant.
Converting enterprises are generally expected to make redundancy 
payments to former employees. Many have found it difficult to meet such
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obligations. The case of the Elektrostal plant illustrates this point. Owing to 
conversion the plant lost its biggest orders from the Soviet Ministry of Defence.
The plant treasury was already R20 million in the red when its profit intake was 
decreased by a further R6 million per annum.(78) Despite these losses the 
enterprise was still expected to fund the re-equipment of its plants as well as pay 
off those workers made redundant. After much petitioning of Gosplan, the 
USSR Ministry of Finance and the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy compensation 
was obtained for the wage fund.(79) This was a long and arduous process to go 
through every time an enterprise manager felt the need to lay off more workers.
The Union and Republic governm ents did attem pt to simplify m atters. 
Significant guarantees and compensation for workers of converting enterprises 
were established in the basic legislation of the USSR and Republics for the
:Employment of the Population (art. 5, 26, 27, 29) and in the law of the RSFSR on 
the employment of the Population and the Social Defence of the Citizens of the 
RSFSR (April 1991). Supplementary compensation was offered by the Russian 
Conversion Fund which was established in 1992.
Obviously not everyone in the defence sector has been or will be made 
redundant. Attempts have been made to re-train personnel. This, however, is a 
matter which solves some problems while creating new ones. There is certainly 
a need for the re-training of defence employees if conversion is to succeed. 
Although the engineers in the military-industrial complex are highly trained 
specialists they lack the skills to deal with certain areas of civilian production,(80)
This inability has served to hinder the progress of conversion and as a result the
demand for consumer goods has not been met sufficiently.
commodities in short supply. At one point it was suggested that the country
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The retraining of specialists, however, takes both time and money —
i
should have a system for retraining skilled specialists that would make it 
possible for a person, in the course of one or two years, to obtain a civilian 
specialty at the same level as his former work. The operational conversion plan 
did indeed propose to re-train and relocate personnel in the shortest time 
possible while also maintaining their production qualifications, professional 
prestige and job satisfaction. Unfortunately this has not always been possible.(81)
Obtaining a civilian post which demands the same qualifications as a 
positions in the MIC and allows the employee to enjoy equal benefits and the 
same level of prestige appears to have been difficult for some defence personnel.
For example, at the VP. Chkalov aviation factory several thousand staff 
specialists whose jobs were eliminated refused to be trained in other professions 
and left the enterprise.(82) In the writings on conversion much has been made 
of the unwillingness of defence sector employees to accept less prestigious 
jobs.(83) Samorodov in his article on conversion and its consequences for labour 
stated his view that indeed too much had been made of this point. He argued 
that the transfer of defence employees to the civilian sector should not prove to
.
be an insurmountable obstacle since about one-fifth of them voluntarily left 
their jobs each year and always succeeded in finding alternative employment.(84)
If Samorodov is presuming that the defence sector had a smaller labour reserve, 
say of 9 million(85), then his argument that the potential dislocation of the 
workforce is exaggerated is acceptable. If, however, Shchenin's calculations on
TRANSFER AND MODERNISATION OF TECHNOLOGY
the size of the workforce are correct, then there is sufficient reason for concern 
about the repercussions of conversion for the workforce.
1
The transfer of technology and the re-equipping of factories have caused
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additional problems for defence enterprises. In the early stages of conversion the 
problem which needed to be solved was how to transfer technology to the 
civilian sector. Essentially there were two points to consider: should the defence 
complex make a direct transfer of equipment or should it seek to disseminate 
information on the process of production? Both aspects had their inherent 
difficulties. These issues remain relevant but now another question is being 
asked: how does the defence sector update its own plants?
Initially defence enterprises attem pted to provide their civilian 
counterparts with higher quality equipment. There were problems at both ends. 
The defence m inistries felt that to meet satisfactorily the dem ands of 
refurbishing civilian enterprises, not only did they have to give them machinery, 
they also had to provide crews to install the equipment and instruct the new 
owners on its operations. The m ilitary argued that it did not have the 
manpower and time to provide full service to each and every civilian enterprise.
At one stage the state hoped to facilitate matters by placing certain civilian 
industries under the control of the MIC. It was thought that by placing these 
enterprises under the management of the Ministry of Defence the transfer of 
technology would somehow be easier. What they discovered instead was that it 
was often simpler to close down an old plant and build a new one than try to 
modernise a plant whose assets were hopelessly outdated.(86)
Eventually a new method of transferring technology was created, the 
commodities exchange. The first military exchange was an off-shoot of the 
Russian Commodity and Raw Material Exchange (RCRME) and the Central 
Institute for Mechanical Engineering Research (CIMER). The military exchange 
sought to solve the problem of matching buyers with sellers. Previously,
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enterprises in both sectors experienced difficulties in coaxing raw materials and 
components out of suppliers. The defence enterprises had the added difficulty of 
trying to find buyers for their finished products.(87) The exchange incorporated 
several different organisations: the USSR Exchange for Defence Industries, secret 
broker offices of the VPK, Office 500 (a liaison office for the VPK-RCRME) , a 
secret department of the Russian National Bank, an insurance company, and a 
special department of the economic news agency. The purpose of the exchange 
was to facilitate the transfer of goods and services between the defence and 
civilian sectors.(88) Goods circulating strictly within the confines of the MIC 
were dealt with secretly on the MIC exchange. Goods to be sold by civilians to 
defence enterprises or vice versa went through the 500 Office and were auctioned 
openly on the RCRME.
To judge from its description the military exchange is very much a means 
to transfer technology and finished goods rather than a commercial venture.
The military have, via another exchange, entered the commercial sector. ESTRA 
was established by some of the major defence industrial plants as a commercial 
stock exchange, which deals in radio, electronic and com puter equipm ent, 
communications media, and productions processes.(87) If ESTRA is successful it 
will go some way in tying the enterprises of the defence sector more securely to 
the economic reforms and the market mechanism.
- , ÿ 'il;'I;
As for the second issue — how does the MIC update its own plants? — this 
is still difficult to solve. Part of the problem stems from the way in which the 
sector was structured. Rather than retool old facilities plant managers sanctioned 
the construction of new buildings every time a new product line was in prospect.
In a market economy an enterprise would expand into a market by building 
facilities as they were required, rather than building the facilities before the
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contract was assured.(90) The defence sector in the former Soviet republics is 
now burdened by excess capacity and high overhead costs. The cost of converting 
these facilities is sizable and there is an almost desperate need to put the facilities 
to some kind of use. There have been several cases in which defence technology 
has been wasted on or m isused in the process of m anufacturing civilian 
goods.(91) Since the pressure to produce finished goods for the consumer market 
has been removed more thought may be put into the best way to convert the 
technology.
The solution to this problem has in essence been determined by the 
enterprise's perceived role in the economy. Under the Soviet system the 
enterprise played only a small part in planning its own production. The Laws on 
Enterprises and Cooperatives attempted to change this by stressing that they were 
the basic units of the "single national-economic complex" and by encouraging 
m anagers to accept more responsibility for planning for the future of their 
enterprises.
The confusion and delays witnessed in the Soviet state's promotion of a 
conversion programme further shifted the burden on to the shoulders of the 
defence enterprise managers. Over time a greater num ber of Soviet analysts 
supported the shift from national to local control of conversion. In his 1990 
article "Proekty zakonodatel'nogo regulirovaniya i osushchestvleniya v 
zapadnykh stranakh", A. Kireev discussed the proposed roles of both the 
national governm ent and the individual enterprises by exam ining the 
experiences of America, Sweden and Britain in converting their military 
industries. He pointed out that in America and Sweden the governments 
established councils to regulate both the defence economy and the process of 
conversion. The composition of the councils was similar in both nations,
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In 1990 the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Central Board of Trade Unions 
and the Peace Fund established the Soviet National Commission for Promotion 
to Conversion. Composed of 33 scientists, political figures, representatives of the 
defence industrial complex and a number of military and civilian experts, the 
Commission's aim was to act like its Western counterparts and promote practical 
solutions to different conversion problem s.(93) This was a step in the right 
direction but ultim ately the im petus needed to come from the enterprises 
them selves.
This was effectively the lesson Soviet military reformers learned from the 
Lucas Aerospace experiment.(94) In the 1970s when the m ilitary-industrial 
complex in Britain was being scaled down, the board of Lucas Aerospace turned 
to its workers for advice on conversion. The engineers and science officers were 
asked to compile a list of peaceful products they felt the enterprise was capable of 
manufacturing. The list of 140 possible product lines was eventually narrowed 
down and the result was that Lucas branched into aspects of commercial 
aviation. The lessons learned from the three case studies were that enterprises 
and governm ents need (1) to analyse the scale of production and labour 
resources and (2) to adjust to the demands of the national and world markets.
In order to implement these lessons academics of various disciplines
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;consisting of representatives from the m inistries of trade, labour, health, 
education and social development. Also present were those representing the 
interests of the housing construction industry, transport, regional development 
and of course the military.(92) The councils were established to synthesise the 
needs of society, to eradicate potential problems and generally to ease the 
transition "on to the rails of peaceful production".
I
urged that the m ilitary-industrial complex be regulated by the m arket. 
Specifically they spoke of three rules which should be implemented: (1) the laws 
of supply and demand should guide enterprises in their activities; (2) enterprises 
should adapt output to what they are technically capable of producing; and (3) 
enterprises should bid or compete for government contracts.
Although it has at times been difficult for enterprises to adjust to the new 
guidelines, the collapse of the Union has made it imperative that they do so. 
Initial attempts by the Republics, while still under Soviet control, to delineate 
their powers posed problems for conversion. In a sense a custody battle took 
place for the ownership of the defence enterprises. Russia in its "Law 
Guaranteeing the Economic Basis of Sovereignty of the RSFSR" and the Ukraine 
and Belorussia in their decrees on state sovereignty all laid claim to the 
enterprises, regardless of their military or civilian nature, on their territory.(95) 
A legislative battle erupted with both Soviet and Republican governments 
declaring that their laws took precedence over the others. The ownership of the 
defence was of great concern to the central authorities. Although it has been said 
that the Republics would never have taken control of strategic enterprises the 
question was not completely resolved until the collapse of the Union.(96) It has 
been estimated that of the 600 enterprises affected by some form of conversion by 
August 1991 approximately 460 were located in the RSFSR, 94 in Ukraine, 19 in 
Belorussia (now Belarus), and 11 in Kazakhstan.(97) Each of these republics has 
adopted its own conversion programme.(98)
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The Russian government, unlike its Soviet predecessor, acted quickly to 
promote conversion. The nine defence industry ministries were abolished in 
1991 and the defence enterprises were placed under civilian control. 
Furtherm ore, the Russian Programme for Conversion was passed by the
i
legislature on 20 March 1992. Like the programme passed by the Soviet 
governm ent the Russian plan was vague in many respects; however, the 
Russian government attempted to compensate for this by aligning it with other
legislative acts on finance and investment. The actual law on conversion 
outlines the government's commitment to defence reform, but shifts the burden
Îof organisation on to local and city councils. It is up to future legislation to flesh 
out how conversion should proceed. While this may be a beneficial approach in 
that it ties conversion to overall economic reform, it may also hinder the 
progress of conversion should more orthodox figures regain control of the
reform process. Political events during the course of 1992 and 1993 made that 
point abundantly clear. Initially the government announced that 70% of the MIC
Iwould shift its output to civilian production (i.e. diversify). Ten percent of these 
enterprises would have to convert 80-100% of their output. It was presumed that 
intense conversion would last for three to four years and that the bulk of 
governm ent spending would be during this period. It was suggested that 
conversion of the MIC would cost $150 billion.(99) However, the government 
did not have $150 billion to spend. Arkady Volsky, leader of the industrialist 
group Civic Union, has argued that the cost of conversion in financial and 
hum an terms is too great. He favours a slower programme in which only three 
percent of the enterprises would be converted per year. His argument is that it 
would be easier to budget the costs over a longer period of time and thus the 
government would be able to avoid a dramatic rise in unemployment.(lOO)
RUSSIAN FINANCING OF CONVERSION
The governm ent has continued to pursue conversion and is now 
examining alternative methods of financing the effort. The two main ways, 
other than direct state subsidy, are the sale of weapons for hard currency and
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foreign investment. In line with Article 9 of the 1992 Law on Conversion, 
converted enterprises "have the right to engage independently in foreign 
economic activities in accordance w ith the legislation of the Russian 
Federation". Article 9 grants converted enterprises the right to sell weapons 
abroad, to obtain foreign investment and to establish joint ventures so long as 
they strictly adhere to all laws which govern such activity, and in particular the 
law on Foreign Investments in the RSFSR.(lOl)
Despite loud cries of protest at the export of weapons this particular piece 
of action went ahead. On July 24 1992 legislation was passed which sanctioned 
the sale of armaments for hard currency. The Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations is now responsible for issuing defence firms with the appropriate 
licences. The government based this action on the belief that once the defence 
enterprises had established sufficient hard currency reserves they w ould 
discontinue the sale of weapons abroad and begin converting production. 
Opponents of this policy argue, and rightly so, that it only delays conversion and 
there is a very real risk that the production lines for the weapons will never be 
m othballed.(102) They feel that it would be safer for all concerned to halt 
weapons production completely, re-equip the productive facilities and begin to 
manufacture consumer goods immediately. Proponents of this latter policy are 
also in favour of more direct foreign involvement in conversion through 
investment and the establishment of joint ventures.
As dem onstrated in the earlier discussion of privatisation, foreign 
investors can only become involved once the enterprise is fully converted. This 
means that the enterprise is not receiving the inflow of capital it needs during 
the most difficult period. Dr. K.F. Samsonov, laboratory head of the Scientific 
Research Economic Institute of the Ministry of Economics, and O.A. Khokhlov,
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administrative chief of the Russian President's Committee on Conversion, have 
suggested ways to correct this problem. In their 1992 article "Privatisation as a 
Source of Self-Financing for Conversion Processes", they declared that one of the 
main goals of privatisation and conversion was the "creation of conditions for 
the restoration of economic relations among its enterprises in Russia and other 
CIS countries."(103) For this to occur the state m ust closely control and 
coordinate the processes of destatization and privatisation of the defence 
complex with its anti-monopoly policy.(104) Samsonov and Khokhlov stated 
their belief in the vital im portance of involving foreign investors in the 
transformation of the defence sector and suggested a programme which would 
accomplish this goal. The first step would be the reorganisation of state 
enterprises into state joint-stock companies. Step two w ould involve the 
transfer and sale of stocks to enterprise personnel and management. The third 
and subsequent steps would witness the sale of enterprise stock to commercial 
structures, private persons and foreign investors through auction or on another 
basis, taking care to assess the peculiarities of enterprises belonging to the defence 
complex. (105) One of Samsonov and Khokhlov's main complaints has been that 
insufficient funds have been directed to the conversion programme. Under the 
current, general privatisation programme all proceeds go to general budget 
funds at different levels. Under their proposed programme 30% of the proceeds 
would go to the enterprise collective, 40% to the regional conversion fund, 20% 
to the federal fund and 10% to miscellaneous program m es.(106) They also 
outlined the various accounts which should be formed within any conversion 
fund. They include an investment account for the development and production 
of civilian goods (60%), socioeconomic support (10%), and support of scientific- 
technical potential (30%).(107) Samsonov and Khokhlov agree that the 
conversion of the defence sector can prove to be a self-financing exercise and that 
the implementation of their programme could make this a reality.
The current reality is that such a programme is not in place and that 
enterprises are looking for other means of financing. One alternative method is 
to create ties with a foreign firm through the establishment of a joint venture. 
Although the defence firm must still be going through the process of conversion 
it does not need to be fully converted prior to contact being made. The 
establishment of joint ventures will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
A third current method of establishing ties involves the purchase of 
insolvent enterprises. Although this method would demand a greater capital 
investment from the foreign firm, it does provide a 'foot in the door'. Foreign 
investment in insolvent enterprises is permitted by the 'Decree of the Russian 
President on Measures for Support and Recovery of Insolvent State Enterprises 
and Application of Special Sanctions on Such Enterprises' which was issued on 
June 14, 1992. State enterprises will be declared insolvent when a) they fail to 
meet liabilities to the budget for three months; b) they fail to meet the demands 
of corporate bodies and individuals with property claims to such enterprises 
within three months of the due date; and c) they accumulate debts which exceed 
double the value of the assets of the enterprise.(108) Once an enterprise has been 
declared insolvent by the Russian State Property Management A uthority a 
competition will be held to transfer the enterprise to independent management. 
The competition is open to "entrepreneurs - corporate bodies and individuals, 
including foreign ones."(109) Foreign investors are also allowed to purchase 
firms which are being sold as a result of liquidation. In both cases the foreign 
investor would need to submit an application to the Russian State Property 
Management Authority, show proof of solvency and place a deposit of 10% in the 
first instance and 50% in the latter.(llO)
197
This is an im portant ruling for the defence sector. Many m ilitary 
enterprises have found that the costs of conversion exceed their available 
savings. These enterprises are now faced with bankruptcy. Although a foreign 
investor may not be involved in privatisation he may purchase a bankrupt 
enterprise. It may be assumed that this is one of the key ways into the defence 
sector simply because Arkady Volsky and Alexander Titkin, the former Minister 
of Industry, tried so hard to prevent the closure of the defence enterprises as a 
result of bankruptcy by increasing the levels of subsidies. This decree will 
demand careful study in the future.
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To entice foreign investment, be it within the civilian or the defence 
sector, more incentives need to be in place. The Russian governm ent now 
realises this and has attempted to establish safeguards for the foreign investor. 
The 'Law on Foreign Investment in the RSFSR', passed in July 1991 and 
amended in April 1992, insures investors against a worsening in the conditions 
of investment. Should the economic situation deteriorate, which it has done, 
investors are allowed to invoke the provisions of the legislation which existed at 
the time of their registration for up to ten years.(Ill) i .
The Russian governm ent also intends to change the procedure for 
registering foreign-owned companies. Enterprises with a charter capital of not 
more than RIO million will be registered by local government. Those companies 
with a charter capital of RIO to RlOO million will be registered by the committee 
for foreign investment. Any enterprise with a capital base of over RlOO million 
must be registered by the government of the Russian Federation.(112) Prior to 
registration the shares of the founders will be checked by an auditing firm 
appointed by the government.
In order to protect Russian industry as well as the foreign investor the 
Russian government is set to impose tighter licensing legislation in those areas 
considered ripe for foreign investment, such as aerospace, utilisation of land, 
mineral and other natural resources and operation involving real estate, hard 
currency and securities. No specific details have as yet been published.
CONCLUSION
Just as the history of the conversion programme in the late 1980s has and 
will influence the prospects for republican efforts at conversion and or defence 
development, the history of the Soviet defence sector before the Gorbachev 
reform s affected their potential. The logic behind the 1920s policy of 
assimilyatsiya was to create a small but efficient and flexible defence sector. 
Unfortunately, that policy was replaced by one which advocated a massive 
defence sector made up of large scale production facilities which could meet the 
threat of a future attack far more rapidly. While these facilities were able to meet 
the dem ands of the Cold War they were neither flexible nor efficient. A 
cumbersome and unwieldy defence sector was created which resembled not so 
much a series of enterprises working towards a common goal, but a collection of 
fiefdoms ruled by m anagers/ autocrats who were willing to protect themselves 
and the state from an external threat posed by the West, and perfectly capable of 
protecting themselves from an internal threat posed by a reform m inded 
government. In this respect they began to collectively resemble the military- 
industrial complex described by President Eisenhower in the 1950s.
Egbert Jahn and others claimed in the 1960s and 1970s that such an 
institution did not exist in the Soviet Union. Plans for conversion proposed 
during this period were predicated on the assumption that since there was no 
MIC no opposition could be expressed to a centrally imposed plan. In these
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conditions conversion would be a relatively straightforward matter. Yet, as has 
been indicated, vested interests did exist and they controlled the flow of 
information to the governm ent making the imposition of a program m e of 
reform difficult. The progress of reform was further hindered by confusion over 
the ultimate aim of conversion and the lack of government commitment. As 
has been discussed, the initial aim of the programme was to produce finished 
consumer goods. This was latter modified to the promotion of the means of 
production. The level of government commitment also changed. Initially state 
support was reasonably high when it was believed that, in accordance with the 
1962 UN Report, the government need only change the emphasis of its directives 
for a shift in production to transpire. As awareness grew that the economic 
system lacked the potential for internal change and that structural reforms were 
needed support for conversion waned. Problems within the defence sector were 
evident, but it still appeared as the most profitable and efficient sector of the 
national economy and the one most likely to generate a much needed hard 
currency income in the future. It would appear that a decision was taken to 
promote conversion in word rather than in deed. The potential for short-term 
capital gain outweighed the distant promise of more balanced, long-term 
economic growth.
Yet even if Gorbachev had managed to transform the Soviet planned 
economy into a fully functioning market economy, in the initial stages, as is 
currently the case in Russia, there would have been insufficient funds to 
promote conversion in the manner advocated by the UN Report. If we recall, 
the Report suggested that in the case of the United States the government need 
only increase expenditure in other types of goods and services, maintain a high 
level of consumer dem and and apply fiscal and m onetary policies in the 
appropriate manner, the market would do the rest.(113) Currently the Russian
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governm ent has insufficient funds to promote conversion, provide for the 
unem ployed or develop new industries w ithout external support, and its 
economy is closer to that of a market oriented one than that which existed in the 
late Soviet period.
In Chapter Two an ideal conversion programme was outlined. W ithin 
that programme the primary function of the state was to provide both stability 
and vision by carefully planning for conversion. It was suggested that any 
conversion program m e have a recognisable beginning and end lest new 
dependencies be created. As has been demonstrated, the Soviet government did 
not plan for conversion in sufficient detail. Nor did it highlight the beginning 
and end of that programme. Indeed, if Gonchar is to be believed conversion 
never began under Soviet authority. Lack of planning is further evidenced in 
the absence of an economic bill of rights, which forms one of the main pillars of 
the ideal programme. The final element of the thesis is that policies of 
centralisation and decentralisation need to coexist. While the state must take the 
initiative of promoting conversion the individual enterprises must shoulder the 
burden of implementing that programme. This final point will be the subject of 
the following chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONVERSION IN PRACTICE: 
A CASE STUDY OF RO STO V -O N-D O N
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ÏThe collapse of the Soviet Union and the em ergence of the
Commonwealth of Independent States in the w inter of 1991 changed many 
components of the political and economic structures while leaving other aspects 
untouched. Nowhere was this more evident then in the defence economy. The 
rise of the newly independent states called into question the very ownership of 
the defence enterprises and the future progress of conversion, while at the same 
time leaving the managers of these enterprises as much in the dark as they had 
been under Gorbachev.
As discussed in Chapter Five, when the various Soviet republics declared 
their sovereignty in 1991 they were fairly obscure about their intentions towards 
the defence enterprises. It later became apparent that these enterprises had 
rem ained firmly under the control of the defence sector and the central 
government. That situation changed, however, in August 1991. With  formal 
independence in December 1991 came the desire to establish indigenous security 
structures. Each of the former Soviet republics in turn laid claim to the defence 
industries located within its territory.(1)
These actions concerned the Russian government, which was attempting 
to inherit the mantle of the Soviet Union and maintain overall stability in the 
region. The proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons among small, 
re la tively  unstab le  nations w as also of grave concern to Western 
governm ents.(2) The Russian governm ent and specifically M arshal
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Shaposhnikov, Chief of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, pledged to 
settle the question of ownership through the use of treaties betw een the 
independent states.(3) Lieutenant-General Vladimir Ivanovich, Army Chief of 
Staff for the Rostov-on-Don military district, made it clear that the republics 
could take control of all defence enterprises which were not of a strategic 
nature.(4) This solution in itself seems reasonable. However, relations among 
the members of the CIS have failed to stabilise and if anything have continued to 
deteriorate. Negotiations on economic matters failed to take place owing to 
conflict over the ownership of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union. 
Ukraine in particular loudly voiced its opposition to Russia acting as the sole 
negotiator for the CIS in disarmament talks as well as to Russia's claim to be the 
owner of the Black Sea Fleet. The lengthy conflict gave rise to another: the 
ow nership of strategic nuclear weapons was also in question, w ith  the 
Ukrainians loathe to relinquish their weapons because of the possible threat 
emanating from a politically and economically unstable Russia. Although they 
subsequently agreed to the terms of the START Treaty and relinquished their 
nuclear weapons the animosity felt on both sides hindered closer economic 
relations.
Although at the time of writing a central authority remains in control of 
strategic assets, other defence enterprises are now subject to the conversion 
programmes of the Republics in which they are situated. The defence economy 
as a whole suffered confusion and mismanagement as a result of the Soviet 
conversion programme. It is not yet evident whether the new Republican 
programmes can repair the damage. Ivanovich, in particular, has argued that 
the collapse of a strong central pow er to oversee the adm inistration of 
conversion will further hinder the process of reform.(5) The General is not 
against market principles being applied to conversion, indeed he believes that
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they could prove beneficial. However, he is of the opinion that there should be 
some form of coordination among the Republics to ensure the success of defence 
reform. In January 1992 when the interview with General Ivanovich occurred. 
Republican conversion programmes were not formally linked. This changed on 
January 13, 1993 when Viktor Antonov, Minister for the Ukrainian conversion 
programme, and his Russian counterpart, Mktor Glukhikh, signed an agreement 
to further the level of cooperation between the two states in the fields of rocket 
and space technology, aviation, radioelectronics and civilian goods.(6)
Coordination, generally, has been difficult not only between Republics, but 
also between the government and the military and between the defence and 
civilian sectors. Despite the hopes of civilian analysts there appears to have been 
little consultation between the branches during the drafting of either the Soviet 
or the Russian conversion program m es. Enterprise m anagers w ere not 
consulted on the best ways of implementing such a program m e, and, if
Ivanovich is to be believed, neither was the military.(7) In the General's words, 
"Conversion is a political question, discussed and decided by politicians".(8)
2 1 2
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The confusion and disillusionment encountered during the conversion 
process has led many defence engineers to consider leaving not only their 
factories but also their hom eland. Conversion, a political question, has
generated a second political question: how to stop the exodus? This problem is of
grave concern to both the West and the CIS. The Western powers fear that 
defence engineers will be lured to the Middle East where they will receive a 
sizable rem uneration for their skills in manufacturing nuclear weapons. The 
CIS states also fear this outcome, but perhaps what they fear most is the resultant 
brain drain.(9) In 1992 the Russian government considered a new emigration 
policy for employees of the military sector. The government planned to increase
I
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wages and improve the living standards for those working in this sector. If that 
policy failed to entice them to remain at home then a statute of limitations 
would be imposed. Depending on the branch in which the engineer worked and 
his knowledge of new technologies he would have to remain in the country for a 
predetermined number of years or until that knowledge was no longer deemed 
relevant.(10) In essence the new Russian law closely resembled the Soviet 
version. In addition, the Russian governm ent is now receiving financial 
assistance from the United States in order to keep scientists and engineers in 
employment. (11)
There are num erous problems facing the converting enterprises. The 
following section details the difficulties encountered and the solutions proposed 
by several enterprises located within the territory of the Russian Federation, and 
particularly within Rostov-on-Don. There were several reasons for choosing the 
city for a case study. Located 500 miles south of Moscow, on the mouth of the 
River Don, it is a city proud of its history of defending 'M other Russia'. It is 
viewed by older residents as a bulwark against the Asian population to the south, 
as the last defence against Hitler's invading troops in 1941, and as a contributor to 
the defence economy. While the city is located in a fertile agricultural region its 
main industries are geared towards defence production. Rostov-on-Don is 
representative of many such cities dotted throughout Russia. Although not a 
'closed city', it is responsible for producing key components for the defence sector. 
Conversion places many jobs at risk.
Much of the attention on conversion has been centred on enterprises in 
St. Petersburg and Moscow, because they are the first points of entry for Western 
businessmen. Defence enterprises in these cities have, on average, received 
more assistance from local and state governments. Rostov's distance from
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Moscow means that less attention has been placed upon it by the Russian 
government and Western investors. For the most part, the enterprise managers 
and city counsellors will have to solve the problems posed by conversion on 
their own. Therefore, it is more representative medium-sized Russian cities and 
their experience. Generally, the obstacles encountered and the hopes that 
remain for the future are the same for all the enterprises examined.
CONVERSION IN ROSTOV-ON-DON: A CASE STUDY
W ithin Rostov-on-Don there are six defence electronic firms and one 
helicopter factory in addition to the civilian m anufacturing u n its .(12) 
Ivanovich, the Army Chief of Staff for the district, was fairly dismissive of 
attempts at conversion within the region. He stated that the defence enterprises 
were producing only a limited number of consumer goods and that this output 
was generally insignificant. He also stated, when interviewed in January 1992, 
that their main activity was to perform repairs, and that this was particularly true 
of the helicopter factory.(13) After further interviews with enterprise managers 
in Rostov-on-Don a different picture emerged. The enterprises might not be 
producing consumer goods in the sense that they were manufacturing vacuum 
cleaners and the like, but they were attempting to create items which can be used 
in the sphere of medicine or which w ould generate further productive 
capabilities.
There are three enterprises which seem to have made some headway in 
either diversifying or converting their productive output. First, there is 
Chaszavod. Built before the Revolution, Chaszavod promotes itself mainly as a 
manufacturer of watches and clocks. While it certainly produces timing devices, 
they have not always been for civilian applications. The military equipment
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which these devices have been applied to are of an unspecified or classified 
nature. The enterprise, located in the centre of Rostov, is trying once again to 
em phasise its civilian orientation. As of January 1992 Chaszavod was 
maintaining its programme of diversification and attempting to branch out into 
the aviation industry. However, with Aeroflot experiencing financial hardship 
and the defence sector in confusion after the collapse of the Union, it was finding 
it quite difficult to procure any orders. As a result the management found it 
necessary to reduce its workforce.(14)
Granite, an electronics firm, has also had to reduce its workforce as a result 
of conversion. Founded in 1958 under the auspices of the M inistry of the 
Electronics Industry of the USSR, its purpose was to provide electrical devices for 
other military industries. Granite is a medium sized, middle-stage enterprise 
which provided devices for radio navigation and anti-missile systems. For the 
most part its products were designated for the Ministry of Radio Production, 
although even before conversion it produced items for the civilian sector.
Conversion took its toll as early as 1989. Within two years orders from the 
Ministry of Defence were cut by 70 percent. This came as a great shock to the 
m anagem ent. It m eant that there was less money to finance the firm 's 
reprofiling and to support the workforce. The restructuring process has had and 
will continue to have a severe impact on the lives of the employees. In 1989 
there were 5,000 people employed by Granite. By January 1992 there were 4,000. 
The assistant marketing manager predicted that by the end of 1992 there would 
be only 3,000 employees remaining.(15)
As of January 1992 unemployment had not yet registered as a major 
concern in Rostov-on-Don. The general attitude was that there were enough
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private cooperatives being established to absorb the newly released workforce. 
However, there are not many cooperatives which can provide the type of work to 
which these engineers are accustomed. In order to acclimatise its workers to the 
new economic condition Granite has established a compulsory staff retraining 
programme. The administration hopes to achieve two goals: (1) to enable the 
rem aining staff at Granite to meet the challenges of operating in a market 
economy; and (2) to assist those employees made redundant in surviving in the 
new economic system. Essentially the enterprise is attem pting to fulfil its 
previous responsibility of supporting and caring for its workforce.
Instruction in Western-style economics forms the core of the curriculum.
The course lasts one to two months depending on the attitudes of the students. 
Engineers occasionally lack enthusiasm  for the program m e, however, they 
generally recognise its worth by the time it concludes. Those who do particularly 
well are selected for further instruction. Alexander Davydenko, the deputy 
marketing director, was just such a candidate. Having completed Granite's i  
course he went on to take an intensive English course and further instruction in 
economics at institutes in Austria and Finland.
The reorganisation of the productive output has proved slightly more 
difficult. Granite did not receive any assistance from the government once the 
defence orders were cut. Unlike other enterprises it was not given suggestions 
on what it should produce. It was effectively left on its own.
While literature on conversion has stressed the need for and the 
difficulties to be encountered in retooling, many enterprises, like Granite, have 
attem pted to manufacture products which require little or no retooling of the 
enterprise. Thus in compiling a new list of products Granite has relied on
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previous experience. Its main emphasis has been on microwave electronics (for 
examples of Granite's productive output see Appendix A). Under the old system 
en terp rises could w ork only in selected frequencies designated  by 
MinRadProm.(16) Now with deregulation, or rather the collapse of central 
control, firms may produce equipment in any frequency they choose. Granite's 
range of products now includes the following:
1. Microwave vacuum tubes (klystrons, magnestrons, 
travelling wave tubes, discharges)
2. M icrowave ferrite  isolators and circulators 
(microstrip coaxial, waveguide types)
3. Microwave passive devices (directional couplers, 
power dividers, filters)
4. Microwave devices with semiconductor elements 
(amplifiers, mixers, modulators) (17)
In addition to producing equipment for radio and telecommunication 
satellites Granite m anufactures systems for civilian aircraft and terminals. 
Aside from industrial components it also produces children's walkie-talkies, 
ultrasound medical equipment, food processors and crystal. Although rather 
dated in design the walkie-talkies were a relatively new product for Granite in 
1992. Crystal had been manufactured by Granite for considerably longer. On 
display w ithin its m useum  were vases, goblets, chandeliers and even a 
mammoth crystal ashtray, examples of Granite's best work. The managers are 
interested in exporting these items to the West.
What appeared to be the most profitable product under development was 
the ultrasound surgical equipment. The instrum ents were designed after 
consultation with local physicians. Alexander Davydenko announced that 
Granite was the only firm in Russia manufacturing this type of equipment. In 
1992 it began promoting this machinery heavily on various Russian exchanges.
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In order to increase the knowledge of this type of technology it also began 
running training programmes for doctors. Although the level of technology 
appeared behind Western standards it was still a major development in Russian 
medicine. The ultrasound equipment may prove to be a valuable export to the 
Third World.
Granite appeared to be making some headway in producing new civilian 
technology but there were problems in getting products to the consumers. As a 
result of the sudden collapse of the central planning system and the break-up of 
the Union many enterprises were finding it difficult to acquire the supplies they 
needed.(18) This was in part due to the fact that Republics were hoarding all raw 
materials and finished products for their own development. While Granite had 
managed to acquire most of the supplies it needed, it still lacked one crucial 
material — lumber. A large of supply of wood was necessary for the construction
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of packaging for ultrasound equipment. As a result of high inflation, many
enterprises and individuals have now resorted to barter as a means of obtaining 
what they need.(19) In the case of Granite and the lumber supplier, the supplier 
no longer wished to be paid in roubles; instead he wanted to exchange his 
commodity for 15 ultrasound machines which he could in turn  trade for 
something else.(20) The only problem was that Granite could not ship the 
equipment to the supplier until it had received the wood to properly package 
the machines.
ï'I
The search for new customers is another problem which Granite must 
solve. While it had been allowed to export products since the 1970s, it had 
never had direct contact with its purchasers. Enterprises working under the 
Soviet Ministry of Defence had to go through certain channels in order to trade 
abroad. Within the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations there was a I
3
military departm ent known as the Central Technical Adm inistration (CTA). 
This branch would place special orders with the enterprise on behalf of a foreign 
company. Once the equipment was finished it would be sent to the Ministry 
which would then send the product on to the buyer. If the equipm ent was 
purchased by an East European country then the account would be settled in 
transferable roubles. If the country was outside the bounds of the CMEA then 
the account would be settled in hard currency, usually in dollars. This former 
arrangem ent has posed two problems for enterprises like Granite. First, the 
nonconvertibility of the East European currencies has made it difficult to settle 
outstanding accounts. The second problem is that because there was never any 
direct contact between producer and consumer it has been very difficult either to 
maintain or to develop client relationships.
Several different methods have been devised to facilitate trade. The 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations has assumed the role of the 
CTA. The Ministry orders arms from the defence enterprises and then its 
specialised export body, Oboroneksport, attempts to find buyers. The production 
firm receives a percentage of the receipts in hard currency. The second method 
is to allow enterprises free access to the world market as is the case of the 
Kalashnikov factory in Tula.(21)
Granite has devised a third method. In conjunction with eleven other 
enterprises, it established a joint-stock company called Elektrontorg. The aim of 
this company is to assist the defence enterprises in their search for new 
customers. In return for a 2 percent commission for every contract signed 
Elektrontorg provides assistance in matching buyers and sellers. Once a deal has 
been made Elektrontorg takes care of both the customs clearance and taxes. In 
essence this new joint-stock company has taken on the duties of the CTA.(22)
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Alexander Davydenko seemed quite enthusiastic about what Elektrontorg 
could do for Granite. Questions have been raised, however, about similar joint- 
stock companies. During the course of 1991 several government directorates 
reorganised themselves into concerns, joint-stock companies or associations. 
Some managers view these so-called concerns as a 'sham ', while others, like 
Davydenko, are quite enthusiastic about them.(23) It remains unclear whether 
Elektrontorg had a previous history or if it is a completely new creation. On the 
basis of Davydenko's comments it would appear that it did not have any prior 
connections with the directorates.(24)
In the newly emerging economic system the aim of enterprises is to 
receive payment in hard currency. Granite has accounts with Promstoriya Bank, 
a Russian investment bank. Granite's marketing department favours this bank 
because of its excellent contacts with foreign banks. According to Davydenko it 
takes perhaps two to three days for payments to clear. The other benefit is that 
Promstoriya has nothing to do with Vneshekonombank. When the latter bank 
collapsed in 1991 many enterprises lost both their rouble and hard currency 
assets. Granite managed to avoid this fate and is now slightly better able to 
compete in the new market conditions.
Currency payments of whatever kind are still hard to come by and that is 
why Granite has taken steps in addition to joining Elektrontorg, to improve its 
standing. One way is by renting out its resources. One piece of property owned 
by Granite is designed specifically for training purposes. This building contains 
an auditorium, two large reception halls, classrooms, and computer facilities 
(the computers are manufactured by Granite). The auditorium and one of the 
halls are rented out to local businesses and community groups for various
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functions. In 1992 Granite was trying to promote itself as a conference facility. 
The second hall, which has a bar and catering facilities (basically the former staff 
lunchroom), is now used for wedding receptions. The classrooms and computer 
facilities are available for use by staff and their children. The corridors are 
frequently filled w ith youngsters on their way from one computer course to 
another. While Granite may not be making a great deal of money from these 
ventures, it is making some small profit. In preventing its facilities from 
suffering disuse it is also maintaining its links with the community
The dream for many defence enterprises is either to find a foreign partner 
or receive external financial assistance. Granite has foreign customers (most 
notably in former Czechoslovakia) but no firm has yet come forward to form a
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Granite is involved in another venture which is more promotional than 
preventive. On January 25, 1992 a computerised exchange was established in 
Russia. What makes this exchange different from others is that the KGB is 
involved: the new system operates on the old KGB communications links. 
There are eight communication centres in Russia, three of which are known to 
be located in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Rostov-on-Don. Enterprises which 
decide to list themselves on the exchange promote at least two products at an
established price. For example, as of January 1992 Granite began marketing its 
walkie-talkies at 100 roubles a set. A buyer in Moscow noting the price listed on 
his computer screen would commence trading on the basis of that price either 
raising or lowering the bid as he saw fit. The marketing personnel at Granite 
feel that by using the KGB communications links they will be able to reach a 
wider audience for their walkie-talkies and ultrasound equipment.
FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN CONVERSION
joint venture. Various governments, in the past, have offered both financial 
and technical assistance to the Russians at large so that they might be able to 
convert their defence industries.(25) The aims behind these offers were
1. to reduce the military potential of the USSR;
2. to provide a basis of stability by providing a benign 
occupation for civilians and military procurement staff 
and workforce;
3. to create a means of satisfying the civilian needs for 
goods and systems.(26)
The initial aim of its study was to select five enterprises which would be
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In 1990 an A m erican delegation  com posed of C ongressional 
representatives and businessmen visited the Soviet Union in order to assess the 
situation and determine what type of assistance they could provide during the 
conversion process. Their offers were rejected.(27) In 1991 Japan presented the 
Soviet government with an aid package totalling $2.5 billion, which included 
trade credits and technical assistance for defence conversion.(28) In the latter half 
of 1991 the US government again extended an offer of assistance, and on this 
occasion the offer was accepted.(29)
Technical and monetary assistance is not simply doled out. Of necessity 
there is a selection process involved. The British government has established an 
investigative body to determ ine the m ost likely recipients for aid. 
Representatives from the MoD, Royal Ordnance, Imperial College in London 
and management consultants at Coopers & Lybrand have come together in order 
to select likely candidates able to undergo conversion and develop along Western 
lines. This British body is seeking monetary assistance from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the European Union (EU) to enable it to have a 
greater effect on the development of the enterprises in Russia. At the time of 
writing, however, the results of its applications are not available.(30)
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w orthy of aid and then "develop them along Western lines of management, 
producing goods approaching world standards and then using them as models 
for others in the [former] USSR to follow".(31) In selecting these enterprises one 
im portant condition has been established: "that the top management of the 
factories to be studied should be convinced of the need to change and to 
collaborate with the [team] in order to learn how to compete in a world market 
economy".(32) Of course the unwritten condition is that the enterprises possess a 
strong enough and stable enough productive base in order to undergo the 
rigours of the transformation to a 'western-style' enterprise.
In the report released by the investigative body (hereafter referred to as the 
Kennaway Report, after the chief consultant from Im perial College) two 
additional reasons why the defence enterprises should be targeted for aid were 
provided. Like the Soviet planners the authors of the Kennaway Report saw the 
defence enterprises as a means for generating foreign currency. They also agreed 
that the military factories were the "least ineffective of all the Soviet design, 
developm ent and producing organisations".(33) Soviet enterprise managers 
viewed foreign involvement as a means by which they could acquire Western 
technology, equipment, training, foreign currency and access to international 
markets.(34) In another study of Soviet enterprises under the transformation of 
the economic system (the Boeva Report) it became apparent that the enterprise 
m anagers had come to realise that they need some guidance if they were to 
compete on world markets. They were aware of the disarray caused on Western 
markets in 1990 when Soviet metal producers undercut Western prices.(35) They 
were conscious of the fact that if they adopt unscrupulous tactics they would hurt 
their own chances of long-term stable development. Although they desired aid, 
some enterprise managers were wary of their trust being abused. In the Boeva 
Report one enterprise manager voiced the opinion that Western parties in joint
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ventures were "as interested in the potential of Soviet producers as in teaching 
them the rules of the international trading game."(36)
This certainly poses a problem for long-term stable growth, but so too does 
the current state of the defence enterprises of the former Soviet Union. The 
Kennaway Report made clear that even in 1991 not all the defence enterprises 
were in as good a condition as originally presumed. Certainly, many of these 
factories were better off than their civilian counterparts but that does not mean 
that they m atched w estern technological standards. One exam ple is 
E lektropribor-Pushkino. Like so m any of the converting en terprises 
Elektropribor is part of the electronics industry. This firm mainly produces 
fractional horsepower (FHP), alternating current electric motors. Unlike other 
firms studied in the Kennaway Report it has not adapted well to the 
environment of conversion. There are several marks against it. Its premises are 
disorganised and unsanitary. Its productive capabilities are badly dated and its 
flow of raw material supplies is sporadic. The initiative for change is almost 
non-existent.(37) The head of the enterprise, Makarov, has an "old Bolshevik 
attitude" and believes that the West has nothing to teach him.(38) The attitude 
of the General Manager may be the most significant strike against its possible 
conversion. %
I
Elektropribor-Pushkino is certainly not the only example of a defence 
enterprise in disarray. Some of the adverse conditions could easily be rectified 
w ith  foreign assistance. The Kennaway Report has already m ade 
recommendations for the redesign of plant facilities and the modernisation of 
productive capabilities. However, foreign assistance may not be forthcoming 
unless the attitudes of the management are changed. The greatest advances in 
the conversion process have been made by those firms which are managed by
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people with youthful attitudes and a willingness to demonstrate a certain level 
of initiative. The marketing department of Granit is a prime example of this 
theory. The department is headed by two men, both in their early to mid-thirties, 
with engineering backgrounds and training in Western-style economics. Both 
men seem eager to learn and willing to take risks. The collapse of central 
authority in what was the Soviet Union has resulted in a very interesting 
economic situation. In a sense the slate has been wiped clean and for the 
moment there are no longer any hard and fast rules. Survival in these economic 
conditions depends on continuously correct assessments of the ever-changing 
economic situation and the ability to manage risk safely.
Managers who attempt to cling on to the old methods of operation, like 
Makarov, may be swiftly thrown aside. The members of the former Communist 
Party have, since February 1992, participated in demonstrations against the 
government, yet until recently the general mood of the populace has been to 
renounce any former allegiance to the Communist Party.(39) During a visit to 
the country in January and February 1992, it appeared that it was not considered 
fashionable to espouse Com munist ideology or to tout the old ways of 
conducting business. With the worsening of the economic situation, however, 
public support for the "old days" has increased. While the western press has 
concentrated on the crisis in government and public dissatisfaction, economic 
reform at the grass-roots level has proceeded. Men like Makarov, unable to keep 
abreast of changing economic conditions, may have already lost their jobs or
;alternatively their factories. Furthermore, more "wily" managers have learned 
to adapt to the new conditions and despite privatisation have remained in their 
posts as directors of the defence firms. It remains to be seen how fully they 
support conversion.
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Independent foreign firms have made their own attempts to establish - 
partnerships with former Soviet enterprises and thereby force their way into the
CIS/Russian domestic market. Progress tends to be slow but the results can be 
highly beneficial for all concerned. The foreign firm can reduce the cost of 
production through the use of cheap but well-qualified labour while the Russian
firm is able to obtain Western technology and hard currency. 'I
Kelvin Hughes Limited, for instance, formed a joint venture with 
Gorizont, a former defence enterprise located in Rostov-on-Don in 1991. 
Gorizont was formed just over 40 years ago under the auspices of the Soviet 
Ministry of Shipbuiliding. Its list of products includes m erchant marine 
navigation radars for deep sea operating vessels and coastal and river fleet 
vessels. In the past it also supplied the military with navigational radars and 
land-based radar systems. Prior to the initiation of conversion Gorizont 
employed 9,000 people. By January 1992 the workforce had been scaled down to 
approximately 7,000. This reduction was due to a loss of defence contracts and 
the removal of the Party organisation from within the company.(40)
Kelvin Hughes, a British-based firm, conducted business with the Soviet 
Union for around fifteen years. During that time it built up numerous contacts ç 
within the relevant ministries and through various merchant marine and river 
fleet operators. In 1989 it decided to establish a joint venture and as a result of its 
contacts was put in touch with Gorizont. Kelvin Hughes and Gorizont have 
been joined in their venture by two other Russian firms. Kelvin Hughes and 
Gorizont each hold a 45% share in the venture while the other two firms each 
possess only a 5% stake. As stipulated by Soviet law foreign firms involved in a 
joint venture were unable to hold a controlling interest within that venture.(41)
The foreign firm is allowed to guide the venture by having one of its directors act
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as the chairman of the board of directors. These are the conditions under which 
Gorizont and Kelvin Hughes are operating.
After close to three years of negotiations production began in November 
1991. The current operational programme involves Kelvin Hughes sending 
knocked-down kits of parts from England to the venture's final assembly and test 
process in Rostov-on-Don. The piece of equipment being manufactured is the 
HR 3000A display, a radar system for deep sea vessels above a certain gross 
registered tonnage (g.r.t). Kelvin Hughes is hoping that the venture will 
eventually be able to manufacture certain parts as well as produce other types of 
navigational equipment. Its commercial director was unwilling to specify the 
nature of their commerical arrangements, i.e. how money earned from the 
venture is distributed between partners and how it is removed from Russia. He 
did imply, however that the collapse of the Vneshekonombank and the political 
and economic crises had affected operations.(42) As Davydenko of Granite 
explained, the declaration of bankruptcy by Vneshekonombank wiped out the 
savings of a large number of enterprises in both the defence and the civilian 
sectors.(43) The influx of capital from Kelvin Hughes may enable Gorizont to 
survive future crises.
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Enterprises unable to secure a foreign partner must find other ways in 
which to earn foreign currency. As outlined in Chapter Five there are three 
options open to defence enterprises: full conversion, diversification, and sell-off. 
Full conversion is seen as a long-term prospect, diversification as a short to 
m edium  term prospect and sell-off as an immediate prospect. The Soviet 
government intially believed that it could improve economic conditions by a 
massive sell-off of defence products. One of the earliest experiments in 
generating hard currency reserves was through the efforts of a cooperative with
Î
ANT was an inter-branch state cooperative concern. Its purpose was to 
acquire Western consumer goods and sell them on the Soviet domestic market. 
In order to accomplish this ANT was given permission to buy Soviet-made
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strong links to the defence sector. The cooperative was known as ANT. It was 
the government's first experiment in the field of sell-off and its first failure in 
the transition from an armed economy to a disarmed economy.
Every state with a military-industrial complex is to some extent involved 
in the export of m ilitary hardw are. The Soviet Union was certainly no 
exception. In 1988, for example, the USSR sold 12.8 billion dollars' worth of 
defence equipment. That sum was equivalent to over one-third of the world's 
volume.(44) The export of Soviet-made weapons was conducted on two levels. 
First the USSR provided credits for its "socialist partners" in order that these 
nations might purchase Soviet-made weapons. Frequently the repaym ent of 
credits was overlooked. Secondly, the government sold weapons in order to 
increase their hard currency reserves. In 1989 it was already becoming apparent 
that these reserves were dwindling.
As discussed in the previous chapter, conversion was promoted as a way 
to increase the governm ent's hard currency reserves. Despite the emphasis 
placed on conversion it was fairly evident that the transform ation of the 
enterprises would not occur rapidly enough to meet the immediate demands of 
the consumers and stem the outward flow of hard currency. Early in 1989 the 
CPSU launched an attempt to create stable financial sources for both the rouble 
and foreign currency. (45) In line with this directive Nikolai Ryzhkov, then 
Prime Minister, signed secret decree number 924 for the Council of Ministers of 
the USSR on May 30 1989.(46) ANT was born.
goods and either trade them for the desired Western item or sell them for cash. 
In principle this was a good plan. In practice it turned out to be something quite 
different.
The only products available in the USSR at the time capable of being 
exchanged for consumer durables or of fetching a reasonable price were those in 
the defence sector. W hat was involved was not defence-m anufactured 
refrigerators or televisions, which have a tendency to self-destruct, but military 
technology. As has been stated the sale of such technology was not opposed by 
the Soviet authorities so long as it was done through normal channels. For 
example, the export of aviation equipment was handled by Aviaexport, while the 
Central Technical Administration, a unit of the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations, dealt with other aspects of the defence trade. ANT operated outside of 
these agencies and relied instead on the manipulation of political contacts.
Vladimir Ryashentsev was the general director of ANT. However, in the 
ensuing scandal V.K.Dovgan, the head of Vzlet NPO, a design bureau with which 
ANT was associated, played the leading role. ANT had close links with the 
defence ministries. These links would have been deemed acceptable if the 
ensuing trade had been legal. However, in later investigations by a government- 
appointed committee the network of defence ministries supporting ANT was 
viewed as suspicious and considered a type of state-run mafia.(47)
Vzlet NPO was a unit of the Ministry of the Radio Industries. Dovgan, 
because of his background, managed to convince the Ministry of A viation 
Industry to allow ANT to represent it in special sales of aircraft abroad, thereby 
bypassing Aviaexport.(48) It would appear that initially the sale and or barter of 
aircraft and the relevant technology was legitimate. Through the contacts made
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during the course of this trade ANT negotiated the sale of the latest model T-72 
tank. This tank was of particular interest to Western intelligence because it was 
believed to incorporate a special glass-reinforced plastic arm our.(49) Once a 
possible buyer was located Dovgan negotiated the "purchase" of twelve of these 
tanks with the plant director, VS. Seryakov, at the Uralvagonzavod tank plant in 
N izhnii Tagil. The tanks were placed on a train and shipped to the port of 
Novorossiisk on the Black Sea. They were listed on the manifest as "non­
dismantled cargo for resmelting". In their "non-dismantled" state they were 
fitted with machine guns, optical sights and vehicle stowage.(50)
The tanks failed to arrive at their final destination, presumed to be France,
for at this point both the KGB and the press stepped in . The suspicions of the 
two institutions were aroused by the movement of a tank echelon from the 
Urals to the Black Sea during peace time.(51) The story was made public on 
January 14 1990. A Moscow television station announced its intention to 
produce a programme about the incident. Gorbachev responded by establishing a 
special investigative committee. As a result of the investigation Dovgan and 
Ryashentsev were dismissed from their posts while ministers of various defence
■ „
ministries were severely reprim anded for being lax in their duties and not 
paying proper attention to export controls.
The ANT scandal is unfortunately not an unusual case. At the time it was 
seen as quite distressing. People were surprised that such an event could happen 
and by the extent of elite involvement.(52) To a certain extent the ANT scandal 
succeeded in tarnishing the image of conversion. It was no longer a panacea for 
the economy's ills but rather a method by which politicians and enterprise 
managers lined their pockets. The incident has been displaced in the collective 
memory by more recent corruption scandals within the military establishment.
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yet it continues to act as an important reminder of the types of precautions which 
should be in place when dealing in arms,
ANT remains in existence despite the fact that the scope of its operations 
has been curtailed. The Soviet government was forced to w ait for the 
enterprises to convert and market their goods abroad and to rely only on the 
previous method of sales: the marketing of the MiG-29 at the Paris Air Show. 
The Russian government, as discussed in Chapter 5, has proceeded with the sell- 
off of various weapons, despite loud opposition. It has stated that the export of 
"strategic raw and other materials and equipment" should be accompanied by the 
appropriate licenses.(53) A system of export controls was also established by 
Presidential Decree (11/04/92) and state regulation (12/05/92). The decree created 
an export control commission which consists of representatives from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Defence, 
the Ministry of Science, the Higher School of Technological Policy, the Ministry 
of Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the State Customs
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Committee, the Ministry of Security, the Committee for the Protection of 
Economic Interests of the Russian Federation, the State Com mittee for 
Supervision over Nuclear and Radiation Safety and the Russian Academy of 
Sciences.(54) The Regulation went on to enumerate the various duties of the 
individual bodies which make up the Commission.(55) The government was 
obviously attempting to protect itself from future accusations of impropriety. Yet 
the imposition of new controls did not mean that the governm ent w ould 
withdraw  from the international arms bazaar, instead it actively pursued new 
contracts. A report in the Financial Times on February 16 1993 stated that Mr. 
Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian Foreign Minister, had proposed an "arms sales for 
arms conversion plan".(56) He specifically requested free and open competition
between Russian and Western firms in the international arms market. The
?i
Foreign Minister classified this plan as another form of economic assistance.(57) 
It appears to matter very little whether or not the governments of the West agree 
to this plan of action for the Russians intend to promote arms sales vigorously. 
In November 1992, Petr Aven, then Russian Minister of Foreign Economic 
Relations, told the Congress of People's Deputies that the government intended 
to increase weapon sales to China, India, Iran and possibly Taiwan and 
Malaysia.(58) While rumours of a deal with China circulated, the government 
was busy agreeing to the sale of 3 kilo-class submarines to Iran, 30 MiG-29 fighters 
to Malaysia and 20 more to India.(59) Although sizeable amounts of money 
were made in these deals, $1.35 billion in the case of the submarines, it remains 
doubtful whether the policy will be successful in meeting all the demands placed 
upon it.
CONCLUSION
The transition from an armed economy to a disarmed economy is fraught 
with difficulties. As has been established, the main aim of the state is to provide 
stability and direction. Failure to achieve these aims is the result of a lack of 
coherent and non-conflicting directives. As a result, relatively well-organised 
and efficient enterprises have fallen into disarray. Enterprises which were poorly 
managed and operating at a loss under the old system have a dim future under 
the new economic conditions.
Despite these conditions conversion can still be successful. The drawback 
is that the benefits of conversion will not be felt within the timeframe and on 
the scale first imagined by the Soviet and Russian governments. Experience to 
date suggests that if conversion is to be successful, certain conditions look as if 
they will have to be met. Suggestions made in the Kennaway Report should be
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added to those enumerated in the "ideal programme". First, the managers of the 
defence enterprises should be convinced of the need to change. Obiviously there 
are different levels of conviction and they have been represented by the various 
cases examined within this chapter. Granite can be viewed as an atypical-positive 
example. The conditions that it has faced are the same as for any other medium- 
scale enterprise but their approach has been m arkedly different. The 
management of Granite are convinced of the urgent need for reform and have 
been working diligently to transform their productive output in order to meet 
the dem ands of both the domestic and foreign markets. Its m arketing 
department has also been enthusiastically facing up to new economic challenges. 
Most of the literature on conversion has suggested that retooling and retraining 
are the greatest barriers to successful conversion. Granite seems to have found a 
way around that hurdle by sticking to the technology it knows best and limiting 
the amount of retooling. Its very size may prove to be an advantage because it is 
not as concerned with the high costs of maintaining excess capacity. The future 
for Granite looks relatively positive.
Gorizont would appear to be a standard example. Although willing to 
collaborate with Kelvin Hughes in order to learn how to compete in a world 
market economy, business has proved particularly difficult for the joint venture 
as a result of both political and economic unrest.(60) But just as Kelvin Hughes 
m ay teach Gorizont how to operate in a world market, Gorizont may show 
Kelvin Hughes how to operate in the Russian domestic market.
ANT is a typical-corrupt example. While the management of ANT and 
Vzlet NPO demonstrated initiative it resulted in a negative impact. The collapse 
of the old economic system and the slow emergence of its replacement have 
created a very special situation in the Republics of the former Soviet Union. The
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laws defining the economic structure at times appear confusing. Do the old 
Soviet laws apply or do the new Russian ones? Have any laws been drafted at all 
which deal with a particular situation? There is everything to play for and 
everything to lose. If ANT and Vzlet NPO had been operating in the present 
conditions perhaps their business methods would not have been viewed as 
criminal: renegade perhpas, but not criminal. However, in 1989 there were still 
strict laws governing export trade, and these laws were breached.
So, initiative must be present within the top management but it m ust be 
channeled in the proper direction. The good of the enterprise, which will lead to 
an im provem ent in the overall economy, must come before an increase in 
personal wealth.
The second condition to be met if conversion is to be successful involves 
foreign investment. Professor Steven Rosefielde has written that because of the 
irrationalities of the Soviet economic system  W estern aid w ould be 
squandered.(61) If Western nations were providing only m onetary aid they 
would undoubtedly be pouring money into a bottomless pit. However, financial 
aid coupled with technical assistance could be highly beneficial to all concerned. 
As discussed in Chapter Five, the G7 states have attem pted to devise such 
packages of assistance with limited success. Action should continue to be taken 
by governments to stabilise the economy of the CIS, but the greatest stability will 
come from efforts of individual enterprises.
The role of governments should be to establish guidelines for the safe 
operation of business. The Soviet government under Gorbachev did a disservice 
to converting or diversifying enterprises by not providing them w ith any 
guidelines. Davydenko feels that the government failed to provide any
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assistance whatsoever during Granite's attempts to convert. In his opinion the 
enterprise was left completely to its own devices.(62) Another enterprise 
m anager described the effects of conversion in this way: "It was as if the 
enterprise had been tripped while running at full speed."(63)
The Russian government m ust work quickly to change this situation. 
First, it should to work towards the stabilisation of economic relations between 
Republics. With the current state of the economy the ownership of a naval fleet 
should be secondary to who owns the bakery and whether they are willing to sell 
the bread. Second, Yeltsin should try to avoid the mistakes made by Gorbachev. 
He needs to encourage his government to produce a conversion programme that 
provides the defence enterprises with guidelines and links them to the overall 
reform programme.
I'
Meanwhile Western governments and international organisations should 
assist those firms which are interested in doing business with the enterprises of 
the CIS. One suggestion would be to eliminate or reduce the list of products 
deemed unacceptable by the United States for sale within the CIS. Another 
alternative would be for governments to offer firms willing to invest and 
operate in the CIS some form of financial aid or export credit guarantees. At 
present the International Financial Corporation, a unit of the IMF, and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development are willing to underwrite 
deals w ith the CIS. However, many businessm en are unaw are of this 
support. (64)
There is a very real risk that conversion will continue to be mismanaged.
If conversion is to succeed then governments and enterprises should attempt to 
coordinate their efforts. It is the initiative, the adaptability, the enthusiasm and
*
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the hope of the management teams which will drive the enterprises forward.
These characteristics should be capitalised on by the government. The best way 
to do this is by providing stable conditions in which all enteprises can operate.
Gorbachev was correct in saying that conversion is an international 
issue,(65) The panic which has arisen over the control of the former Soviet 
U nion's weapons stockpile merely confirms that belief. The international 
community should not promise that all goods m anufactured by converted 
enterprises be traded on world markets, as suggested by some Soviet and Russian 
economists. Natural product selection should still occur. The international 
community can help to ease the transition of the Soviet armed economy. By 
doing so the community would not only provide "a basis of stability" for the 
former Soviet Union, it would also ensure a more stable and prosperous 
environment for itself,
I
:
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îCHAPTER SEVEN C O N C LU SIO N
The Soviet conversion programme was a failure; at least this is the 
opinion of several writers on the subject.(1) Various reasons for this outcome 
have been cited, the most frequent of which is that the Gorbachev government 
failed to plan for disarmament and conversion. Although the governm ent 
recognised the negative effect of the arms race on the economy it failed to 
consider the potentially negative repercussions of a poorly orchestrated 
conversion programme. In a country in which detailed plans still governed 
economic development, a programme for conversion was not issued until the 
transform ation of the defence sector was supposed to be well under way. 
Although conversion was heralded as the panacea for the nation's economic ills 
it was left to chance.
Professor Laure Desprès has argued that the absence of a conversion
programme contributed to the destruction of the planned system.(2) Enterprises
-
like Granite which had lost their state orders were forced to fend for themselves.
They did so by creating links with other enterprises in similar situations. By the 
time the conversion programme was at last adopted in the winter of 1990, the 
planned system itself had virtually ceased to function.(3) In its place a new 
system had emerged. Alexei Makushkin has described this system as one in 
which oboronka (defence) enterprises established and strengthened horizontal 
structures between enterprises and organised relations with the authorities at all 
levels.(4) At the height of the Soviet period an enterprise would turn  to the 
state for capital or financial aid; now in the transitional period it looks to other 
enterprises, ones which formerly operated under the auspices of the same 
defence ministry, for that assistance.(5) The main aim of these structures is to
preserve the technological potential through the rapid development of highly 
profitable production facilities that take market conditions into account. (6)
Rather than being viewed as a failure these attempts at structuring the 
rudiments of a specialised market could be viewed as a clear success. In Chapter 
Five a definition of conversion was offered: a process involving change in 
productive output. lurii Khromov would view that definition as a narrow or 
traditional one, for it interprets conversion as a "structural organisation that 
affects military production alone."(7) He argues instead that if conversion is 
viewed in a broader sense it "coincides with the transformation of the entire 
economic system and is a transition from a state, highly militarised economy to a 
"mixed" market economy with complementary private and social forms of 
enterprise".(8) While the Soviet conversion programme did not succeed in 
meeting all the demands of the civilian economy it did begin the process of 
orienting the defence sector around market procedures.
Shulunov's classifications coincide roughly with the ones offered in Chapter 
Six: typical-corrupt and atypical-positive. In the preceding chapter, enterprises 
like Gorizont which were willing to collaborate with Western firms, but were 
finding competition w ithin the m arket place difficult were described as
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As in other sectors of the economy and society as a whole, the Russian 
defence sector remains in a transitional period. In 1993, A. Shulunov, the 
Chairman of the League to Assist Defence Enterprises, described MIC managers 
in these terms:
some involved themselves in trade, possibly in an I
illegal way, some passively waited for instructions
from above, certain others, the most experienced,
bright and enthusiastic were trying to protect their y
workers' collective and get out of a difficult situation
at a minimum loss.(9)
Istandard. Shulunov and others might prefer to place that monicker on those 
enterprises which continue to wait passively for instructions from above. It is 
this group which has been accused of giving continued credence to the existence 
of a military-industrial complex within Russia. Evgenii Kuznetsov has studied 
converting and diversifying enterprises in great detail and while he would agree 
that there are those MIC managers who are guilty of attempting to obstruct the 
implementation of government conversion policy they are not w ithout their 
reasons.(10) He claims that the military-industrial complex can be viewed as a 
pyramid. Only the top of this structure, which employs about 20% of the labour 
force, is strictly military-specific and cannot be converted to civilian use.(ll) The 
remaining 80% of this pyramid consists of plants which manufacture dual-use 
technology, which does not require conversion, or else which is so inefficient 
that it would be cheaper and less time consuming to scrap it altogether. (12)
I
Yet to do this is a frightening prospect because of the very nature of the 
former Soviet defence sector, with the self-sufficiency of enterprises and the 
number of "closed" defence cities. Kuznetsov claims that by the end of 1991 
three types of segmentation could be identified:
1. territorial immobility of labour (one-company 
towns);
2. informational stratification (industrial structure 
divided between insiders);
3. imperfect substitution among similar intermediate 
products that were produced by defence-related 
ministries;
4. stratification of manufacturing processes employed 
in the defence sector with respect to their military 
specificity. (13)
In order to ease the transition of both enterprises and their employees, 
managers have petitioned for and received subsidies from the government. 
Approximately 55% of all credits and subsidies received in 1992 were used to 
maintain employment and wages.(14) The rise in inflation between 1992 and
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1994 meant that those subsidies, on average 40,000 roubles, covered less and less. 
The declining value of credits, the reduction of state orders from $3 billion in 
1992 to $2 billion in 1993, and government non-payment for orders which had 
already been completed m eant that enterprises could no longer wait for 
directions from above.(15) It soon became apparent that if enterprises were to 
survive at all they would have to follow the route of the atypical-positive plant, 
they would have to implement their own individual conversion programmes. 
According to estimates made by Kuznetsov, the share of enterprises following a 
fragile real adjustment strategy increased from 25% in 1992 to 50% in 1994.(16) 
The atypical-positive example may soon be known as standard-positive.
There is some concern, however, over the wisdom of allowing individual 
plants to implement their own conversion programmes without consideration 
of the larger picture. It is true that if conversion, in its broader sense as defined 
by Khromov, is to be successful then government will undoubtedly have to 
release its control of a significant share of the sector while at the same time 
rem aining involved in the establishment of "safety nets" in the form of 
unemployment wage funds, retraining and relocation programmes. To date, 
the government and some economists have operated on the premise that in 
order to create this distance between governm ent and defence sector 
privatisation should be strongly promoted. For instance, Mikhail Malei, 
President Yeltsin's advisor on conversion, has advocated that the market should 
operate conversion and that the defence sector should be privatised.(17) As 
indicated in Chapter Five, this has already occurred to a certain extent. Yet, 
because of reasons of security and the efforts of the military-industrial complex, 
only those sections of the enterprise which have been converted have been 
privatised. Thus, since there are insufficient funds for conversion, for the 
reasons stated above, privatisation of the defence sector has proceeded slowly.
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Oleg Gapanovich, the chairman of the St. Petersburg City Soviet's Commission 
on Military Industry and Defence Conversion, expressed his concern in 1993, 
that "privatisation had become more a political campaign and less an economic 
reform."(18) If this is true, than like any political decision it can be revoked. 
Indeed, Vladimir Polevanov, the former Minister of Privatisation, pledged to 
renationalise privatised companies.(19)
It was argued in Chapters Five and Six that part of the reason for the 
limited success of conversion was the government's failure to link conversion 
adequately with other economic reforms. If conversion is to prove successful in 
the long-term than this is a problem which must be rectified. Economists like 
Faramazian and Borisov may be correct to argue that "under the conditions of 
the transition to a market economy, converted enterprises should be totally 
privatised and organisationally separated from the defence complex," but the 
process should not end there. (20) The phrasing of their statement would leave 
one to believe that while the majority of the sector might sever its ties to the 
defence economy there would remain a core of enterprises within the military- 
industrial complex. Thus Russia would be left with a "mixed market economy 
with complementary private and social forms of enterprise."(21) In such an 
economy there is need for a national industrial policy.
Calls for the creation of such a policy have increased. Shulunov has 
declared that while there was "no well planned, logical and adequately financed 
conversion policy", it was not too late to devise a long-term industrial 
policy. (22) The creation of an appropriate programme could serve to link the 
defence sector and the economy as a whole. Thus we return to the concept of an 
ideal conversion programme. The conclusion was reached in Chapter Two that 
the primary function of the state is to provide both stability and vision. It was
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It could be assumed that as the conservatives gain the upperhand over 
reform -m inded politicians in the Yeltsin governm ent the prospects for 
conversion in Russia will diminish. This may not be the case, however.
f
recommended that the way to accomplish this, initially, is to plan carefully for 
conversion. A programme should have a recognisable beginning and end, lest a 
new dependency on the state be created. It was also suggested that an industrial 
policy which incorporates an economic bill of rights might be necessary. That 
particular conclusion addressed the issue of enterprise conversion but it still has 
relevance for the larger m ilitary-industrial complex, one which includes 
military personnel. Programmes for retraining and relocation of m ilitary 
personnel are equally important, both in social and political terms. If the needs 
of the military are addressed adequately the role of military in society may 
prove less of a political determinant than at present. Thus, an industrial policy 
would serve to promote economic and political stability.
|L
■As part of the ideal program m e policies of centralisation and 
decentralisation were also recommended. These policies would need to coexist 
in the sense that while the state would create the basic fram ework for 
conversion it would be up to the enterprises to implement that policy in the 
best way possible. In the case of the Soviet Union and its successor, Russia, a 
mixed message has been sent to the defence sector. The government has tended 
to advocate a policy of decentralisation through the promotion of programmes 
like privatisation. It has also been seen to shift the responsibility of conversion 
squarely onto the enterprises by its failure to develop a viable national 
conversion programme. Yet, there has also been a tendency to support marginal 
defence enterprises through the offer of subsidies and grants, thus prolonging 
the inevitable transformation of the defence sector.
1!
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While there are those in the West who might decry the continuance of a
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Enough damage has been done to the technological and financial infrastructure 
of the defence sector through the erosion of state orders and the loss of 
international clients to make some form of change necessary. Simply 
renationalising those defence plants which have been privatised  and 
continuing to maintain a military-industrial complex which employs twenty- 
five percent of the Russian labour force will not guarantee the prosperity of the 
sector.(23) Downsizing appears to be the policy of the future for defence 
industries throughout the Western w orld.(24) An increasing num ber of 
Russian MIC managers have reached that conclusion for themselves and thus 
are now willing to proceed with the restructuring of the defence sector.(25) In 
the course of restructuring the attitudes of MIC managers will play a key role. 
Kuznetsov has put forward the hypothesis that successful conversion rests 
upon two critical characteristics of managerial history: diversity of technological 
and organisational challenges experienced and R&D intensity  of the output 
produced (i.e. managers of high-tech enterprises are quicker to adjust).(26) His 
hypothesis is supported by the evidence in the Kennaway report and by the 
conclusions drawn in the preceding chapter. It is those enterprise managers 
who are most forward-looking who will shape the military-industrial complex
of the future.
Faramazian and Borisov predict that that complex will be much smaller 
and compact. While there will continue to be state involvement in the sector, 
in the way that the United States government is involved in the defence sector, 
the new complex should function on the basis of the new (market) 
principles.(27) Their suggestions mirror those of Seymour Melman when he 
called for a policy of state market capitalism.
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military-industrial sector subject to continued government involvement in the 
form of state market capitalism in a politically unstable Russia, it should be 
recognised that the Russian government, no matter its political hue, is unlikely 
to forgo state security. As Faramazian and Borisov have suggested, the 
maintenance of a military-industrial complex, albeit in a smaller form, should 
not be regarded as an attempt to preserve or restore militarism. (28) The aim of 
the Russian government, the aim of any government, is to maintain a national 
economy that ensures not only prosperity, but national security as well. The 
best way to do that is to provide the conditions in which stability will prevail.
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RUSSIA 344700 Roslov-^jn-Don 
Phone & Fax : ( 8632 ) 52-62-46 
( 8632 ) 54-09-90
" GRANITE " ELECTRONIC C O M P A N Y
Dear sirs,
'We hereby like to introduce ourselves as the " GRANITE " Electronic Company in the field 
of microwave electronics.
Our Company is much interested to promote mutial Business in the US and European 
electronic market.
Our range of products includes the following :
1. Microwave vacuum tubes ( klystrons, magnetrons, 
travelling wave tubes, discharges ).
2. Microwave ferrite isolators and circulators
( microstrip, coaxial, waveguide typ es).
3. Microwave passive devices (directional couplers, 
power deviders, filters).
4. Microwave devices with semiconductor elements 
; ( amplifiers,mixers, modulators).
:■ "GRANITE" has own Design and Research O ffice. "GRANITE" guarantees high quality , 
military electronic standards and manufacturing according to the requirements of our 
partners.
'We have good business links with many leading electronic firms and science centers in our 
country. We believe there are three main areas of possible cooperation which are worthwhile
to investigate :
1. Utilization of production capabilities of "GRANITE” 
for foreign partner’s products .
2. Utilization of foreign partner’s existing marketing structure for 
representation of"G ^N ITE"-m ade electronic components.
3. Foundation of joint information center to collect and distribute information in 
the field of electronics.
We are open for suggestions from your side on any other mutial business relationships that are 
in the area of our expertise and which can be beneficial for both parties.
Ifegards
Deputy Marketing Director A. Davydenko
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MHy-79, MHy-79-1
AMnJIHTPOHLI OTIJiHMETPOBOrO 
A H A n A 3 0 H A
ripeacTaBJiJiioT COÔOH ycHJiHTCJTH AeuHMCTpoBoro HHanaaoHa co cKpemeHHSiMH 
nOJTJIMH.
npHMCHaioTCH B BbixoHHbrx KBCKaflax nepeflaTMHKOB HaaeMHbLX PJIC. 
K oH crpyK U H H  -  naK eT H p o B aH H an  h j ih  no /iynaK C T H poB aH H a^i.
OxjiaxcaeHHe -  BoanyuiHoe (MPiy-79) hjih boahhoc (MHy-79-1).
Bboh h BbiBon 3HeprHH -  KoaKCHajibHbie.
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MHy-79, MHy-79-1
L-BAND AMPLITRONS
They are L-band crossed-field amplifiers used in output stages of ground radar trans­
mitters.
Construction -  packaged or half-packaged.
C o o ling -a ir (MHy-79) or water (MHy-79-1).
Power input and output -  coaxial.
I
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
TYPE MHy-79 MHy-79-1
Frequency range, GHz 1,215-1,28 1,215-1,28
Pulsed output power. kW 40 100
Average output power, kW 0,57 2,5
Gain, dB 19 13
Pulse duration, mcs 25 25
Anode voltage, kV 10,5 18
Anode current. A 6,5 10
ELECTRONINTORG Ltd. 24/2, UL. USIEVICHA, 125315 MOSCOW, USSR
Telephone: 151-72-41,155-40-38
Telefax: 151-54-41, Telex: 411326
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ananaaoHa aJiHH BoaH (15 FFu) Ha KoaKcwaabHbix h BoaHOBoaHO-KoaKCHaabHbix 
coMaeHCHHflx aHHHH nepeaaHH.
FIpeaHaaHaMCH aaa oaHonanpaBaeHHoro pacnpeaeacHHa CBH-3HeprHH a paaaHM- 
Hbix paaHOTexHHMecKHx cHCTCMax Maaoro ypoana CBH -m oiuhocth.
H w e e r  o t  2 ao 6 abixoanbix Kanaaoa.
OxaaxcacHHe -  ecTecTBCHHoe.
CBH-BbiBoabi:
-  aaa 2-x KanaabHoro, Bxoa -  BoanoBoaHbiH
-  I Kanaji, axoa -  aoaHOBoaHbiH. ceneHHeM 23 x  10 mm.
-  I I ,  I II  Kanaa -  KoaKCHaabnaa aHHHH, 50 O m .
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FERRITE MICROWAVE POWER DIVIDER
It is ferrite non-reciprocal microwave power divider of 2-cm waves (15 GHz) on 
coaxial and waveguide-coaxial bondings of transmission line.
It is designed for one-direction microwave power distribution in different radio­
engineering systems of microwave power low level.
The divider has from 2 to 6 output channels.
Cooling -  without special cooling.
Microwave leads;
-  input-waveguide for 2-channel divider
-  1 channel -  input-waveguide with a cross-section 23 x 10 mm.
-  II, III channels -  coaxial line, 50 Om.
-  lY channel -  output-waveguide with a cross-section 23 x 5 mm.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
TYPE HJI-01
^Operating frequency band, % 9
Return damping and isolation between channels, dB, no less than 40
Insertion losses (without division), dB, no more than 1,1
Continious microwave power, W, no more than 0,5
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KJIHCTPOH OTPA*ATEJIbHbIM
K-187-cepMH MexaHHMecKH nepecTpaHBacMbix no MacTOTe oTpajKaxenbHbix KnvicT- 
poHOB, npeflHaaHaneHHbix Hcnonb30BaHHH b KasecTBe rexepomiHOB b paaniiM- 
HOM panMOTexHHMecKOH annaparype.
Oxjia>KaeHHe -  c^opcHpoBaHHoe. BoaayujHoe.
BfaiBOH 3HeprnH -  BO.iHOBoaHbiA. ceMCHHe.M:
K-187 A, B. B - 3 .4 x 7 ,2 mm.
K-187 r ,  H, E -5 .5 X  II mm .
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REFLEX KLYSTRON
The K-187 -  series of mechanically tuned reflex klystrons intended for use as a local 
oscillator in different electronic equipment.
Cooling-forced air.
Waveguide output with a cross-section;
K-187 A, B. B -3 .4 x 7 .2 m m .
K-187 r .  H, E -  5.5 X11 mm.
O
GÉNÉRAL CHARACTERISTICS
TYPE K-187
Frequency range (6 modes), GHz 16,6-39,8
Output power. mW 11
Filament voltage, V 6.3
Cathode current max. (at beam voltage 1500 V), mA 20
Filajnent current, at 6.3 V, A 1,0
Dimensions, mm 115x38,5x230
Weight, g 230
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PP-184
CUBOEHHW H PA3PHHHHK SAIUHTbl 
nPH E M H H K A
npeacTaBJiflCT coooA caBOCHHtiH BOJiHOBonHbiH paapaaHHK aatuHTfai npHCMHHKa 
npoxonHoro T H n a . npeaHasHaMeHHbiH gjisi aauiHTbi MajiouiVMamero c w e c H T e j iB  h j ih  yCHJIHTCJIH.
PaapHUHHK o 6 j i a a a e x  5 % - h o h  o o j io c o h  p a ô o H H x  nacroT h  h c  T p e o y e r  K aK O H -jiH ôo  
n o n cr p o H K H  b n p o u e c c e  a K cn jiy a x a u H H .
B H -B b iB o a b i -  BOJiH O BonH bie, c eM e n n eM  23 x 10 m m .
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<T>
O C HO BHtlE  XAPAKTEPHCTHKH
r a n PP-184
InanaaoH nacroT, IT  u 9,3-9,8
iMnvJibCHan MomnocTb, kB t 0,4-1,0
H.XHTejibHOCTb HMnyjibca, .m k c 0,15-1,0
Co3(|)(|)HUHeHT aanojTHeHHfl 0.001
noTepH nponycKaHHfl. aB 1,5
BpcMH BOccraHOBaeHHB. .mkc 3,0
VIoLUHOCTb aajKHraHHfl, mB t 1500
'aôapHTbi, MM 97x42,5x37
M acca, r 300
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PP-184
X-BAND DUAL TR-TUBE
It is a dual waveguide bandpass TR-tube for low-noise solid-state mixer or amplifier 
protection. It has a 5% operating bandwidth and does not require any tuning in servi­
ce.
Microwave leads -  waveguide with a cross-section of 23 x 10 mm.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
TYPE PP-184
Frequency range, GHz 9,3-9,8
Peak power, kW 0,4-1,0
Pulse duration, mcs 0,15-1,0
Duty cycle 0,001
Insertion loss, dB 1,5
Recovery time, mcs 3,0
Breakdown power, mW 1500
Dimensions, mm 97x42,5x37
Weight, g 300
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